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Since July, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, set up to try the assassins of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, has occupied all the political space in Beirut. That won't end soon, as the indictment process, once it begins, could take months, after which the tribunal will prepare for the trial - probably in autumn.
Until now, the prosecutor of the tribunal Daniel Bellemare has yet to present draft indictments to the pre-trial judge Daniel Fransen, who must confirm them in writing. Mr Bellemare is on vacation, and once he returns to The Hague, presumably he will need more time to finalise his case before sending draft indictments on. If, and here we are being optimistic, he does so by the middle of January, officials at the tribunal do not expect confirmations before March or April.
During this period, an important development is likely to take place. The bylaws of the tribunal allow Mr Fransen to accelerate the confirmation phase by transmitting legal queries he might have to the appeals chamber for discussion. The hearings are public, and even if none of the indicted will be named, observers will get a sense of the tenor of the case through the subjects debated. Lebanese actors, like states involved in Lebanon's affairs, will be watching carefully to stake out their political positions before formal indictments are released.
Throughout the latter part of this year, the special tribunal has become a crucial instrument in a wider power game for control of Lebanon. This has principally affected, and been shaped by, the intricate triangular relationship between Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The divided Lebanese, their allegiances offered to one or several of these states, have been turned into, or rather have turned themselves into, a political football, their destiny defined by outsiders.
During the past year, Saudi Arabia has sought to ease Syria's political return to Lebanon in the hope that this would contain Iran's growing influence in the country, and that of Hizbollah. Last summer, King Abdullah flew to Beirut with Syria's President Bashar Assad in a clear message along these lines to the Iranians. Hizbollah was visibly displeased, and soon thereafter the party appeared to play a key role in provoking a military confrontation between friendly units of the Lebanese army and Israeli soldiers along the southern border, as if to show that the party had the final say on Lebanon's stability.
Mr Assad was delighted to be brought into the mix by the Saudi king, as it allowed him to exploit Saudi-Iranian disagreements to Syria's advantage. The Syrian president will not break with Tehran or allow Hizbollah to be decisively weakened by the tribunal, but he wants to regain the paramount role that Syria had in Lebanon before 2005, when the Hariri killing forced its army out of the country. To do that, Mr Assad needs to take back political and security levers held by Iran, which, through Hizbollah, controls the ground in Lebanon.
In October, Iran organised its rejoinder to the Assad-Abdullah visit, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Lebanon. The symbolism of the trip left no doubt that Tehran regarded itself as the dominant actor on the Lebanese scene. This confidence was echoed by Iran's ambassador in Beirut the following month, in an interview with the daily Al Hayat. He was asked in a roundabout way whether Syria was not more entitled than Iran to have the greater say in Lebanon. The ambassador evaded the question, before pointing out that the relationship between Lebanon and Iran was an ancient one.
The tribunal is at the heart of this interplay of interests. Iran and Hizbollah want the Lebanese government to discredit the institution and terminate cooperation with it. Syria concurs, fearing the tribunal might undermine Hizbollah and perhaps point the finger at Syrian officials. But just as Mr Assad does not want to lose the Hizbollah card, he does not want Hizbollah to cripple Lebanon's prime minister, Saad Hariri, politically, since Damascus gains by playing the Lebanese parties off against one another. This has injected an unstable equilibrium in Beirut.
In late December, Syria and Saudi Arabia were still reportedly negotiating an accord to end the impasse over the tribunal, which has led to Hizbollah and its allies' refusal to attend Lebanese cabinet sessions unless ministers first agree to the transfer of the so-called "false witnesses" file to the Lebanese judiciary. Hizbollah has claimed that the special tribunal's evidence will be based on manipulated witness testimony, and has insisted that the matter be dealt with by Lebanon's Judicial Council. In fact, this is a red herring. There is no evidence that the tribunal will hear such testimony at all. Hizbollah's real objective is to create a parallel legal route inside Lebanon that would delegitimise the tribunal in The Hague.
Last week, an unidentified American official issued a warning in an Al Hayat interview that any Syrian-Saudi effort to impair Lebanese support for the tribunal would constitute "blackmail". This seemed directed primarily at Riyadh, which has considerable sway over Mr Hariri, who would be called upon to lead any assault on the tribunal approved by Syria and Saudi Arabia. The American statement could have a freezing effect on Syrian-Saudi discussions, whose results Iran must first endorse to become effective.
For now, Lebanon is caught up in a stalemate, despite claims that a breakthrough on the "false witnesses" front may come in the new year. The conflicting aims of the parties make broad agreement difficult, after which the dynamics of the tribunal may take over. There are no guarantees that Mr Bellemare will win his case or even prepare persuasive indictments. However, the legal avenue may be less important today than the political manoeuvring attached to it, with the Lebanese subordinate decision-makers in their own narrative.
Thursday, December 30, 2010
A White House clueless on Syria
Barack Obama did it. With Congress in recess, the United States president confirmed the appointment of several ambassadors, including the ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, whose approval had been held up by the Senate. The decision is not only bound to anger Republicans, who now hold a majority in the House of Representatives, it also happens to be remarkably foolish.
Let’s go back to one of the leaked American diplomatic cables to bring home why. The cable, dated February 2009, was prepared by the US Embassy in Paris, and recounted a meeting with the French diplomatic troubleshooter, and former ambassador to Syria, Jean-Claude Cousseran, in which he discussed engaging Syria.
The meeting took place a year after Cousseran and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner sought to facilitate the election of a Lebanese president once Emile Lahoud’s term ended. The mediation effort failed because of Syrian intransigence, and Cousseran offered this advice to the Americans, according to Mark Pekala, the deputy chief of mission, who signed the cable: “[He] urged that Washington should ‘get something tangible’ from the Syrian regime. He cautioned that the Syrians were masters of avoiding any real concessions and were adept at showering visitors with wonderful atmospherics and delightful conversations before sending them away empty handed.”
This was very sound counsel, which Obama has basically ignored by dispatching Ford to Damascus for nothing tangible. The administration has yet to explain convincingly why it would willingly risk congressional ire in order to ram through an appointment that is bound to leave Washington empty-handed.
In the cable, Pekala went on to report that Cousseran also cautioned Washington against over-reaching: “If the U.S. were to aim for something too difficult, such as urging Syria to sever its ties to Hamas or Hizballah, than [sic] it would get nowhere,” the diplomat said.
No doubt the French envoy was correct. There is a structural difficulty hindering better American-Syrian relations: Washington wants to engage Syria so that it will give up on alliances that the Syrians will never willingly surrender, because doing so would so weaken Damascus politically that it would defeat the very purpose of engagement. Syrian President Bashar Assad always wanted Obama to yield, but refused to offer anything substantial in return. By sending Ford, the president fell magnificently into the Syrian leader’s trap.
Against congressional opposition, the administration offered a lukewarm defense of Ford’s appointment, with officials stating that it would allow Washington to get its message to Damascus more clearly. Nonsense. There are plenty of ways to transmit messages to Syria without legitimizing the fact that in the five years since the previous ambassador was withdrawn, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the Assad regime has not budged on issues the US considers important—whether Lebanon, inter-Palestinian affairs, Iraq, Syrian cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah, and negotiations with Israel.
But worse, if Cousseran is right, namely that the US must not overreach by asking Syria to cut its ties to Hezbollah and Hamas, that only begs the question: What is the Obama administration entitled to ask of Syria? No explicit answer whatsoever has come out of the White House and State Department. And with uncertainty filling the thick Potomac air, what is Washington’s broader Syria strategy anyway? If Ford is a mailbox, what specific ideas will he be relaying?
There really are none. Obama has a wish list. He still hopes for a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and wants someone in Damascus to ease the process. But the president has done things in reverse. He should have sent Ford to Syria in exchange for a solid concession from Assad—perhaps Syrian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, which Damascus has refused to sanction; or maybe Syrian consent to the return of direct negotiations with Israel; or at least participation in a high-profile event that would help inject life into the Syrian-Israeli talks. The problem is that neither Syria nor Israel is keen to engage in bilateral moves, because the Syrian-Israeli track is moribund. Alive or dead, it made no sense for Obama to throw away a card he should have made Syria pay for.
It is not as if the US is unaware of Syrian intentions. Last week, an American official issued a pointed warning to Syria and Saudi Arabia that they should not reach any accord over Lebanon that might undermine the tribunal formed to indentify and punish Rafik Hariri’s killers. Syria has fought tooth and nail to obstruct the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which Washington supports, and recently intensified those efforts. And yet at the same moment, Obama sends Ford to Damascus, as if to say that whatever the Assad regime does, even taking measures that America opposes, it will be rewarded.
Obama would answer that he had a small window of opportunity in which to put Ford on a flight to Syria, before Congress reconvened, so he took his shot. A laudable rationale for an important decision: Let time pressures, and sneakiness, guide your foreign policy. Here’s a wager: Ford will cool his heels in Damascus without achieving much, because Assad got what he wanted, and is now in a position to stall Washington interminably. He won’t have to forfeit anything, because Obama has not a clue about what he really expects from Syria.
Let’s go back to one of the leaked American diplomatic cables to bring home why. The cable, dated February 2009, was prepared by the US Embassy in Paris, and recounted a meeting with the French diplomatic troubleshooter, and former ambassador to Syria, Jean-Claude Cousseran, in which he discussed engaging Syria.
The meeting took place a year after Cousseran and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner sought to facilitate the election of a Lebanese president once Emile Lahoud’s term ended. The mediation effort failed because of Syrian intransigence, and Cousseran offered this advice to the Americans, according to Mark Pekala, the deputy chief of mission, who signed the cable: “[He] urged that Washington should ‘get something tangible’ from the Syrian regime. He cautioned that the Syrians were masters of avoiding any real concessions and were adept at showering visitors with wonderful atmospherics and delightful conversations before sending them away empty handed.”
This was very sound counsel, which Obama has basically ignored by dispatching Ford to Damascus for nothing tangible. The administration has yet to explain convincingly why it would willingly risk congressional ire in order to ram through an appointment that is bound to leave Washington empty-handed.
In the cable, Pekala went on to report that Cousseran also cautioned Washington against over-reaching: “If the U.S. were to aim for something too difficult, such as urging Syria to sever its ties to Hamas or Hizballah, than [sic] it would get nowhere,” the diplomat said.
No doubt the French envoy was correct. There is a structural difficulty hindering better American-Syrian relations: Washington wants to engage Syria so that it will give up on alliances that the Syrians will never willingly surrender, because doing so would so weaken Damascus politically that it would defeat the very purpose of engagement. Syrian President Bashar Assad always wanted Obama to yield, but refused to offer anything substantial in return. By sending Ford, the president fell magnificently into the Syrian leader’s trap.
Against congressional opposition, the administration offered a lukewarm defense of Ford’s appointment, with officials stating that it would allow Washington to get its message to Damascus more clearly. Nonsense. There are plenty of ways to transmit messages to Syria without legitimizing the fact that in the five years since the previous ambassador was withdrawn, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the Assad regime has not budged on issues the US considers important—whether Lebanon, inter-Palestinian affairs, Iraq, Syrian cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah, and negotiations with Israel.
But worse, if Cousseran is right, namely that the US must not overreach by asking Syria to cut its ties to Hezbollah and Hamas, that only begs the question: What is the Obama administration entitled to ask of Syria? No explicit answer whatsoever has come out of the White House and State Department. And with uncertainty filling the thick Potomac air, what is Washington’s broader Syria strategy anyway? If Ford is a mailbox, what specific ideas will he be relaying?
There really are none. Obama has a wish list. He still hopes for a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and wants someone in Damascus to ease the process. But the president has done things in reverse. He should have sent Ford to Syria in exchange for a solid concession from Assad—perhaps Syrian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, which Damascus has refused to sanction; or maybe Syrian consent to the return of direct negotiations with Israel; or at least participation in a high-profile event that would help inject life into the Syrian-Israeli talks. The problem is that neither Syria nor Israel is keen to engage in bilateral moves, because the Syrian-Israeli track is moribund. Alive or dead, it made no sense for Obama to throw away a card he should have made Syria pay for.
It is not as if the US is unaware of Syrian intentions. Last week, an American official issued a pointed warning to Syria and Saudi Arabia that they should not reach any accord over Lebanon that might undermine the tribunal formed to indentify and punish Rafik Hariri’s killers. Syria has fought tooth and nail to obstruct the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which Washington supports, and recently intensified those efforts. And yet at the same moment, Obama sends Ford to Damascus, as if to say that whatever the Assad regime does, even taking measures that America opposes, it will be rewarded.
Obama would answer that he had a small window of opportunity in which to put Ford on a flight to Syria, before Congress reconvened, so he took his shot. A laudable rationale for an important decision: Let time pressures, and sneakiness, guide your foreign policy. Here’s a wager: Ford will cool his heels in Damascus without achieving much, because Assad got what he wanted, and is now in a position to stall Washington interminably. He won’t have to forfeit anything, because Obama has not a clue about what he really expects from Syria.
Ahead, a Syrian-Saudi obstacle course
The Syrian-Saudi initiative is like the abominable snowman. Some people claim to have seen it; some can even describe it. But proceed to the frozen wastelands where the creature was supposedly spotted last, and you only find snow, nothing more substantial.
There is no doubt that the Syrians and the Saudis are exchanging ideas on a new modus vivendi in Lebanon. We know this from the fact that an unidentified American official took the trouble last week, through the Saudi-owned daily Al-Hayat, to warn against any steps the two countries might take to undermine the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. But what are the particulars of their discussions?
Here and there we will get useful sound-bites. An Arabic diplomatic source told The Daily Star, in remarks published Wednesday, that Damascus and Riyadh were discussing a package deal. The pact would encompass the special tribunal, Syrian arrest warrants against Lebanese considered close to Prime Minister Saad Hariri, as well as a possible change in government with Hariri remaining in office, and an overhaul of Lebanon’s security and judicial hierarchies.
This seems awfully close to a Syrian interpretation of the talks to be entirely convincing. Here is why. Most revealing is the last thought, namely transformation of the security services and the judiciary. Even with a glass eye one can easily discern which party controls the major security posts. It is equally useful to recall that the Syrians have played a crucial role in blocking administrative and diplomatic appointments during the past year. The reality is that any changes in the military and in the major security agencies – the top leadership posts of the army and military intelligence, as well as of the General Security directorate, airport security, and so on – would principally affect individuals close to Hizbullah. And for Syria and Saudi Arabia to take from Hizbullah, Iran would first have to approve.
In public, pro-Syrian Lebanese spokesmen offer a slightly different reading. They will agree that a change in government is in the air, but will not admit to any divergences with Hizbullah. They will suggest that the political momentum is in Syria’s and Hizbullah’s favor, and that the government and the security services and other parts of the public administration must reflect this balance. Some will go so far as to hint that a complete revamping of the Lebanese political system is needed, one which grants the Shiite community more power.
Such ideas do not a Syrian-Saudi agreement make. In fact quite the contrary. Whatever Damascus and Riyadh consent to will not only have to pass Iranian muster, but also gain American approval. And if there are any doubts about the impediments, the deputy secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Bagheri, remarked Monday in Damascus that it was Hizbullah that would decide how to react to indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This seemed a careful way of stating that the Syrians and Saudis would be given latitude to cripple the tribunal, but that Tehran’s patience had limits.
Syria’s president, Bashar Assad, is engaged in a delicate balancing act. He is happy to gain from Saudi-Iranian tensions, but he also needs to ensure that he will not alienate either side. Assad is impatient to damage the special tribunal’s legitimacy, since he doesn’t want the institution to weaken Hizbullah or point the finger at Syrian officials. But he cannot allow Hizbullah to humiliate Hariri, as it did in May 2008, as this would harm Assad’s relationship with the Saudis, deny Syria the valuable Lebanese Sunni card it has spent years reclaiming, and only reinforce Iran’s role as the dominant actor in Beirut.
Assad probably believes that the Saudis will push Hariri some of the way, which is why he has reportedly urged them to approve measures to scuttle Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal. However, many of the recent leaks indicating that Hariri would soon agree to renounce the tribunal were really no more than disinformation, efforts to pressure the prime minister into bending in Syria’s direction. Yet for all these pressures, the rickety Hariri government remains standing and Syria’s allies have not yet seriously threatened to withdraw.
Then there is the United States. The Syrians and Saudis must not only consider how Iran views their deliberations, but also the way Washington will respond. Assad’s expectations for a breakthrough on the Syrian-Israeli front may be low, but that doesn’t mean the Syrian president can be reckless with regard to the Obama administration or Israel. For Assad, repairing Syria’s ties with Washington is necessary to provide him with options beyond his profitable, but also frequently demeaning and constraining, alliance with Iran. And Damascus needs to protect itself against the Israelis if they come to view Hizbullah as a strategic menace, leading to a Lebanon war that draws in Syria.
If Assad pushes too hard against the tribunal, to Hizbullah’s advantage, both the United States and Israel will begin fretting. Washington will not readily give up on an institution that might soon accuse Hizbullah (which is different than saying that the Americans are manipulating the indictments). Israel, in turn, will not look kindly on Lebanese measures shielding the party from a trial, thereby implicitly strengthening its military capacity, therefore Iran’s.
Here is the dizzyingly complicated context for the Syrian-Saudi talks, and such complexity seems a good reason to lower expectations about a breakthrough anytime soon. For what we have now are negotiations between two parties that have significant sway over Lebanese affairs, but not necessarily the final say. Whatever decisions they reach must still clear several hurdles, not one of which will be easy.
There is no doubt that the Syrians and the Saudis are exchanging ideas on a new modus vivendi in Lebanon. We know this from the fact that an unidentified American official took the trouble last week, through the Saudi-owned daily Al-Hayat, to warn against any steps the two countries might take to undermine the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. But what are the particulars of their discussions?
Here and there we will get useful sound-bites. An Arabic diplomatic source told The Daily Star, in remarks published Wednesday, that Damascus and Riyadh were discussing a package deal. The pact would encompass the special tribunal, Syrian arrest warrants against Lebanese considered close to Prime Minister Saad Hariri, as well as a possible change in government with Hariri remaining in office, and an overhaul of Lebanon’s security and judicial hierarchies.
This seems awfully close to a Syrian interpretation of the talks to be entirely convincing. Here is why. Most revealing is the last thought, namely transformation of the security services and the judiciary. Even with a glass eye one can easily discern which party controls the major security posts. It is equally useful to recall that the Syrians have played a crucial role in blocking administrative and diplomatic appointments during the past year. The reality is that any changes in the military and in the major security agencies – the top leadership posts of the army and military intelligence, as well as of the General Security directorate, airport security, and so on – would principally affect individuals close to Hizbullah. And for Syria and Saudi Arabia to take from Hizbullah, Iran would first have to approve.
In public, pro-Syrian Lebanese spokesmen offer a slightly different reading. They will agree that a change in government is in the air, but will not admit to any divergences with Hizbullah. They will suggest that the political momentum is in Syria’s and Hizbullah’s favor, and that the government and the security services and other parts of the public administration must reflect this balance. Some will go so far as to hint that a complete revamping of the Lebanese political system is needed, one which grants the Shiite community more power.
Such ideas do not a Syrian-Saudi agreement make. In fact quite the contrary. Whatever Damascus and Riyadh consent to will not only have to pass Iranian muster, but also gain American approval. And if there are any doubts about the impediments, the deputy secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Bagheri, remarked Monday in Damascus that it was Hizbullah that would decide how to react to indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This seemed a careful way of stating that the Syrians and Saudis would be given latitude to cripple the tribunal, but that Tehran’s patience had limits.
Syria’s president, Bashar Assad, is engaged in a delicate balancing act. He is happy to gain from Saudi-Iranian tensions, but he also needs to ensure that he will not alienate either side. Assad is impatient to damage the special tribunal’s legitimacy, since he doesn’t want the institution to weaken Hizbullah or point the finger at Syrian officials. But he cannot allow Hizbullah to humiliate Hariri, as it did in May 2008, as this would harm Assad’s relationship with the Saudis, deny Syria the valuable Lebanese Sunni card it has spent years reclaiming, and only reinforce Iran’s role as the dominant actor in Beirut.
Assad probably believes that the Saudis will push Hariri some of the way, which is why he has reportedly urged them to approve measures to scuttle Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal. However, many of the recent leaks indicating that Hariri would soon agree to renounce the tribunal were really no more than disinformation, efforts to pressure the prime minister into bending in Syria’s direction. Yet for all these pressures, the rickety Hariri government remains standing and Syria’s allies have not yet seriously threatened to withdraw.
Then there is the United States. The Syrians and Saudis must not only consider how Iran views their deliberations, but also the way Washington will respond. Assad’s expectations for a breakthrough on the Syrian-Israeli front may be low, but that doesn’t mean the Syrian president can be reckless with regard to the Obama administration or Israel. For Assad, repairing Syria’s ties with Washington is necessary to provide him with options beyond his profitable, but also frequently demeaning and constraining, alliance with Iran. And Damascus needs to protect itself against the Israelis if they come to view Hizbullah as a strategic menace, leading to a Lebanon war that draws in Syria.
If Assad pushes too hard against the tribunal, to Hizbullah’s advantage, both the United States and Israel will begin fretting. Washington will not readily give up on an institution that might soon accuse Hizbullah (which is different than saying that the Americans are manipulating the indictments). Israel, in turn, will not look kindly on Lebanese measures shielding the party from a trial, thereby implicitly strengthening its military capacity, therefore Iran’s.
Here is the dizzyingly complicated context for the Syrian-Saudi talks, and such complexity seems a good reason to lower expectations about a breakthrough anytime soon. For what we have now are negotiations between two parties that have significant sway over Lebanese affairs, but not necessarily the final say. Whatever decisions they reach must still clear several hurdles, not one of which will be easy.
Friday, December 24, 2010
Daniel Bellemare’s Christmas message
We didn’t get draft indictments as a Christmas gift from Daniel Bellemare, the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), but we did get a video. In a document posted on the tribunal’s website, Bellemare once again insisted that his work was not politicized, and that his only guide was the evidence available to him.
However, plainly there are others in Beirut and elsewhere in the Middle East who now view the tribunal as a political bargaining chip. Day in and day out, the prime minister, Saad Hariri, is pushed to deny or play down some media report or other claiming that he has given up on the institution, or is about to do so. Here is a sure sign that the haggling is continuing between the Syrians and the Saudis to finalize a formula that would end the Lebanese impasse over the tribunal.
These developments beg the question: Is there a political understanding that can be reached between the Lebanese, the Syrians and the Saudis that might undermine the special tribunal?
The question was at the heart of several notable pronouncements this week. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dismissed all eventual decisions taken by the tribunal as “null and void.” The Syrian ambassador in Beirut, Ali Abdul Karim Ali, after saying that Syrian-Saudi contacts were continuing, added, “[but] the results should come from the parties in Lebanon through the responsiveness and consensus they reach between themselves, away from the media.”
An unidentified US official told Lebanese daily Al-Hayat in comments published on Thursday that Washington had received no news of a Syrian-Saudi deal, but added that if such a deal were reached at the tribunal’s expense, it would constitute “blackmail.” The official observed that the tribunal was “an international mechanism that could not be eliminated or subjected to political bargaining,” before pointedly describing it as “Lebanon’s best hope to garner international support to transcend its tragic and bloody history of political violence.”
The statements from the US official seemed an implicit warning to the Saudis, based on the fear that some arrangement was being negotiated. Nor would the statement this week by Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad have reassured Washington. Raad said his party would be willing to compromise in the “false witnesses” dispute, after he confirmed Syrian-Saudi efforts to resolve the political deadlock.
What does all this mean? If the Americans are subtly raising the heat against their allies in Beirut and Riyadh, that may imply they smell a rat. That Mohammad Raad has offered to be flexible might be a signal that progress is being made between Syria and Saudi Arabia, explaining why Hezbollah is willing to offer concessions of its own to find a consensus – the same consensus the Syrian ambassador has urged the Lebanese to achieve through compromise. Or this brouhaha could be maneuvering because Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has left hospital, and all sides expect Syrian-Saudi negotiations to resume in earnest.
The bottom line, however, is that Bellemare’s assurances that the tribunal is not politicized does not signify that politics cannot get the better of the court. Lebanon will try to avoid taking the drastic measures required to cripple the tribunal – withdrawing the Lebanese judges, cutting funding and cooperation, and denouncing the institution as politicized — since the international repercussions would be severe. But even lesser measures agreed between the Lebanese parties under foreign sponsorship, for example casting doubt on essential aspects of the tribunal’s work, could hinder the trial process.
For instance, once the trial begins, the willingness of new witnesses to come forward and the readiness of the Lebanese security forces to arrest suspects, uncover new leads, or simply assist tribunal investigators when interviewing witnesses, will be substantially shaped by the prevailing mood among the Lebanese authorities. If the government appears increasingly lukewarm to tribunal affairs, this would have a negative bearing on how the Lebanese respond to the possibilities opened up by the new dynamics the trial will release.
It’s no great secret what serious Syrian-Saudi negotiations represent to each side. The Saudis hope to strengthen Damascus’ power in Lebanon to better contain Iran and Hezbollah. The Syrians want that too, of course, and something substantial from Saad Hariri in the way of denting the tribunal’s integrity. Hezbollah has demanded the same, in exchange for unblocking the cabinet. Damascus and Riyadh may fail to come to an accord, one that Iran must first approve anyway for it to work, but there is little doubt what the bottom line is for each side.
Daniel Bellemare should be conscious of what is taking place around him. No one can blame the prosecutor for avoiding political skirmishing; his focus is on the legal dimensions of his case. But given a happening as fundamentally political as the Hariri assassination, the prosecutor cannot be blind to politics. To strengthen his hand, he will have to help ensure that Beirut remains squarely on the tribunal’s side.
However, plainly there are others in Beirut and elsewhere in the Middle East who now view the tribunal as a political bargaining chip. Day in and day out, the prime minister, Saad Hariri, is pushed to deny or play down some media report or other claiming that he has given up on the institution, or is about to do so. Here is a sure sign that the haggling is continuing between the Syrians and the Saudis to finalize a formula that would end the Lebanese impasse over the tribunal.
These developments beg the question: Is there a political understanding that can be reached between the Lebanese, the Syrians and the Saudis that might undermine the special tribunal?
The question was at the heart of several notable pronouncements this week. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dismissed all eventual decisions taken by the tribunal as “null and void.” The Syrian ambassador in Beirut, Ali Abdul Karim Ali, after saying that Syrian-Saudi contacts were continuing, added, “[but] the results should come from the parties in Lebanon through the responsiveness and consensus they reach between themselves, away from the media.”
An unidentified US official told Lebanese daily Al-Hayat in comments published on Thursday that Washington had received no news of a Syrian-Saudi deal, but added that if such a deal were reached at the tribunal’s expense, it would constitute “blackmail.” The official observed that the tribunal was “an international mechanism that could not be eliminated or subjected to political bargaining,” before pointedly describing it as “Lebanon’s best hope to garner international support to transcend its tragic and bloody history of political violence.”
The statements from the US official seemed an implicit warning to the Saudis, based on the fear that some arrangement was being negotiated. Nor would the statement this week by Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad have reassured Washington. Raad said his party would be willing to compromise in the “false witnesses” dispute, after he confirmed Syrian-Saudi efforts to resolve the political deadlock.
What does all this mean? If the Americans are subtly raising the heat against their allies in Beirut and Riyadh, that may imply they smell a rat. That Mohammad Raad has offered to be flexible might be a signal that progress is being made between Syria and Saudi Arabia, explaining why Hezbollah is willing to offer concessions of its own to find a consensus – the same consensus the Syrian ambassador has urged the Lebanese to achieve through compromise. Or this brouhaha could be maneuvering because Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has left hospital, and all sides expect Syrian-Saudi negotiations to resume in earnest.
The bottom line, however, is that Bellemare’s assurances that the tribunal is not politicized does not signify that politics cannot get the better of the court. Lebanon will try to avoid taking the drastic measures required to cripple the tribunal – withdrawing the Lebanese judges, cutting funding and cooperation, and denouncing the institution as politicized — since the international repercussions would be severe. But even lesser measures agreed between the Lebanese parties under foreign sponsorship, for example casting doubt on essential aspects of the tribunal’s work, could hinder the trial process.
For instance, once the trial begins, the willingness of new witnesses to come forward and the readiness of the Lebanese security forces to arrest suspects, uncover new leads, or simply assist tribunal investigators when interviewing witnesses, will be substantially shaped by the prevailing mood among the Lebanese authorities. If the government appears increasingly lukewarm to tribunal affairs, this would have a negative bearing on how the Lebanese respond to the possibilities opened up by the new dynamics the trial will release.
It’s no great secret what serious Syrian-Saudi negotiations represent to each side. The Saudis hope to strengthen Damascus’ power in Lebanon to better contain Iran and Hezbollah. The Syrians want that too, of course, and something substantial from Saad Hariri in the way of denting the tribunal’s integrity. Hezbollah has demanded the same, in exchange for unblocking the cabinet. Damascus and Riyadh may fail to come to an accord, one that Iran must first approve anyway for it to work, but there is little doubt what the bottom line is for each side.
Daniel Bellemare should be conscious of what is taking place around him. No one can blame the prosecutor for avoiding political skirmishing; his focus is on the legal dimensions of his case. But given a happening as fundamentally political as the Hariri assassination, the prosecutor cannot be blind to politics. To strengthen his hand, he will have to help ensure that Beirut remains squarely on the tribunal’s side.
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Defining success in the Lebanon tribunal
In an effort to be more transparent, this week officials responsible for outreach at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon sought to clarify for journalists the probable timeframe leading up to the formal issuing of indictments in the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri. The Lebanese should not hold their breath.
You might have already noticed, but the prosecutor of the tribunal, Daniel Bellemare, took his end-of-year vacation without transmitting draft indictments to Daniel Fransen, the pretrial judge. The assumption at the institution is that he will do so soon. However, one must be realistic: If Bellemare failed to hand anything over before heading home for Christmas, it is not likely he will do so right after his return. Let’s assume optimistically, therefore, that the prosecutor gives Fransen draft indictments in mid-January, what happens then?
The estimation at the tribunal is that the pretrial judge will take at least 6-10 weeks, perhaps longer, to confirm the indictments in writing. That means we will not see anything final with respect to the accusations before March, or even April, if Bellemare meets a mid-January deadline. Fransen has the latitude to dismiss all or certain charges, or to ask for more evidence, which could add to the time needed for the tribunal to present confirmed indictments.
During the period when he is considering the draft indictments, Fransen has the option of accelerating proceedings by asking the appeals chamber to consider certain matters of law pertaining to the case. The pretrial judge will quite possibly take advantage of this rule, which involves holding public hearings. While no one would be named in these hearings, something would inevitably be revealed by the tenor of the legal discussions, which would provide the first real hint of the direction and substance of the prosecution’s case.
Until the formal confirmation of the indictments by Fransen, the contents will remain confidential. Once the confirmed indictments are issued, the names of the indicted will probably be made public, although in exceptional circumstances the prosecution or the defense might request that an indictment be sealed. Lawyers believe that naming the indicted publicly would become unavoidable if the tribunal has to take steps to conduct the trial in absentia, as the Lebanese authorities will, first, have to be notified of their identities.
Although Hizbullah and its allies have accused the court of being “politicized,” spokespersons for the institution insist that the only timetable employees are working on is a legal timetable. The continued delay in Bellemare’s finalization of draft indictments would seem to confirm that point. It was obvious months ago that the president of the tribunal, Antonio Cassese, was seeking to push the prosecutor to complete his preliminary indictments before the end of the year. He was forced to backtrack, doubtless at Bellemare’s insistence. In this context it is legitimate to wonder where and why there is a holdup. Does the prosecutor have evidence strong enough to prepare indictments that can pass Fransen’s muster?
Some experienced observers ask another pointed question. What happens if none of the indicted are in court once the trial begins? The expectation was always that somebody would be standing in the dock, even if not all the accused were. However, how can the tribunal function effectively, and credibly, if the entire trial is conducted in absentia? How would the defense coordinate its actions on behalf of the accused? And how might the absence of the indicted impact on Bellemare’s case, if he relies substantially on circumstantial evidence?
There is a risk the trial could become a virtual exercise, its proceedings detached from the reality of the Hariri assassination. Not only would that damage the tribunal’s integrity, it would undermine a principal purpose justifying the establishment five years ago of a Lebanese-international investigative and legal mechanism: bolstering Lebanon’s judiciary and ending impunity for political killings.
If I were related to someone killed or injured in the succession of murders and bomb attacks during and after 2005, I would have to start questioning whether the special tribunal will ever give me satisfaction. For some lawyers, the legal process itself is the measure of its own success. In other words a tribunal was set up, following an international investigation; the proper norms and regulations were respected; and the accused will be granted due process. Whether or not the trial leads to the guilty, and punishes them, is less vital than the fact that the institution fulfilled the role it was set up to fulfill.
From a strictly legal standpoint, that is perfectly defensible. Ultimately, tribunals are not formed under the condition that someone must necessarily be found guilty, except perhaps in totalitarian systems. Due process allows for the alternative that someone who stands accused might be declared innocent.
However, does that apply if the investigation leading up to the trial was flawed? In other words, if the United Nations inquiry was intentionally stalled, or simply conducted incompetently at a given stage, can we still take so detached, so academic, a view that only the good conduct of the trial matters? The investigation and the trial were always organically related; shortcomings in the first were necessarily going to impact the second. One cannot artificially separate the two.
And what of the human cost? Trials are not intellectual competitions, particularly criminal trials. People were killed by other people and many have suffered. It was always the right of the families of the victims to expect that everything would be done to ensure that the guilty would be identified and punished. Has everything been done to achieve that outcome? Only an affirmative answer should be the benchmark for success when the special tribunal eventually closes its doors; not the issuing of indictments or scholastic pride in a remote legal process that ends up in a cul-de-sac before an empty courtroom.
You might have already noticed, but the prosecutor of the tribunal, Daniel Bellemare, took his end-of-year vacation without transmitting draft indictments to Daniel Fransen, the pretrial judge. The assumption at the institution is that he will do so soon. However, one must be realistic: If Bellemare failed to hand anything over before heading home for Christmas, it is not likely he will do so right after his return. Let’s assume optimistically, therefore, that the prosecutor gives Fransen draft indictments in mid-January, what happens then?
The estimation at the tribunal is that the pretrial judge will take at least 6-10 weeks, perhaps longer, to confirm the indictments in writing. That means we will not see anything final with respect to the accusations before March, or even April, if Bellemare meets a mid-January deadline. Fransen has the latitude to dismiss all or certain charges, or to ask for more evidence, which could add to the time needed for the tribunal to present confirmed indictments.
During the period when he is considering the draft indictments, Fransen has the option of accelerating proceedings by asking the appeals chamber to consider certain matters of law pertaining to the case. The pretrial judge will quite possibly take advantage of this rule, which involves holding public hearings. While no one would be named in these hearings, something would inevitably be revealed by the tenor of the legal discussions, which would provide the first real hint of the direction and substance of the prosecution’s case.
Until the formal confirmation of the indictments by Fransen, the contents will remain confidential. Once the confirmed indictments are issued, the names of the indicted will probably be made public, although in exceptional circumstances the prosecution or the defense might request that an indictment be sealed. Lawyers believe that naming the indicted publicly would become unavoidable if the tribunal has to take steps to conduct the trial in absentia, as the Lebanese authorities will, first, have to be notified of their identities.
Although Hizbullah and its allies have accused the court of being “politicized,” spokespersons for the institution insist that the only timetable employees are working on is a legal timetable. The continued delay in Bellemare’s finalization of draft indictments would seem to confirm that point. It was obvious months ago that the president of the tribunal, Antonio Cassese, was seeking to push the prosecutor to complete his preliminary indictments before the end of the year. He was forced to backtrack, doubtless at Bellemare’s insistence. In this context it is legitimate to wonder where and why there is a holdup. Does the prosecutor have evidence strong enough to prepare indictments that can pass Fransen’s muster?
Some experienced observers ask another pointed question. What happens if none of the indicted are in court once the trial begins? The expectation was always that somebody would be standing in the dock, even if not all the accused were. However, how can the tribunal function effectively, and credibly, if the entire trial is conducted in absentia? How would the defense coordinate its actions on behalf of the accused? And how might the absence of the indicted impact on Bellemare’s case, if he relies substantially on circumstantial evidence?
There is a risk the trial could become a virtual exercise, its proceedings detached from the reality of the Hariri assassination. Not only would that damage the tribunal’s integrity, it would undermine a principal purpose justifying the establishment five years ago of a Lebanese-international investigative and legal mechanism: bolstering Lebanon’s judiciary and ending impunity for political killings.
If I were related to someone killed or injured in the succession of murders and bomb attacks during and after 2005, I would have to start questioning whether the special tribunal will ever give me satisfaction. For some lawyers, the legal process itself is the measure of its own success. In other words a tribunal was set up, following an international investigation; the proper norms and regulations were respected; and the accused will be granted due process. Whether or not the trial leads to the guilty, and punishes them, is less vital than the fact that the institution fulfilled the role it was set up to fulfill.
From a strictly legal standpoint, that is perfectly defensible. Ultimately, tribunals are not formed under the condition that someone must necessarily be found guilty, except perhaps in totalitarian systems. Due process allows for the alternative that someone who stands accused might be declared innocent.
However, does that apply if the investigation leading up to the trial was flawed? In other words, if the United Nations inquiry was intentionally stalled, or simply conducted incompetently at a given stage, can we still take so detached, so academic, a view that only the good conduct of the trial matters? The investigation and the trial were always organically related; shortcomings in the first were necessarily going to impact the second. One cannot artificially separate the two.
And what of the human cost? Trials are not intellectual competitions, particularly criminal trials. People were killed by other people and many have suffered. It was always the right of the families of the victims to expect that everything would be done to ensure that the guilty would be identified and punished. Has everything been done to achieve that outcome? Only an affirmative answer should be the benchmark for success when the special tribunal eventually closes its doors; not the issuing of indictments or scholastic pride in a remote legal process that ends up in a cul-de-sac before an empty courtroom.
Friday, December 17, 2010
The diplomatic warrior
The death this week of US diplomat Richard Holbrooke has provided some instructive lessons about the transformation in American foreign policy during the last decade and a half.
I still recall the galvanizing scene in 1994 being broadcast from Dayton, Ohio, where the Clinton administration had just put the finishing touches to a peace deal for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was more than anything else Holbrooke’s triumph, as he succeeded in bludgeoning hard men like Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman (as well as the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic) into accepting an American-sponsored accord.
At one point there was a commotion, as Holbrooke stood on the rostrum announcing the results. It was European envoy Carl Bildt, co-chairman of the Dayton conference, walking away from the stage in a huff, clearly fed up with Holbrooke for stealing the show. No one could ever accuse the late American diplomat of missing such an opportunity, but the scene spoke volumes of the Europeans’ failure to bring about peace in their own back yard. The termination of the ruinous war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very much America’s doing.
Cut to Holbrooke’s final assignment, as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. There, the diplomat seemed mislaid in a policy that remains a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. US President Barack Obama has sought a victory in Afghanistan, but would be satisfied with a draw, which may well lead to a defeat. And to prove his long-term commitment to the Afghans, the US president is dedicated to begin withdrawing troops by as soon as next summer. And though the fight may be in Afghanistan, the victory lies in Pakistan, but success is proving so difficult in Pakistan, that America’s determination to stick it out in Afghanistan is waning rapidly.
You get the point. Or perhaps not.
You could say many things about the former US president, Bill Clinton, but when he finally, and very reluctantly and shamefacedly, sank his teeth into resolving the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He gave Holbrooke and the US military the latitude they needed to bring home a solution. With Obama, however, Holbrooke was one among what usually seemed to be too many cooks – between the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry (with whom Holbrooke clashed), General David Petraeus, the military commander in Afghanistan, and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose briefs all involve blending politics with military policy.
Holbrooke was too experienced not to know a stumbling thing when he saw it. Obama’s Afghan-Pakistan plan was surely too hazy for a man of sharp angles, and it seems he was less and less convinced by his mission. Near the end, after being rushed to the hospital, a doctor told him to relax. He allegedly joked that it was difficult to relax given his worries about the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan – one of those smart-alecky answers that probably revealed genuine concern.
To get a sense of the foreign policy Holbrooke felt most comfortable with, we should recall that he helped the late Clark Clifford, an advisor to numerous Democratic presidents, write his memoirs during the 1980s. Clifford was among the smoothest mandarins of the postwar American empire – a lawyer who could make the big deals and clean up the small messes. But he was also the personification of American foreign policy pragmatism during the Cold War, of the famed bipartisan consensus, someone who could glide effortlessly between Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, between money and political authority. Inherent in such individuals was a conceit that the United States could place its rationalism and goodwill at the service of power; that while idealism may have been an illusion, there were certain ways of doing things overseas – calm, collected ways – and that they, as individuals, were best equipped to recommend those ways.
There was certainly smugness here, but also considerably less confusion about what the United States represented. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton had wanted to steer away from the conflict, but the brutish siege of Sarajevo and the butchery in Srebrenica had brought him around. He couldn’t resist the public condemnation that his unresponsiveness to human suffering was bringing down on his shoulders. So, politically, he changed tack; but he also did so because he had to satisfy an ambient sense of what the US stood for.
You have to ask whether Barack Obama, in his haste to accelerate the American departure from Iraq, while outlining a similar process in Afghanistan, has such a sense? Holbrooke was no romantic naïf standing against Obama’s heartlessness when it came to foreign matters. The president is facing difficult times. But Obama does frequently look like a vicar counting his alms, when Holbrooke was made of larger, more combustible material. His fire was a sense of what America could get right, not what America has done wrong.
I still recall the galvanizing scene in 1994 being broadcast from Dayton, Ohio, where the Clinton administration had just put the finishing touches to a peace deal for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was more than anything else Holbrooke’s triumph, as he succeeded in bludgeoning hard men like Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman (as well as the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic) into accepting an American-sponsored accord.
At one point there was a commotion, as Holbrooke stood on the rostrum announcing the results. It was European envoy Carl Bildt, co-chairman of the Dayton conference, walking away from the stage in a huff, clearly fed up with Holbrooke for stealing the show. No one could ever accuse the late American diplomat of missing such an opportunity, but the scene spoke volumes of the Europeans’ failure to bring about peace in their own back yard. The termination of the ruinous war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very much America’s doing.
Cut to Holbrooke’s final assignment, as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. There, the diplomat seemed mislaid in a policy that remains a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. US President Barack Obama has sought a victory in Afghanistan, but would be satisfied with a draw, which may well lead to a defeat. And to prove his long-term commitment to the Afghans, the US president is dedicated to begin withdrawing troops by as soon as next summer. And though the fight may be in Afghanistan, the victory lies in Pakistan, but success is proving so difficult in Pakistan, that America’s determination to stick it out in Afghanistan is waning rapidly.
You get the point. Or perhaps not.
You could say many things about the former US president, Bill Clinton, but when he finally, and very reluctantly and shamefacedly, sank his teeth into resolving the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He gave Holbrooke and the US military the latitude they needed to bring home a solution. With Obama, however, Holbrooke was one among what usually seemed to be too many cooks – between the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry (with whom Holbrooke clashed), General David Petraeus, the military commander in Afghanistan, and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose briefs all involve blending politics with military policy.
Holbrooke was too experienced not to know a stumbling thing when he saw it. Obama’s Afghan-Pakistan plan was surely too hazy for a man of sharp angles, and it seems he was less and less convinced by his mission. Near the end, after being rushed to the hospital, a doctor told him to relax. He allegedly joked that it was difficult to relax given his worries about the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan – one of those smart-alecky answers that probably revealed genuine concern.
To get a sense of the foreign policy Holbrooke felt most comfortable with, we should recall that he helped the late Clark Clifford, an advisor to numerous Democratic presidents, write his memoirs during the 1980s. Clifford was among the smoothest mandarins of the postwar American empire – a lawyer who could make the big deals and clean up the small messes. But he was also the personification of American foreign policy pragmatism during the Cold War, of the famed bipartisan consensus, someone who could glide effortlessly between Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, between money and political authority. Inherent in such individuals was a conceit that the United States could place its rationalism and goodwill at the service of power; that while idealism may have been an illusion, there were certain ways of doing things overseas – calm, collected ways – and that they, as individuals, were best equipped to recommend those ways.
There was certainly smugness here, but also considerably less confusion about what the United States represented. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton had wanted to steer away from the conflict, but the brutish siege of Sarajevo and the butchery in Srebrenica had brought him around. He couldn’t resist the public condemnation that his unresponsiveness to human suffering was bringing down on his shoulders. So, politically, he changed tack; but he also did so because he had to satisfy an ambient sense of what the US stood for.
You have to ask whether Barack Obama, in his haste to accelerate the American departure from Iraq, while outlining a similar process in Afghanistan, has such a sense? Holbrooke was no romantic naïf standing against Obama’s heartlessness when it came to foreign matters. The president is facing difficult times. But Obama does frequently look like a vicar counting his alms, when Holbrooke was made of larger, more combustible material. His fire was a sense of what America could get right, not what America has done wrong.
Thursday, December 16, 2010
The canard of regime change in Syria
Recently, the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, offered up an interpretation that he has frequently repeated since moving closer to Syria and taking his distance from the United States.
Jumblatt was responding to my column last week on a WikiLeaks cable mentioning that in 2006, Serge Brammertz, the second UN commissioner investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, had basically admitted to the US ambassador in Beirut, Jeffrey Feltman, that he was focusing on Syrian participation in the crime. For the Druze leader, that mention was a return to the “tone of Condoleezza Rice and others and the neoconservatives [favoring] regime change,” by which he meant regime change in Syria. “The Syrian people and Syria decide what they want,” Jumblatt added.
That’s no doubt true, however it is equally true, with the benefit of hindsight, that the Bush administration never sought regime change in Damascus. Some in Beirut did, but Washington never seriously pursued such a foolhardy project, nor did it indicate the contrary.
How would the US have changed the regime of President Bashar Assad anyway? Presumably, it would have had to send into Syria the American armed forces, namely those stationed in neighboring Iraq. But as we now know from countless sources, including Bob Woodward’s 2006 book “State of Denial,” the thinking at the Pentagon went in precisely the opposite direction. From the start, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw Iraq as a short-term venture for the armed forces – a matter of a few months, no more. That is why the secretary resisted for so long an expansion in the number of troops that might have stabilized the Iraqi situation much sooner.
The military hierarchy knew that President George W. Bush’s declaration of an end to combat operations in Iraq was a farce. Therefore, it also grasped that there was a hard slog ahead. Not only was there no appetite in Washington to expand the war to Syria, there was no intention from the military in Baghdad to permit such a slide. In fact even when it came to controlling the open Iraqi-Syrian border, through which suicide bombers were passing, the Americans were surprisingly unobtrusive. Aside from a few high-profile operations, the military didn’t have the manpower to exert sustained local pressure on Syria, let alone conceive of something more ambitious.
Proponents of the regime-change theory might respond that even if the Bush administration was not plotting to overthrow Assad through force, it was looking to set up the conditions for a domestic upheaval, perhaps a coup. Possibly. The US would not have saved the Assad regime had it fallen from the weight of its own ills. But that doesn’t qualify as regime change. Nor does it take into account the strangely resilient conviction in Washington that, for all its shortcomings, Assad’s rule is better than a Sunni-led Islamist alternative. Assad, quite effectively, has played on this line, and although nothing makes an Islamist regime in Damascus inevitable, American officials have bought into that fear, because it is what they witnessed in Iraq.
According to those who argue that the US supported regime change indirectly, by weakening Syria elsewhere, events in Lebanon between 2004 and 2005 take on central importance. Passage of Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, is Exhibit A in this contention. However, it only tells us half the story. While the US and France did seek to get the ball rolling on a Syrian pullout from Lebanon in 2004, and while Assad read this as a potential threat to his leadership at home, and responded in kind by extending Emile Lahoud’s mandate in Beirut, one key item is missing.
As Feltman once explained in an interview, “[T]hose of us working most closely on the Lebanon file focused on not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good.” If the US could not force the Syrians out of Lebanon in one stage, it would not hinder this effort by avoiding doing so in several stages, the primary aim being to allow relatively free and fair elections in 2005 without the Syrians present. “And this desire for better parliamentary elections led to what was the real focus in late 2004 and early 2005: persuading the Syrians to pull back their occupying troops deep into the Bekaa Valley, so that elections in most of Lebanon could have been relatively free and fair.”
This was a return to what had been agreed at Taif on the future of the Syrian military presence, though with deeper Syrian redeployments. One of the advocates of a step-by-step Syrian movement away from Lebanon’s populated areas was Jumblatt. The Syrians were well aware of American thinking – of the Bush administration’s willingness to allow a continuation of their presence in Lebanon, albeit on the country’s periphery. That helps explain their calculations when deciding what to do about Hariri. But one thing it also did was reassure Assad that he could maneuver. Rather than assuming that his regime was under threat, he grasped by early 2005 that the US and France were willing to cut him some slack in Beirut.
Which leads us to the investigation of Hariri’s murder and the subsequent establishment of a tribunal to judge the guilty. It is odd that those who believe the US hoped to bring about regime change in Damascus through the investigative process would, for example, point to the Brammertz-Feltman meeting to bolster their argument. The reality is that Brammertz did not substantially move ahead in the Hariri investigation, as numerous sources now confirm. Whether he did this on purpose is an open question, but the US never twisted the commissioner’s arm to speed up his work. If anything, Washington was painfully respectful of Brammertz’s independence, even though there was growing evidence that he was getting nowhere.
Jumblatt has described the diplomatic information released by WikiLeaks as proof of the failed US policies in the Middle East. In retrospect, we now know that the Americans had more pressing goals in the region than replacing Syria’s leadership. Jumblatt, who says he is relieved to be with Syria again, should thank them for their failure.
Jumblatt was responding to my column last week on a WikiLeaks cable mentioning that in 2006, Serge Brammertz, the second UN commissioner investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, had basically admitted to the US ambassador in Beirut, Jeffrey Feltman, that he was focusing on Syrian participation in the crime. For the Druze leader, that mention was a return to the “tone of Condoleezza Rice and others and the neoconservatives [favoring] regime change,” by which he meant regime change in Syria. “The Syrian people and Syria decide what they want,” Jumblatt added.
That’s no doubt true, however it is equally true, with the benefit of hindsight, that the Bush administration never sought regime change in Damascus. Some in Beirut did, but Washington never seriously pursued such a foolhardy project, nor did it indicate the contrary.
How would the US have changed the regime of President Bashar Assad anyway? Presumably, it would have had to send into Syria the American armed forces, namely those stationed in neighboring Iraq. But as we now know from countless sources, including Bob Woodward’s 2006 book “State of Denial,” the thinking at the Pentagon went in precisely the opposite direction. From the start, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw Iraq as a short-term venture for the armed forces – a matter of a few months, no more. That is why the secretary resisted for so long an expansion in the number of troops that might have stabilized the Iraqi situation much sooner.
The military hierarchy knew that President George W. Bush’s declaration of an end to combat operations in Iraq was a farce. Therefore, it also grasped that there was a hard slog ahead. Not only was there no appetite in Washington to expand the war to Syria, there was no intention from the military in Baghdad to permit such a slide. In fact even when it came to controlling the open Iraqi-Syrian border, through which suicide bombers were passing, the Americans were surprisingly unobtrusive. Aside from a few high-profile operations, the military didn’t have the manpower to exert sustained local pressure on Syria, let alone conceive of something more ambitious.
Proponents of the regime-change theory might respond that even if the Bush administration was not plotting to overthrow Assad through force, it was looking to set up the conditions for a domestic upheaval, perhaps a coup. Possibly. The US would not have saved the Assad regime had it fallen from the weight of its own ills. But that doesn’t qualify as regime change. Nor does it take into account the strangely resilient conviction in Washington that, for all its shortcomings, Assad’s rule is better than a Sunni-led Islamist alternative. Assad, quite effectively, has played on this line, and although nothing makes an Islamist regime in Damascus inevitable, American officials have bought into that fear, because it is what they witnessed in Iraq.
According to those who argue that the US supported regime change indirectly, by weakening Syria elsewhere, events in Lebanon between 2004 and 2005 take on central importance. Passage of Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, is Exhibit A in this contention. However, it only tells us half the story. While the US and France did seek to get the ball rolling on a Syrian pullout from Lebanon in 2004, and while Assad read this as a potential threat to his leadership at home, and responded in kind by extending Emile Lahoud’s mandate in Beirut, one key item is missing.
As Feltman once explained in an interview, “[T]hose of us working most closely on the Lebanon file focused on not letting the perfect become the enemy of the good.” If the US could not force the Syrians out of Lebanon in one stage, it would not hinder this effort by avoiding doing so in several stages, the primary aim being to allow relatively free and fair elections in 2005 without the Syrians present. “And this desire for better parliamentary elections led to what was the real focus in late 2004 and early 2005: persuading the Syrians to pull back their occupying troops deep into the Bekaa Valley, so that elections in most of Lebanon could have been relatively free and fair.”
This was a return to what had been agreed at Taif on the future of the Syrian military presence, though with deeper Syrian redeployments. One of the advocates of a step-by-step Syrian movement away from Lebanon’s populated areas was Jumblatt. The Syrians were well aware of American thinking – of the Bush administration’s willingness to allow a continuation of their presence in Lebanon, albeit on the country’s periphery. That helps explain their calculations when deciding what to do about Hariri. But one thing it also did was reassure Assad that he could maneuver. Rather than assuming that his regime was under threat, he grasped by early 2005 that the US and France were willing to cut him some slack in Beirut.
Which leads us to the investigation of Hariri’s murder and the subsequent establishment of a tribunal to judge the guilty. It is odd that those who believe the US hoped to bring about regime change in Damascus through the investigative process would, for example, point to the Brammertz-Feltman meeting to bolster their argument. The reality is that Brammertz did not substantially move ahead in the Hariri investigation, as numerous sources now confirm. Whether he did this on purpose is an open question, but the US never twisted the commissioner’s arm to speed up his work. If anything, Washington was painfully respectful of Brammertz’s independence, even though there was growing evidence that he was getting nowhere.
Jumblatt has described the diplomatic information released by WikiLeaks as proof of the failed US policies in the Middle East. In retrospect, we now know that the Americans had more pressing goals in the region than replacing Syria’s leadership. Jumblatt, who says he is relieved to be with Syria again, should thank them for their failure.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Thanks a lot, Julian Assange
How many people can seriously say that they regret reading through the American diplomatic cables currently being distributed and uploaded by the WikiLeaks website? For journalists, the documents are a fountain that just keeps giving; for historians, a useful corrective to interpretative ambiguities about past events. For everyone, they provide a valuable window into how the US government functions.
Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, has both been hailed as a champion of free speech and condemned as an irresponsible jerk, even a criminal. But how does he view himself, and his endeavors? In The Australian this week, Assange took a broadly libertarian approach in explaining why he has leaked US diplomatic and military documents. “Democratic societies need a strong media and WikiLeaks is part of that media,” he wrote. “The media helps keep government honest.”
Assange explained, “WikiLeaks coined a new type of journalism: scientific journalism. We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but also to prove it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, then to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?”
Uncovering the truth is an ambition that most honest observers of politics seek to fulfill. However, there are three major problems with Assange’s disclosure of the American diplomatic cables, but also American war logs from Afghanistan and Iraq. The first is fairly straightforward, and has been widely debated. The release of the documents risks the lives of America’s foreign sources or informants if their names are not concealed. Assange has defended himself poorly in this regard. Although he claims that no one has been harmed because of the publication of names, the evidence suggests otherwise.
According to a portrait of Assange in the New York Times, for instance, the Taliban have prepared a wanted list of 1,800 Afghans whom they consider traitors. A Taliban spokesperson told the newspaper that a nine-member commission had been formed to examine the names of “spies” whose identities were divulged in the Afghan war logs released by WikiLeaks, and was checking these against the names on the wanted list. Even people within the WikiLeaks organization have clashed with Assange over his reckless refusal to delete names in many documents.
A second problem is that even though WikiLeaks has put out some documents not related to the United States, by far the most significant material the website has publicized addresses American foreign policy concerns. That is, perhaps, understandable, since Assange was lucky enough to receive a treasure trove of papers and videos downloaded by an American soldier, Bradley Manning. But Assange has also openly expressed his hostility to the US, telling the New York Times that it was increasingly a “militarized society and a threat to democracy”. He also noted, “we have been attacked by the United States, so we are forced into a position where we must defend ourselves.”
That begs the question: Is Assange out to keep government and media honest, or is he out to punish the United States? He might answer that he is pursuing both aims, but today the second is being achieved at the expense of the first, especially in the Middle East. Partisan media outlets here are printing and highlighting only those cables that support their political line, and most of them are doing so by focusing on the links between their political enemies and Washington. In no way have the WikiLeaks leaks improved media behavior. On the contrary.
A third problem is that Assange, in his The Australian article, describes himself as following in the line of his fellow Australian Queenslanders, who “[speak] their minds bluntly” and “[distrust] big government as something that could be corrupted if not watched carefully”.
Sure, big government corrupts, but does Assange really believe that his release of diplomatic documents will do anything but spur Washington to expand its powers? The Obama administration is already throwing its weight around to compel Sweden to extradite Assange; and given American anger over the leaks, we can now expect information to be more tightly controlled by the US government, and officials to be less willing to talk to journalists, than ever before. The leaks won’t help make the US government more open and accountable; they practically ensure that it will be excessively suspicious, imperious and secretive.
So what do we really have with the leak of diplomatic cables? An America that feels, with some justification, that Assange’s prime objective is to humiliate it and impair its information gathering capacities. We have an America more likely to bolster its substantial ability to curb the dissemination of information, while punishing those who dissent. And we have media all over the world behaving like sharks in a feeding frenzy, acting even less responsibly than they normally do.
All we can say to that is thanks a lot Julian Assange.
Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, has both been hailed as a champion of free speech and condemned as an irresponsible jerk, even a criminal. But how does he view himself, and his endeavors? In The Australian this week, Assange took a broadly libertarian approach in explaining why he has leaked US diplomatic and military documents. “Democratic societies need a strong media and WikiLeaks is part of that media,” he wrote. “The media helps keep government honest.”
Assange explained, “WikiLeaks coined a new type of journalism: scientific journalism. We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but also to prove it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, then to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?”
Uncovering the truth is an ambition that most honest observers of politics seek to fulfill. However, there are three major problems with Assange’s disclosure of the American diplomatic cables, but also American war logs from Afghanistan and Iraq. The first is fairly straightforward, and has been widely debated. The release of the documents risks the lives of America’s foreign sources or informants if their names are not concealed. Assange has defended himself poorly in this regard. Although he claims that no one has been harmed because of the publication of names, the evidence suggests otherwise.
According to a portrait of Assange in the New York Times, for instance, the Taliban have prepared a wanted list of 1,800 Afghans whom they consider traitors. A Taliban spokesperson told the newspaper that a nine-member commission had been formed to examine the names of “spies” whose identities were divulged in the Afghan war logs released by WikiLeaks, and was checking these against the names on the wanted list. Even people within the WikiLeaks organization have clashed with Assange over his reckless refusal to delete names in many documents.
A second problem is that even though WikiLeaks has put out some documents not related to the United States, by far the most significant material the website has publicized addresses American foreign policy concerns. That is, perhaps, understandable, since Assange was lucky enough to receive a treasure trove of papers and videos downloaded by an American soldier, Bradley Manning. But Assange has also openly expressed his hostility to the US, telling the New York Times that it was increasingly a “militarized society and a threat to democracy”. He also noted, “we have been attacked by the United States, so we are forced into a position where we must defend ourselves.”
That begs the question: Is Assange out to keep government and media honest, or is he out to punish the United States? He might answer that he is pursuing both aims, but today the second is being achieved at the expense of the first, especially in the Middle East. Partisan media outlets here are printing and highlighting only those cables that support their political line, and most of them are doing so by focusing on the links between their political enemies and Washington. In no way have the WikiLeaks leaks improved media behavior. On the contrary.
A third problem is that Assange, in his The Australian article, describes himself as following in the line of his fellow Australian Queenslanders, who “[speak] their minds bluntly” and “[distrust] big government as something that could be corrupted if not watched carefully”.
Sure, big government corrupts, but does Assange really believe that his release of diplomatic documents will do anything but spur Washington to expand its powers? The Obama administration is already throwing its weight around to compel Sweden to extradite Assange; and given American anger over the leaks, we can now expect information to be more tightly controlled by the US government, and officials to be less willing to talk to journalists, than ever before. The leaks won’t help make the US government more open and accountable; they practically ensure that it will be excessively suspicious, imperious and secretive.
So what do we really have with the leak of diplomatic cables? An America that feels, with some justification, that Assange’s prime objective is to humiliate it and impair its information gathering capacities. We have an America more likely to bolster its substantial ability to curb the dissemination of information, while punishing those who dissent. And we have media all over the world behaving like sharks in a feeding frenzy, acting even less responsibly than they normally do.
All we can say to that is thanks a lot Julian Assange.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
A WikiLeaks warning to Damascus
A diplomatic cable obtained by WikiLeaks and released exclusively by The Daily Star earlier this week helps illustrate the precariousness of Syria’s position, as it instructs its allies to push the Lebanese government to discuss the matter of “false witnesses.”
In the cable, written in 2006, Jeffrey Feltman, the US ambassador to Lebanon, reported that the head of the United Nations International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), Serge Brammertz, had told him the following: “Syria has five different security apparatuses. I can’t imagine that an order came down from [President Bashar Assad] and worked its way through all the security services and until they killed Hariri.” Brammertz then clarified that thought: “If anything, you probably had one security service involved, and the order came from on high and, how high, we’ll have to figure out.”
What Brammertz appeared to be saying was fairly straightforward, for those who recall the security hierarchy at the time in Damascus. Aside from admitting that he was focusing on Syrian involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the commissioner was making an operational observation: It was likely one Syrian security service that had taken part in the crime, by which Brammertz probably meant military intelligence, at the time headed by Assad’s brother in law. The commissioner was merely declaring it unlikely that the entire gamut of Syrian intelligence services were in on the killing of the former Lebanese prime minister; and he was uncertain how far up the chain of command the order to eliminate Hariri had come from.
Far from being a declaration of Syrian innocence, the cable confirms that in 2006 UNIIIC was still convinced that Syria had participated in the Hariri assassination. Sources in UNIIIC have since corroborated this, as did, implicitly, Brammertz’s first report issued in March 2006. The commissioner wrote in the document that investigators believed “there is a layer of perpetrators between those who initially commissioned the crime and the actual perpetrators on the day of the crime, namely those who enabled the crime to occur.”
If we assume, as we must, that the perpetrator was a suicide bomber; and if the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Bellemare, indicts Hizbullah members for having enabled the crime, that still does not answer who commissioned the crime. It was precisely on that question that Brammertz was exchanging views with Feltman, and his remarks, if we are to believe the cable leaked by WikiLeaks, shows in what direction he hoped to point the finger.
But then he never did. However, the Syrians are not reassured. They realize that although Bellemare’s initial indictments might not touch them, there are no guarantees that subsequent indictments will not do so if the trial opens up new investigative avenues. No one in Damascus can be certain of what lies ahead. There is much testimony in Bellemare’s files collected by the first UNIIIC commissioner, Detlev Mehlis, pointing in the direction of Syria, even if the relative lack of progress during Brammertz’s term creates serious doubts about whether Bellemare would have enough to draft solid indictments.
The Syrians appear to be pursuing two simultaneous objectives with the aim of reviving their supremacy in Lebanon: acceptance by the Lebanese government of measures casting doubt on the credibility of the tribunal for the period after indictments are issued; and avoidance of a debilitating Lebanese confrontation over the tribunal before the legal accusations come out, because Damascus grasps that the indictments would allow it to play Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Hizbullah off against each other, to Syria’s own advantage.
That appears to be one reason why the Syrians have instructed the speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, to undermine efforts by President Michel Sleiman to deal with the “false witnesses” file in the national dialogue sessions. The president wants to buy time, but the Syrian gambit doesn’t allow for much time. And the last thing Bashar Assad wants is for his Lebanese counterpart to act as an effective mediator between the Lebanese, because he covets that role for himself.
Syrian intentions continue to be a matter of debate. Recently, the Syrian deputy foreign minister, Faysal Mekdad, told a Kuwaiti newspaper that Syria had no intention of returning to Lebanon militarily, “no matter how difficult the situation becomes.” There seemed more than a hint of sour grapes and menace in that phrase, against the backdrop of Walid Jumblatt’s statements that if there is instability in Lebanon, the return of the Syrian army would be desirable. Syria would relish the opportunity to bring its soldiers back. The problem is that virtually everyone opposes this, including in all probability Iran and Hizbullah, who have extensive control over the commanding heights of Lebanon’s major security institutions.
Sleiman’s performance is another Syrian preoccupation. Because of the polarization in Lebanon, room has been created for the president to fill the vacuum. However, his leading ministers have taken hits lately. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud has been criticized by pro-Hariri politicians, while Elias Murr has had to fend off criticism for indirectly offering advice to Israel in the event it attacked Lebanon – information contained in a US cable leaked to the pro-Hizbullah Al-Akhbar. Sleiman is the vulnerable man in the middle, and everyone is trying to shove the president in one direction or the other, reminding him that his share in any new government might be reduced.
It’s an upward climb for Syria in Lebanon. The Feltman cable, though it tells us nothing we didn’t know, will concentrate minds in Damascus, where the urge to both undermine the tribunal and use it as a lever to enhance Syrian influence in Beirut has imposed a subtle balancing act. Mekdad stated that Syria didn’t seek a military return to Lebanon, but he omitted any mention of a political return. Michel Sleiman’s isolation underscores the significance of that exclusion.
In the cable, written in 2006, Jeffrey Feltman, the US ambassador to Lebanon, reported that the head of the United Nations International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), Serge Brammertz, had told him the following: “Syria has five different security apparatuses. I can’t imagine that an order came down from [President Bashar Assad] and worked its way through all the security services and until they killed Hariri.” Brammertz then clarified that thought: “If anything, you probably had one security service involved, and the order came from on high and, how high, we’ll have to figure out.”
What Brammertz appeared to be saying was fairly straightforward, for those who recall the security hierarchy at the time in Damascus. Aside from admitting that he was focusing on Syrian involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the commissioner was making an operational observation: It was likely one Syrian security service that had taken part in the crime, by which Brammertz probably meant military intelligence, at the time headed by Assad’s brother in law. The commissioner was merely declaring it unlikely that the entire gamut of Syrian intelligence services were in on the killing of the former Lebanese prime minister; and he was uncertain how far up the chain of command the order to eliminate Hariri had come from.
Far from being a declaration of Syrian innocence, the cable confirms that in 2006 UNIIIC was still convinced that Syria had participated in the Hariri assassination. Sources in UNIIIC have since corroborated this, as did, implicitly, Brammertz’s first report issued in March 2006. The commissioner wrote in the document that investigators believed “there is a layer of perpetrators between those who initially commissioned the crime and the actual perpetrators on the day of the crime, namely those who enabled the crime to occur.”
If we assume, as we must, that the perpetrator was a suicide bomber; and if the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Bellemare, indicts Hizbullah members for having enabled the crime, that still does not answer who commissioned the crime. It was precisely on that question that Brammertz was exchanging views with Feltman, and his remarks, if we are to believe the cable leaked by WikiLeaks, shows in what direction he hoped to point the finger.
But then he never did. However, the Syrians are not reassured. They realize that although Bellemare’s initial indictments might not touch them, there are no guarantees that subsequent indictments will not do so if the trial opens up new investigative avenues. No one in Damascus can be certain of what lies ahead. There is much testimony in Bellemare’s files collected by the first UNIIIC commissioner, Detlev Mehlis, pointing in the direction of Syria, even if the relative lack of progress during Brammertz’s term creates serious doubts about whether Bellemare would have enough to draft solid indictments.
The Syrians appear to be pursuing two simultaneous objectives with the aim of reviving their supremacy in Lebanon: acceptance by the Lebanese government of measures casting doubt on the credibility of the tribunal for the period after indictments are issued; and avoidance of a debilitating Lebanese confrontation over the tribunal before the legal accusations come out, because Damascus grasps that the indictments would allow it to play Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Hizbullah off against each other, to Syria’s own advantage.
That appears to be one reason why the Syrians have instructed the speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, to undermine efforts by President Michel Sleiman to deal with the “false witnesses” file in the national dialogue sessions. The president wants to buy time, but the Syrian gambit doesn’t allow for much time. And the last thing Bashar Assad wants is for his Lebanese counterpart to act as an effective mediator between the Lebanese, because he covets that role for himself.
Syrian intentions continue to be a matter of debate. Recently, the Syrian deputy foreign minister, Faysal Mekdad, told a Kuwaiti newspaper that Syria had no intention of returning to Lebanon militarily, “no matter how difficult the situation becomes.” There seemed more than a hint of sour grapes and menace in that phrase, against the backdrop of Walid Jumblatt’s statements that if there is instability in Lebanon, the return of the Syrian army would be desirable. Syria would relish the opportunity to bring its soldiers back. The problem is that virtually everyone opposes this, including in all probability Iran and Hizbullah, who have extensive control over the commanding heights of Lebanon’s major security institutions.
Sleiman’s performance is another Syrian preoccupation. Because of the polarization in Lebanon, room has been created for the president to fill the vacuum. However, his leading ministers have taken hits lately. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud has been criticized by pro-Hariri politicians, while Elias Murr has had to fend off criticism for indirectly offering advice to Israel in the event it attacked Lebanon – information contained in a US cable leaked to the pro-Hizbullah Al-Akhbar. Sleiman is the vulnerable man in the middle, and everyone is trying to shove the president in one direction or the other, reminding him that his share in any new government might be reduced.
It’s an upward climb for Syria in Lebanon. The Feltman cable, though it tells us nothing we didn’t know, will concentrate minds in Damascus, where the urge to both undermine the tribunal and use it as a lever to enhance Syrian influence in Beirut has imposed a subtle balancing act. Mekdad stated that Syria didn’t seek a military return to Lebanon, but he omitted any mention of a political return. Michel Sleiman’s isolation underscores the significance of that exclusion.
Friday, December 3, 2010
Hezbollah looks for an improbable exit
There is a view making the rounds that if Hezbollah members are indicted for their involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, ultimately the party will have no choice but to declare the individuals rogue operators, before distancing itself from them.
Yet how likely is this? The secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, has declared such an outcome an impossibility, in response to an alleged offer from the prime minister, Saad Hariri, that the blame might be placed on the late Imad Mugniyah. However, Hariri’s predecessor, Fouad Siniora, who heads the prime minister’s parliamentary bloc, has hinted that some similar arrangement might be the only way out. Hezbollah need not be responsible for the actions of all of its members, he has repeatedly declared, indicating that the party’s foes would be willing to help it find an outlet to avoid accusations issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
The line of reasoning is this, and Siniora is not the only one pursuing it: Whatever Hezbollah does – bring down or hinder the government, resort to violence or street protests, or even organize a coup against the state – would only push the nail in deeper when it comes to the party’s guilt, without affecting indictments. Implicit in this argument is that Hariri alone has the latitude to grant Hezbollah a certificate of innocence, and that, therefore, some sort of negotiation would need to take place for him to save the party from legal condemnation.
There is something there. Certainly, it would be very difficult for Hezbollah to find a Sunni willing to take over from Hariri and scuttle Lebanese cooperation with the STL. No one doubts that the party can strike hard against the state, but it is equally apparent that this could have grave repercussions on civil peace and draw Hezbollah into a debilitating internal political conflict, maybe even a military one. On top of that, nothing ensures the army will approve. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander, Jean Kahwaji, would not welcome a new slap against his institution, particularly if this creates sectarian tension that pushes Sunni soldiers and officers to say enough is enough.
Assuming Hezbollah could be made to consider working with Hariri on an exit strategy for the party – again, no mean feat – what would negotiations seek to achieve? For an approximate answer, we need to know what each side seeks today. Hezbollah wants Hariri to take tangible steps, before indictments are issued, to dissociate Lebanon from the special tribunal and cast doubt on its legitimacy. The party is not asking Hariri to declare it innocent of Rafik Hariri’s assassination because that is the fundamental premise on which Hezbollah is basing its position, something self-evident, so that if any Hezbollah member is named, we must all assume the accusation is politicized.
Hariri, in turn, may be willing to go part of the way to cast some doubt on the tribunal process, particularly if he sees that the indictments may be problematic to prove in court. That is why he prefers to wait until after indictments are issued to decide. But one thing is almost certain: he will not take measures on the tribunal unless he is compelled to do so by his patrons in Saudi Arabia; and, most important, if the Saudis say nothing, he will refuse to delegitimize the institution unless he first extracts concessions from Hezbollah.
What might these concessions be? Hariri is well aware that any demand for the disarmament of Hezbollah is a non-starter. In fact, those close to the prime minister will often repeat that their objective is not to terminate the Resistance. What he might conceivably ask for, however, is some sort of guarantee that the party will put an end to its campaign of domestic intimidation, and perhaps even something more tangible: assurances that Hezbollah will no longer use its weapons in Beirut, limiting this to areas under its effective control.
The chances that such a quid pro quo might come about would be infinitely complicated by Syria, which has no desire to give Hariri any latitude to bargain with Hezbollah, or Hezbollah with Hariri. The Syrians hope to use the tension between the prime minister and the party over indictments as leverage to enhance their own power in Lebanon; and if there is any bargaining to be carried out over the tribunal, then Damascus wants to be the only broker. Then again, neither Hariri nor Nasrallah wants Syria to gain at his expense.
Therefore, is reaching a middle ground possible between Hariri and Hezbollah? It’s not easy to see how, particularly as the prime minister, even if he is one day willing to surrender something on the tribunal, he will not be able to block the trial process altogether. And yet, short of violence or enforcing a national stalemate, which will only harden the resolve on Hariri’s side, Hezbollah has no alternative to embracing a compromise. It could be that Siniora and Hariri are not that clear about what they hope to achieve from such a process, but are now seeking to push Hezbollah to the realization that negotiations are inevitable, in that way defusing the ambient tension. If the party accepts – a big if – then the exchanges could shape the consequences.
Siniora is right about one thing: all options are bad for Hezbollah when it comes to the Hariri case. The party is learning a hard lesson that the convoluted Lebanese sectarian system can strangle those who refuse to respect its ways. Missiles won’t help Hassan Nasrallah this time around. Few victories in Lebanon are ever divine.
Yet how likely is this? The secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, has declared such an outcome an impossibility, in response to an alleged offer from the prime minister, Saad Hariri, that the blame might be placed on the late Imad Mugniyah. However, Hariri’s predecessor, Fouad Siniora, who heads the prime minister’s parliamentary bloc, has hinted that some similar arrangement might be the only way out. Hezbollah need not be responsible for the actions of all of its members, he has repeatedly declared, indicating that the party’s foes would be willing to help it find an outlet to avoid accusations issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
The line of reasoning is this, and Siniora is not the only one pursuing it: Whatever Hezbollah does – bring down or hinder the government, resort to violence or street protests, or even organize a coup against the state – would only push the nail in deeper when it comes to the party’s guilt, without affecting indictments. Implicit in this argument is that Hariri alone has the latitude to grant Hezbollah a certificate of innocence, and that, therefore, some sort of negotiation would need to take place for him to save the party from legal condemnation.
There is something there. Certainly, it would be very difficult for Hezbollah to find a Sunni willing to take over from Hariri and scuttle Lebanese cooperation with the STL. No one doubts that the party can strike hard against the state, but it is equally apparent that this could have grave repercussions on civil peace and draw Hezbollah into a debilitating internal political conflict, maybe even a military one. On top of that, nothing ensures the army will approve. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander, Jean Kahwaji, would not welcome a new slap against his institution, particularly if this creates sectarian tension that pushes Sunni soldiers and officers to say enough is enough.
Assuming Hezbollah could be made to consider working with Hariri on an exit strategy for the party – again, no mean feat – what would negotiations seek to achieve? For an approximate answer, we need to know what each side seeks today. Hezbollah wants Hariri to take tangible steps, before indictments are issued, to dissociate Lebanon from the special tribunal and cast doubt on its legitimacy. The party is not asking Hariri to declare it innocent of Rafik Hariri’s assassination because that is the fundamental premise on which Hezbollah is basing its position, something self-evident, so that if any Hezbollah member is named, we must all assume the accusation is politicized.
Hariri, in turn, may be willing to go part of the way to cast some doubt on the tribunal process, particularly if he sees that the indictments may be problematic to prove in court. That is why he prefers to wait until after indictments are issued to decide. But one thing is almost certain: he will not take measures on the tribunal unless he is compelled to do so by his patrons in Saudi Arabia; and, most important, if the Saudis say nothing, he will refuse to delegitimize the institution unless he first extracts concessions from Hezbollah.
What might these concessions be? Hariri is well aware that any demand for the disarmament of Hezbollah is a non-starter. In fact, those close to the prime minister will often repeat that their objective is not to terminate the Resistance. What he might conceivably ask for, however, is some sort of guarantee that the party will put an end to its campaign of domestic intimidation, and perhaps even something more tangible: assurances that Hezbollah will no longer use its weapons in Beirut, limiting this to areas under its effective control.
The chances that such a quid pro quo might come about would be infinitely complicated by Syria, which has no desire to give Hariri any latitude to bargain with Hezbollah, or Hezbollah with Hariri. The Syrians hope to use the tension between the prime minister and the party over indictments as leverage to enhance their own power in Lebanon; and if there is any bargaining to be carried out over the tribunal, then Damascus wants to be the only broker. Then again, neither Hariri nor Nasrallah wants Syria to gain at his expense.
Therefore, is reaching a middle ground possible between Hariri and Hezbollah? It’s not easy to see how, particularly as the prime minister, even if he is one day willing to surrender something on the tribunal, he will not be able to block the trial process altogether. And yet, short of violence or enforcing a national stalemate, which will only harden the resolve on Hariri’s side, Hezbollah has no alternative to embracing a compromise. It could be that Siniora and Hariri are not that clear about what they hope to achieve from such a process, but are now seeking to push Hezbollah to the realization that negotiations are inevitable, in that way defusing the ambient tension. If the party accepts – a big if – then the exchanges could shape the consequences.
Siniora is right about one thing: all options are bad for Hezbollah when it comes to the Hariri case. The party is learning a hard lesson that the convoluted Lebanese sectarian system can strangle those who refuse to respect its ways. Missiles won’t help Hassan Nasrallah this time around. Few victories in Lebanon are ever divine.
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Who is really the big boss in Lebanon?
Little attention was paid last week to an Al-Hayat interview with the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Ghadanfar Roknabadi, particularly what he had to say about Syria’s role in Lebanon.
The interviewer asked the ambassador whether, in the same way that Iran was “familiar” with Iraq, did not Iran consider that Syria was “familiar” with Lebanon “more than others were.” Therefore, just as Syria had accepted an Iranian solution in Iraq, would not Iran accept a Syrian solution in Lebanon? It was a subtle question, which left out the dreaded words “spheres of interest,” but the substance was clear. Would Iran concur that Syria was entitled to lead in Lebanon?
Roknabadi diplomatically, but firmly, brushed that thought away. Yes, neighboring countries were more familiar with Lebanese details, but then the ambassador added: “Don’t forget the deep civilizational and cultural ties between Iran and Lebanon. The matter of Syria as a neighbor is one thing, and the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria [is something else]; no one can deny Syria’s role, but the old civilizational and cultural ties between the Iranian and Lebanese peoples have established common ground between them.”
The response must have made officials in Damascus cringe. Not only did Roknabadi sidestep the question of a pre-eminent Syrian role in Lebanon, he placed it against the backdrop of the Iranian-Syrian relationship, as if to affirm that Tehran was the leading partner in any Lebanese arrangement. While the Iranians, along with Hizbullah, have continued to look toward a Syrian-Saudi solution to the deadlock in Beirut over how to deal with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, one gets the distinct sense lately, particularly after the speech last Sunday of Hizbullah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, that any such deal is Iran’s and Hizbullah’s to accept or refuse
Iran and Syria are not about to divorce over Lebanon, or over anything else, but Roknabadi put the relationship into perspective. Iran is the dominant actor in Beirut, and can lay claim to that role because ultimately it is Hizbullah that controls the ground and on which Damascus must rely to protect its own interests. It is indeed remarkable that Syria, despite its 29-year military Lebanese presence, was never able to create durable institutions of influence. Syrian-sponsored groups and politicians remain exceptionally feeble politically; Damascus has never had any “soft power” to deploy in Lebanon; and almost anyone who thinks back to the years of Syrian hegemony would mainly remember it as a time of organized pillage. Had Syria not had Hizbullah to bolster its authority, most of its Lebanese partisans would have long been swept away.
Still, Syria does have considerable political resources. Damascus retains a power of veto over most matters, and even if the coordination between Hizbullah and Syria may not be what it once was, it nevertheless remains relatively close, with Hizbullah keen to avoid any major confrontation with the Syrians. The same goes for Iran. At the same time, the Syrians, even though they hope to revive the authority they had in Lebanon before 2005, are very unlikely to risk their relationship with Iran or Hizbullah to achieve that.
In order to compensate for its shortcomings, the Syrian regime has played on Lebanese contradictions. By opening a new page with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, under Saudi auspices, Damascus to an extent managed to win over a majority of Sunnis, or at least lessen Sunni hostility. Hariri has seen advantages in this, mainly curbing Hizbullah’s ability to attack him and his government. What the prime minister realizes is that Syria cannot afford to allow Hizbullah to decisively weaken him, since that would mean weakening a prime Syrian card.
By the same token, however, Syria will not permit Hariri to neutralize Hizbullah, let alone demand its disarmament, through possible indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, since that, too, would dent Syrian power. The ideal situation for the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, is one of confrontation between Hariri and Hizbullah until the tribunal issues indictments. At that stage, Assad could enter the fray as the broker of a domestic political resolution and take from both sides, to Syria’s advantage. That is why Syria has not brought down the government, though it could easily do so; and it is why Hariri, well aware of what Assad has in mind, has stood firm.
The stalemate may last. Even if the tribunal prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, were to send draft indictments today to the pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, these would probably not be confirmed until early next year. The process calls for Fransen to issue a written legal opinion on the indictments, which could take several weeks to prepare, not taking into consideration the slowdown for the end-of-year holidays. Fransen may also ask Bellemare to revise some counts. The notion that indictments will be finalized before Christmas seems fanciful.
Nasrallah’s latest speech was once again directed in part at the Syrians. The secretary general wants the Lebanese government to begin the process of wrecking the tribunal before indictments come out. That he has been unable to impose this is certainly, to an extent, a consequence of the Syrian refusal to sign off on such a course of action. Hariri’s visit to Iran was, among other things, an effort to earn Iranian goodwill and buy time on that front (as well as a gambit to make him more desirable to Syria), though Nasrallah pointedly mocked the prime minister’s trips. It is conceivable that Hariri’s Iranian sojourn limited his margin of maneuver, with Tehran now having more leverage over him. We will soon see where Nasrallah’s brinkmanship leads, but Syria, displeased with Hariri’s opening to the Islamic Republic, may be in even less of a mood to give Hizbullah a green light.
Meanwhile, the much-awaited Syrian-Saudi “solution” apparently awaits the return home of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, who is undergoing medical treatment in the United States. The clock is ticking away toward an indictment. What ultimately happens will be shaped by the complex interplay of the frequently divergent interests of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hizbullah and Saad Hariri.
The interviewer asked the ambassador whether, in the same way that Iran was “familiar” with Iraq, did not Iran consider that Syria was “familiar” with Lebanon “more than others were.” Therefore, just as Syria had accepted an Iranian solution in Iraq, would not Iran accept a Syrian solution in Lebanon? It was a subtle question, which left out the dreaded words “spheres of interest,” but the substance was clear. Would Iran concur that Syria was entitled to lead in Lebanon?
Roknabadi diplomatically, but firmly, brushed that thought away. Yes, neighboring countries were more familiar with Lebanese details, but then the ambassador added: “Don’t forget the deep civilizational and cultural ties between Iran and Lebanon. The matter of Syria as a neighbor is one thing, and the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria [is something else]; no one can deny Syria’s role, but the old civilizational and cultural ties between the Iranian and Lebanese peoples have established common ground between them.”
The response must have made officials in Damascus cringe. Not only did Roknabadi sidestep the question of a pre-eminent Syrian role in Lebanon, he placed it against the backdrop of the Iranian-Syrian relationship, as if to affirm that Tehran was the leading partner in any Lebanese arrangement. While the Iranians, along with Hizbullah, have continued to look toward a Syrian-Saudi solution to the deadlock in Beirut over how to deal with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, one gets the distinct sense lately, particularly after the speech last Sunday of Hizbullah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, that any such deal is Iran’s and Hizbullah’s to accept or refuse
Iran and Syria are not about to divorce over Lebanon, or over anything else, but Roknabadi put the relationship into perspective. Iran is the dominant actor in Beirut, and can lay claim to that role because ultimately it is Hizbullah that controls the ground and on which Damascus must rely to protect its own interests. It is indeed remarkable that Syria, despite its 29-year military Lebanese presence, was never able to create durable institutions of influence. Syrian-sponsored groups and politicians remain exceptionally feeble politically; Damascus has never had any “soft power” to deploy in Lebanon; and almost anyone who thinks back to the years of Syrian hegemony would mainly remember it as a time of organized pillage. Had Syria not had Hizbullah to bolster its authority, most of its Lebanese partisans would have long been swept away.
Still, Syria does have considerable political resources. Damascus retains a power of veto over most matters, and even if the coordination between Hizbullah and Syria may not be what it once was, it nevertheless remains relatively close, with Hizbullah keen to avoid any major confrontation with the Syrians. The same goes for Iran. At the same time, the Syrians, even though they hope to revive the authority they had in Lebanon before 2005, are very unlikely to risk their relationship with Iran or Hizbullah to achieve that.
In order to compensate for its shortcomings, the Syrian regime has played on Lebanese contradictions. By opening a new page with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, under Saudi auspices, Damascus to an extent managed to win over a majority of Sunnis, or at least lessen Sunni hostility. Hariri has seen advantages in this, mainly curbing Hizbullah’s ability to attack him and his government. What the prime minister realizes is that Syria cannot afford to allow Hizbullah to decisively weaken him, since that would mean weakening a prime Syrian card.
By the same token, however, Syria will not permit Hariri to neutralize Hizbullah, let alone demand its disarmament, through possible indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, since that, too, would dent Syrian power. The ideal situation for the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, is one of confrontation between Hariri and Hizbullah until the tribunal issues indictments. At that stage, Assad could enter the fray as the broker of a domestic political resolution and take from both sides, to Syria’s advantage. That is why Syria has not brought down the government, though it could easily do so; and it is why Hariri, well aware of what Assad has in mind, has stood firm.
The stalemate may last. Even if the tribunal prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, were to send draft indictments today to the pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, these would probably not be confirmed until early next year. The process calls for Fransen to issue a written legal opinion on the indictments, which could take several weeks to prepare, not taking into consideration the slowdown for the end-of-year holidays. Fransen may also ask Bellemare to revise some counts. The notion that indictments will be finalized before Christmas seems fanciful.
Nasrallah’s latest speech was once again directed in part at the Syrians. The secretary general wants the Lebanese government to begin the process of wrecking the tribunal before indictments come out. That he has been unable to impose this is certainly, to an extent, a consequence of the Syrian refusal to sign off on such a course of action. Hariri’s visit to Iran was, among other things, an effort to earn Iranian goodwill and buy time on that front (as well as a gambit to make him more desirable to Syria), though Nasrallah pointedly mocked the prime minister’s trips. It is conceivable that Hariri’s Iranian sojourn limited his margin of maneuver, with Tehran now having more leverage over him. We will soon see where Nasrallah’s brinkmanship leads, but Syria, displeased with Hariri’s opening to the Islamic Republic, may be in even less of a mood to give Hizbullah a green light.
Meanwhile, the much-awaited Syrian-Saudi “solution” apparently awaits the return home of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, who is undergoing medical treatment in the United States. The clock is ticking away toward an indictment. What ultimately happens will be shaped by the complex interplay of the frequently divergent interests of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hizbullah and Saad Hariri.
Who is really the big boss in Lebanon?
Little attention was paid last week to an Al-Hayat interview with the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Ghadanfar Roknabadi, particularly what he had to say about Syria’s role in Lebanon.
The interviewer asked the ambassador whether, in the same way that Iran was “familiar” with Iraq, did not Iran consider that Syria was “familiar” with Lebanon “more than others were.” Therefore, just as Syria had accepted an Iranian solution in Iraq, would not Iran accept a Syrian solution in Lebanon? It was a subtle question, which left out the dreaded words “spheres of interest,” but the substance was clear. Would Iran concur that Syria was entitled to lead in Lebanon?
Roknabadi diplomatically, but firmly, brushed that thought away. Yes, neighboring countries were more familiar with Lebanese details, but then the ambassador added: “Don’t forget the deep civilizational and cultural ties between Iran and Lebanon. The matter of Syria as a neighbor is one thing, and the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria [is something else]; no one can deny Syria’s role, but the old civilizational and cultural ties between the Iranian and Lebanese peoples have established common ground between them.”
The response must have made officials in Damascus cringe. Not only did Roknabadi sidestep the question of a pre-eminent Syrian role in Lebanon, he placed it against the backdrop of the Iranian-Syrian relationship, as if to affirm that Tehran was the leading partner in any Lebanese arrangement. While the Iranians, along with Hizbullah, have continued to look toward a Syrian-Saudi solution to the deadlock in Beirut over how to deal with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, one gets the distinct sense lately, particularly after the speech last Sunday of Hizbullah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, that any such deal is Iran’s and Hizbullah’s to accept or refuse
Iran and Syria are not about to divorce over Lebanon, or over anything else, but Roknabadi put the relationship into perspective. Iran is the dominant actor in Beirut, and can lay claim to that role because ultimately it is Hizbullah that controls the ground and on which Damascus must rely to protect its own interests. It is indeed remarkable that Syria, despite its 29-year military Lebanese presence, was never able to create durable institutions of influence. Syrian-sponsored groups and politicians remain exceptionally feeble politically; Damascus has never had any “soft power” to deploy in Lebanon; and almost anyone who thinks back to the years of Syrian hegemony would mainly remember it as a time of organized pillage. Had Syria not had Hizbullah to bolster its authority, most of its Lebanese partisans would have long been swept away.
Still, Syria does have considerable political resources. Damascus retains a power of veto over most matters, and even if the coordination between Hizbullah and Syria may not be what it once was, it nevertheless remains relatively close, with Hizbullah keen to avoid any major confrontation with the Syrians. The same goes for Iran. At the same time, the Syrians, even though they hope to revive the authority they had in Lebanon before 2005, are very unlikely to risk their relationship with Iran or Hizbullah to achieve that.
In order to compensate for its shortcomings, the Syrian regime has played on Lebanese contradictions. By opening a new page with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, under Saudi auspices, Damascus to an extent managed to win over a majority of Sunnis, or at least lessen Sunni hostility. Hariri has seen advantages in this, mainly curbing Hizbullah’s ability to attack him and his government. What the prime minister realizes is that Syria cannot afford to allow Hizbullah to decisively weaken him, since that would mean weakening a prime Syrian card.
By the same token, however, Syria will not permit Hariri to neutralize Hizbullah, let alone demand its disarmament, through possible indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, since that, too, would dent Syrian power. The ideal situation for the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, is one of confrontation between Hariri and Hizbullah until the tribunal issues indictments. At that stage, Assad could enter the fray as the broker of a domestic political resolution and take from both sides, to Syria’s advantage. That is why Syria has not brought down the government, though it could easily do so; and it is why Hariri, well aware of what Assad has in mind, has stood firm.
The stalemate may last. Even if the tribunal prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, were to send draft indictments today to the pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, these would probably not be confirmed until early next year. The process calls for Fransen to issue a written legal opinion on the indictments, which could take several weeks to prepare, not taking into consideration the slowdown for the end-of-year holidays. Fransen may also ask Bellemare to revise some counts. The notion that indictments will be finalized before Christmas seems fanciful.
Nasrallah’s latest speech was once again directed in part at the Syrians. The secretary general wants the Lebanese government to begin the process of wrecking the tribunal before indictments come out. That he has been unable to impose this is certainly, to an extent, a consequence of the Syrian refusal to sign off on such a course of action. Hariri’s visit to Iran was, among other things, an effort to earn Iranian goodwill and buy time on that front (as well as a gambit to make him more desirable to Syria), though Nasrallah pointedly mocked the prime minister’s trips. It is conceivable that Hariri’s Iranian sojourn limited his margin of maneuver, with Tehran now having more leverage over him. We will soon see where Nasrallah’s brinkmanship leads, but Syria, displeased with Hariri’s opening to the Islamic Republic, may be in even less of a mood to give Hizbullah a green light.
Meanwhile, the much-awaited Syrian-Saudi “solution” apparently awaits the return home of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, who is undergoing medical treatment in the United States. The clock is ticking away toward an indictment. What ultimately happens will be shaped by the complex interplay of the frequently divergent interests of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hizbullah and Saad Hariri.
The interviewer asked the ambassador whether, in the same way that Iran was “familiar” with Iraq, did not Iran consider that Syria was “familiar” with Lebanon “more than others were.” Therefore, just as Syria had accepted an Iranian solution in Iraq, would not Iran accept a Syrian solution in Lebanon? It was a subtle question, which left out the dreaded words “spheres of interest,” but the substance was clear. Would Iran concur that Syria was entitled to lead in Lebanon?
Roknabadi diplomatically, but firmly, brushed that thought away. Yes, neighboring countries were more familiar with Lebanese details, but then the ambassador added: “Don’t forget the deep civilizational and cultural ties between Iran and Lebanon. The matter of Syria as a neighbor is one thing, and the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria [is something else]; no one can deny Syria’s role, but the old civilizational and cultural ties between the Iranian and Lebanese peoples have established common ground between them.”
The response must have made officials in Damascus cringe. Not only did Roknabadi sidestep the question of a pre-eminent Syrian role in Lebanon, he placed it against the backdrop of the Iranian-Syrian relationship, as if to affirm that Tehran was the leading partner in any Lebanese arrangement. While the Iranians, along with Hizbullah, have continued to look toward a Syrian-Saudi solution to the deadlock in Beirut over how to deal with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, one gets the distinct sense lately, particularly after the speech last Sunday of Hizbullah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, that any such deal is Iran’s and Hizbullah’s to accept or refuse
Iran and Syria are not about to divorce over Lebanon, or over anything else, but Roknabadi put the relationship into perspective. Iran is the dominant actor in Beirut, and can lay claim to that role because ultimately it is Hizbullah that controls the ground and on which Damascus must rely to protect its own interests. It is indeed remarkable that Syria, despite its 29-year military Lebanese presence, was never able to create durable institutions of influence. Syrian-sponsored groups and politicians remain exceptionally feeble politically; Damascus has never had any “soft power” to deploy in Lebanon; and almost anyone who thinks back to the years of Syrian hegemony would mainly remember it as a time of organized pillage. Had Syria not had Hizbullah to bolster its authority, most of its Lebanese partisans would have long been swept away.
Still, Syria does have considerable political resources. Damascus retains a power of veto over most matters, and even if the coordination between Hizbullah and Syria may not be what it once was, it nevertheless remains relatively close, with Hizbullah keen to avoid any major confrontation with the Syrians. The same goes for Iran. At the same time, the Syrians, even though they hope to revive the authority they had in Lebanon before 2005, are very unlikely to risk their relationship with Iran or Hizbullah to achieve that.
In order to compensate for its shortcomings, the Syrian regime has played on Lebanese contradictions. By opening a new page with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, under Saudi auspices, Damascus to an extent managed to win over a majority of Sunnis, or at least lessen Sunni hostility. Hariri has seen advantages in this, mainly curbing Hizbullah’s ability to attack him and his government. What the prime minister realizes is that Syria cannot afford to allow Hizbullah to decisively weaken him, since that would mean weakening a prime Syrian card.
By the same token, however, Syria will not permit Hariri to neutralize Hizbullah, let alone demand its disarmament, through possible indictments issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, since that, too, would dent Syrian power. The ideal situation for the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, is one of confrontation between Hariri and Hizbullah until the tribunal issues indictments. At that stage, Assad could enter the fray as the broker of a domestic political resolution and take from both sides, to Syria’s advantage. That is why Syria has not brought down the government, though it could easily do so; and it is why Hariri, well aware of what Assad has in mind, has stood firm.
The stalemate may last. Even if the tribunal prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, were to send draft indictments today to the pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, these would probably not be confirmed until early next year. The process calls for Fransen to issue a written legal opinion on the indictments, which could take several weeks to prepare, not taking into consideration the slowdown for the end-of-year holidays. Fransen may also ask Bellemare to revise some counts. The notion that indictments will be finalized before Christmas seems fanciful.
Nasrallah’s latest speech was once again directed in part at the Syrians. The secretary general wants the Lebanese government to begin the process of wrecking the tribunal before indictments come out. That he has been unable to impose this is certainly, to an extent, a consequence of the Syrian refusal to sign off on such a course of action. Hariri’s visit to Iran was, among other things, an effort to earn Iranian goodwill and buy time on that front (as well as a gambit to make him more desirable to Syria), though Nasrallah pointedly mocked the prime minister’s trips. It is conceivable that Hariri’s Iranian sojourn limited his margin of maneuver, with Tehran now having more leverage over him. We will soon see where Nasrallah’s brinkmanship leads, but Syria, displeased with Hariri’s opening to the Islamic Republic, may be in even less of a mood to give Hizbullah a green light.
Meanwhile, the much-awaited Syrian-Saudi “solution” apparently awaits the return home of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, who is undergoing medical treatment in the United States. The clock is ticking away toward an indictment. What ultimately happens will be shaped by the complex interplay of the frequently divergent interests of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hizbullah and Saad Hariri.
Thursday, November 25, 2010
Trials and tribulations for Mr. Bellemare
The documentary aired by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation earlier this week has set in motion various conspiracy theories. However, the urgent question is what the information disclosed means for the case that will be presented by Daniel Bellemare, the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, presumably in the near future.
The program provides compelling evidence of Hizbullah’s alleged involvement in the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, based mainly on telephone analyses. These analyses, the CBC contends, were significantly advanced by the doggedness of the late Internal Security Forces captain, Wissam Eid, who was assassinated in January 2008. Eid’s boss, Colonel Samir Shehadeh, miraculously survived an earlier assassination attempt in September 2006.
Several things can be said about the matter. The first is that the detailed information in the documentary was not handed over recently to the journalist who broke the story, Neil Macdonald, therefore is not tied into recent political developments, as some are contending. This I know because I had heard that such documents were circulating at the beginning of this year (although I was unaware of their content). If one had to guess, the highly sensitive documents were passed on to Macdonald by someone unhappy with the lack of progress in the investigation. It’s best to keep an open mind on the agenda of a leaker, or leakers, but much of what Macdonald says about the shortcomings of the United Nations investigation between 2006 and 2008 under the stewardship of Serge Brammertz, like his criticism of Bellemare’s investigative and management skills, has long been echoed by others working with the investigation or familiar with its progress.
But let’s give Bellemare the benefit of the doubt. Unlike Brammertz, he appears to have seriously tried to investigate, even if the results until now remain, at best, uncertain. However, on the basis of the CBC report, does the prosecutor have enough to make his indictments stick – bearing in mind that we may not necessarily see indictments soon. Bellemare must first earn the formal approval of the pretrial judge, and this will be determined by the strength of his legal arguments. If these are found wanting, the prosecutor may be asked to rework his indictments.
Assuming his indictments are accepted, however, and that the details provided in the CBC documentary represent the core of Bellemare’s arguments, could he easily win a trial? Surprisingly, the revelations, regardless of how forceful they may look, suggest the prosecutor has a tough judicial climb ahead of him. Here’s why.
If the telephone analyses are Bellemare’s best shot, then as Macdonald pointed out in an article posted on the CBC website, he will first have to prove that the telephones used in the Hariri assassination were actually in the hands of Hizbullah members. Unless he has witness testimony affirming this, or suspects in custody willing to speak up, providing proof will not be easy. In fact it seems increasingly likely that Bellemare will suffer from two major handicaps in convincing the judges: his case may largely be conducted with suspects tried in absentia; and because of the dearth of witness testimony, brought on by Hizbullah’s secretive nature and its refusal to cooperate with the tribunal, the prosecutor may be overly reliant on circumstantial evidence – in other words indirect evidence that leads to conclusions effectively reached through deduction.
In an interview conducted with the Now Lebanon website last August, Bellemare defended circumstantial evidence, declaring “I am strongly of the view that circumstantial evidence is more powerful than direct evidence.” Circumstantial evidence is doubtless important in certain situations, but most lawyers would count it as less persuasive, and more difficult to prove, than witness testimony and documentary or physical evidence. There is also the matter of how much circumstantial evidence a prosecutor relies upon. That is especially relevant to Bellemare.
In a vast conspiracy like the assassination of Rafik Hariri, there are multiple circles of involvement and different levels of decision-making. For Bellemare to win his case, he will need to peel back the many layers and identify who did what when, and who said what to whom. He will need to shed light on significant segments of the crime to expose the whole. The most effective way of doing so is to have suspects in hand willing to spill the beans, and physical or documentary evidence to lend credence to what they say. But to prosecute a complex political killing by relying heavily on conclusions reached through deduction against suspects most or all of whom are not in court can only favor the defense.
No matter how compelling is the material passed on to the CBC, it only casts light on a small corner of the Hariri assassination, and most probably not the one disclosing who ordered the crime. That is why Brammertz’s two years in office were so damaging. The former commissioner focused on crime scene analysis, failed to arrest new suspects, pushed the burden of telephone analysis onto the Lebanese, and more generally did not competently advance his investigation. This was perhaps unintentional, but I am increasingly convinced it was intentional.
Now we are hearing Hizbullah and its political allies stating that Israel has infiltrated the telephone network, as if that will somehow help discredit the CBC’s information. But what the party must now accept is that this latest information cannot be explained away by false witnesses. It is considerably more difficult for the prime minister, Saad Hariri, to dismiss the hard work of Wissam Eid – work that ultimately cost the ISF captain his life – and subsequently that of UN telecom analysts, than it is for him to swallow the insidious idiocy of the false witnesses claim.
But come to think of it, who did kill Eid? Was it the Israelis? If so, that makes no sense at all, since his conclusions were pointing in the direction of Hizbullah, which is precisely, one assumes, what the Israelis wanted. The more those opposed to the tribunal try to manufacture ways to undermine its work, the more absurd their contortions become. Most worrisome is that UN ineptitude or manipulation may have already undermined the possibility of a successful prosecution, when or if the trial ever begins.
The program provides compelling evidence of Hizbullah’s alleged involvement in the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, based mainly on telephone analyses. These analyses, the CBC contends, were significantly advanced by the doggedness of the late Internal Security Forces captain, Wissam Eid, who was assassinated in January 2008. Eid’s boss, Colonel Samir Shehadeh, miraculously survived an earlier assassination attempt in September 2006.
Several things can be said about the matter. The first is that the detailed information in the documentary was not handed over recently to the journalist who broke the story, Neil Macdonald, therefore is not tied into recent political developments, as some are contending. This I know because I had heard that such documents were circulating at the beginning of this year (although I was unaware of their content). If one had to guess, the highly sensitive documents were passed on to Macdonald by someone unhappy with the lack of progress in the investigation. It’s best to keep an open mind on the agenda of a leaker, or leakers, but much of what Macdonald says about the shortcomings of the United Nations investigation between 2006 and 2008 under the stewardship of Serge Brammertz, like his criticism of Bellemare’s investigative and management skills, has long been echoed by others working with the investigation or familiar with its progress.
But let’s give Bellemare the benefit of the doubt. Unlike Brammertz, he appears to have seriously tried to investigate, even if the results until now remain, at best, uncertain. However, on the basis of the CBC report, does the prosecutor have enough to make his indictments stick – bearing in mind that we may not necessarily see indictments soon. Bellemare must first earn the formal approval of the pretrial judge, and this will be determined by the strength of his legal arguments. If these are found wanting, the prosecutor may be asked to rework his indictments.
Assuming his indictments are accepted, however, and that the details provided in the CBC documentary represent the core of Bellemare’s arguments, could he easily win a trial? Surprisingly, the revelations, regardless of how forceful they may look, suggest the prosecutor has a tough judicial climb ahead of him. Here’s why.
If the telephone analyses are Bellemare’s best shot, then as Macdonald pointed out in an article posted on the CBC website, he will first have to prove that the telephones used in the Hariri assassination were actually in the hands of Hizbullah members. Unless he has witness testimony affirming this, or suspects in custody willing to speak up, providing proof will not be easy. In fact it seems increasingly likely that Bellemare will suffer from two major handicaps in convincing the judges: his case may largely be conducted with suspects tried in absentia; and because of the dearth of witness testimony, brought on by Hizbullah’s secretive nature and its refusal to cooperate with the tribunal, the prosecutor may be overly reliant on circumstantial evidence – in other words indirect evidence that leads to conclusions effectively reached through deduction.
In an interview conducted with the Now Lebanon website last August, Bellemare defended circumstantial evidence, declaring “I am strongly of the view that circumstantial evidence is more powerful than direct evidence.” Circumstantial evidence is doubtless important in certain situations, but most lawyers would count it as less persuasive, and more difficult to prove, than witness testimony and documentary or physical evidence. There is also the matter of how much circumstantial evidence a prosecutor relies upon. That is especially relevant to Bellemare.
In a vast conspiracy like the assassination of Rafik Hariri, there are multiple circles of involvement and different levels of decision-making. For Bellemare to win his case, he will need to peel back the many layers and identify who did what when, and who said what to whom. He will need to shed light on significant segments of the crime to expose the whole. The most effective way of doing so is to have suspects in hand willing to spill the beans, and physical or documentary evidence to lend credence to what they say. But to prosecute a complex political killing by relying heavily on conclusions reached through deduction against suspects most or all of whom are not in court can only favor the defense.
No matter how compelling is the material passed on to the CBC, it only casts light on a small corner of the Hariri assassination, and most probably not the one disclosing who ordered the crime. That is why Brammertz’s two years in office were so damaging. The former commissioner focused on crime scene analysis, failed to arrest new suspects, pushed the burden of telephone analysis onto the Lebanese, and more generally did not competently advance his investigation. This was perhaps unintentional, but I am increasingly convinced it was intentional.
Now we are hearing Hizbullah and its political allies stating that Israel has infiltrated the telephone network, as if that will somehow help discredit the CBC’s information. But what the party must now accept is that this latest information cannot be explained away by false witnesses. It is considerably more difficult for the prime minister, Saad Hariri, to dismiss the hard work of Wissam Eid – work that ultimately cost the ISF captain his life – and subsequently that of UN telecom analysts, than it is for him to swallow the insidious idiocy of the false witnesses claim.
But come to think of it, who did kill Eid? Was it the Israelis? If so, that makes no sense at all, since his conclusions were pointing in the direction of Hizbullah, which is precisely, one assumes, what the Israelis wanted. The more those opposed to the tribunal try to manufacture ways to undermine its work, the more absurd their contortions become. Most worrisome is that UN ineptitude or manipulation may have already undermined the possibility of a successful prosecution, when or if the trial ever begins.
Friday, November 19, 2010
Trial or error?
After more than a year of doing nothing to burnish its public image, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has lately gone the extra mile to familiarize journalists with its activities. This hasn’t brought greater insights into the investigation of the Rafik Hariri assassination, but it has created a sense among Lebanese that things are moving ahead on the trial front and that success might follow.
It is a pity, then, that success might not necessarily follow, even though this would represent a letdown of incalculable proportions. The attention of the Lebanese is on the indictments that will be issued by Daniel Bellemare, the STL prosecutor. Their interest is largely political, particularly if Hezbollah members are accused. However, from a judicial standpoint, indictments are only a first step, after which a long and complex legal process will unfold. Success can only really be measured by whether or not Bellemare identifies, and the tribunal punishes, both those who commissioned the assassination and who facilitated it.
Anyone who seeks a measure of justice would wish Bellemare the best. The push to blame so-called false witnesses will fail, because what Hezbollah and its allies seek to impose is a charade that forces supporters of the tribunal to engage in monstrous self-deception.
Then again, party pressure can sometimes work. On Thursday, it was reported that the BBC had pulled a documentary on the Hariri assassination, allegedly because it had not complied with editorial guidelines. More likely, as The Guardian reported, the BBC climbed down after journalist Ibrahim Amin of the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar newspaper wrote that the intention of the program was “to implicate Hezbollah in the crime.” If the BBC caved in, then that is disconcerting news. On the other hand, other foreign documentaries are soon coming out on the killing, and no amount of intimidation in Beirut will stop that.
More problematic is the kind of case that Bellemare puts together. It seems likely that he has enough evidence to implicate certain individuals, and if we are to believe Hezbollah’s secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, party members will be blamed. Since Nasrallah has threatened to cut off the hands of whoever tries to arrest Hezbollah suspects, and since the Lebanese state is unlikely to test his resolve on that vow, the chances of a trial in absentia remain very high.
If the trial takes place in absentia, Bellemare will probably be lacking in witness testimony. While United Nations investigators did collect testimony in 2005, it is no secret that the commissioner at the time, Detlev Mehlis, was working mainly on the assumption that Syria had ordered the crime. That hypothesis was never abandoned by Mehlis’ successors. However, the most compelling electronic evidence that landed in the lap of the first commissioner after Mehlis, Serge Brammertz (who apparently, sensing the dangers, ordered that it be handed over to the Lebanese), and then Bellemare – evidence based primarily on the analysis of telephone communications — pointed to one angle of the crime, namely the circle of people who facilitated the assassination by reporting on Rafik Hariri’s movements.
Bellemare still has the testimony that Mehlis collected, but if he is wanting in witnesses on Hezbollah’s potential involvement in the crime, he may have to rely inordinately on other forms of evidence. And while his documentary and physical evidence might be persuasive, it is unclear whether or not it would be enough to reconstruct the decision-making hierarchy and specifics of Hariri’s killing. If so, Bellemare might have to depend more on circumstantial evidence, which means evidence derived through deduction from other facts.
And if Bellemare bases his indictments largely on telephone analyses and circumstantial evidence, but does not have much testimony to corroborate his information, then it will be difficult for him to win his case. Indeed, his delay in issuing indictments, one suspects, may come from the fact that he has had to firm up the circumstantial evidence to remove all possible doubts about what he will contend.
Once Bellemare issues indictments, the defense will have several months to prepare a rebuttal. The initial passion among the Lebanese for and against his decisions will be lost in a haze of procedural jousting between prosecution and defense. Yet it is then that we will be able to say whether Bellemare’s efforts might bear fruit or not. More significantly, it is then that we will be able to determine whether or not the two years of Serge Brammertz between 2006 and 2008, when the second commissioner arrested no suspects and did relatively little to advance his investigation, was fatal to the prosecution’s endeavors.
Unfortunately, the indictments, when they come, will not in any way spell triumph. We Lebanese should step back and take a deep breath. Politics is one thing, but an accomplished judicial course of action is something entirely different. Our tendency has been to confuse the two, and we may end up, not for the first time, deeply disappointed.
It is a pity, then, that success might not necessarily follow, even though this would represent a letdown of incalculable proportions. The attention of the Lebanese is on the indictments that will be issued by Daniel Bellemare, the STL prosecutor. Their interest is largely political, particularly if Hezbollah members are accused. However, from a judicial standpoint, indictments are only a first step, after which a long and complex legal process will unfold. Success can only really be measured by whether or not Bellemare identifies, and the tribunal punishes, both those who commissioned the assassination and who facilitated it.
Anyone who seeks a measure of justice would wish Bellemare the best. The push to blame so-called false witnesses will fail, because what Hezbollah and its allies seek to impose is a charade that forces supporters of the tribunal to engage in monstrous self-deception.
Then again, party pressure can sometimes work. On Thursday, it was reported that the BBC had pulled a documentary on the Hariri assassination, allegedly because it had not complied with editorial guidelines. More likely, as The Guardian reported, the BBC climbed down after journalist Ibrahim Amin of the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar newspaper wrote that the intention of the program was “to implicate Hezbollah in the crime.” If the BBC caved in, then that is disconcerting news. On the other hand, other foreign documentaries are soon coming out on the killing, and no amount of intimidation in Beirut will stop that.
More problematic is the kind of case that Bellemare puts together. It seems likely that he has enough evidence to implicate certain individuals, and if we are to believe Hezbollah’s secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, party members will be blamed. Since Nasrallah has threatened to cut off the hands of whoever tries to arrest Hezbollah suspects, and since the Lebanese state is unlikely to test his resolve on that vow, the chances of a trial in absentia remain very high.
If the trial takes place in absentia, Bellemare will probably be lacking in witness testimony. While United Nations investigators did collect testimony in 2005, it is no secret that the commissioner at the time, Detlev Mehlis, was working mainly on the assumption that Syria had ordered the crime. That hypothesis was never abandoned by Mehlis’ successors. However, the most compelling electronic evidence that landed in the lap of the first commissioner after Mehlis, Serge Brammertz (who apparently, sensing the dangers, ordered that it be handed over to the Lebanese), and then Bellemare – evidence based primarily on the analysis of telephone communications — pointed to one angle of the crime, namely the circle of people who facilitated the assassination by reporting on Rafik Hariri’s movements.
Bellemare still has the testimony that Mehlis collected, but if he is wanting in witnesses on Hezbollah’s potential involvement in the crime, he may have to rely inordinately on other forms of evidence. And while his documentary and physical evidence might be persuasive, it is unclear whether or not it would be enough to reconstruct the decision-making hierarchy and specifics of Hariri’s killing. If so, Bellemare might have to depend more on circumstantial evidence, which means evidence derived through deduction from other facts.
And if Bellemare bases his indictments largely on telephone analyses and circumstantial evidence, but does not have much testimony to corroborate his information, then it will be difficult for him to win his case. Indeed, his delay in issuing indictments, one suspects, may come from the fact that he has had to firm up the circumstantial evidence to remove all possible doubts about what he will contend.
Once Bellemare issues indictments, the defense will have several months to prepare a rebuttal. The initial passion among the Lebanese for and against his decisions will be lost in a haze of procedural jousting between prosecution and defense. Yet it is then that we will be able to say whether Bellemare’s efforts might bear fruit or not. More significantly, it is then that we will be able to determine whether or not the two years of Serge Brammertz between 2006 and 2008, when the second commissioner arrested no suspects and did relatively little to advance his investigation, was fatal to the prosecution’s endeavors.
Unfortunately, the indictments, when they come, will not in any way spell triumph. We Lebanese should step back and take a deep breath. Politics is one thing, but an accomplished judicial course of action is something entirely different. Our tendency has been to confuse the two, and we may end up, not for the first time, deeply disappointed.
Thursday, October 7, 2010
Syria's sleight of hand gives it regional standing
If any relationship today speaks to the new dynamics in the Middle East, it is that between Syria and Saudi Arabia.
The volatile nature of those dynamics has complicated ties between Riyadh and Damascus, when the Saudi regime would have preferred more clarity. At the heart of Saudi worries is Iraq, while at the centre of Syria's preoccupations is Lebanon.
Earlier this month the two countries sought to reach an understanding that might advance their interests in both places. At a summit in Damascus, followed by a visit to Beirut, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Bashar Assad of Syria agreed to a deal that went something like this: Syria would collaborate with the Saudis in derailing the appointment of Nouri al Maliki as prime minister of Iraq, while the Saudis would push Saad Hariri, Lebanon's prime minister who is politically beholden to Riyadh, to end his government's co-operation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established to try suspects in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Syria remains the major suspect in the crime.
In Lebanon, the two Arab leaders endorsed a statement that Lebanese disputes would be settled in the framework of the national unity government. This was regarded as an effort to avert violence in light of Hizbollah's threats that all options were open to the party to undermine Lebanese support for the tribunal, which its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, had described as an "Israeli project".
The understanding stabilised Lebanon, but not for long. Each side felt the other had not respected its engagements. Syria, with few means to shape Iraqi affairs and facing Iranian and American backing for Mr al Maliki's return, rallied to that option. In turn the Syrians accused the Saudis of failing to push Mr Hariri to abandon the tribunal, even though they had compelled the prime minister to make a statement to a Saudi newspaper casting doubt on the institution's work and virtually declaring Syria innocent of his father's killing.
Despite the strains, the Syrians and Saudis will probably try to preserve their understanding. The Saudis are deeply uneasy that Mr al Maliki may come back, and even more so that this was facilitated by Iran and blessed by the United States.
For Riyadh, the new situation only consolidates an Iranian-led Shiite order in Baghdad, even if one can dispute that Mr al Maliki is Tehran's stooge. Consequently, the Saudis hope to gain by maintaining open channels to Syria, since both need to retain a hand in Iraqi affairs as part of their regional leverage.
In Lebanon, the situation is thornier. The Saudis have effectively signed off on a Syrian political revival there, hoping this will contain Hizbollah. However, Riyadh holds a weak hand. The Syrians have spent more time undercutting Mr Hariri than they have treating him as an ally. Thanks to the tension over the special tribunal, Mr Assad has been playing Mr Hariri off against Hizbollah to Syria's advantage, while strengthening his ties with Iran. Indeed, last week the Syrian president made a much-publicised visit to Tehran, reiterating the closeness of the Syrian-Iranian relationship.
The Saudis are gambling that Syrian self-interest will prevail in Lebanon. Mr Assad wants to dominate alone, they believe, and seeks once again to make Lebanon more a Syrian than an Iranian card. That may be true, and it is why Mr Hariri continues to defend his reconciliation with Syria, even though last weekend the Syrian judiciary issued arrest warrants for Lebanese officials and journalists, most of whom are close to the prime minister. The problem with the Saudi calculation is that if Mr Assad does reassert Syrian hegemony in Beirut, Mr Hariri and the Saudis will be marginalised.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Saudis were at the heart of the Arab balancing game, their principal objective to ward instability away from the kingdom's borders while ensuring that no one rival gained the upper hand in the region. Syria took advantage of this, earning Saudi approval for its military takeover of Lebanon, while also aligning itself with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, against the Arab consensus. For Hafez Assad this served several purposes: it allowed him to counterbalance his great foe, Saddam Hussein; it made gaining Syrian approval more expensive for the Arab states; and it allowed Assad to manoeuvre between the Arabs and Iran, permitting him to exploit their enmities.
Today, Bashar Assad is replicating his father's policies, but he has more to play with. Syria's rapport with a powerful Iran has bought it valuable space with respect to the Arab states, so that in the past five years Mr Assad reimposed his writ in Lebanon over Saudi and Egyptian opposition thanks to his alliance with Hizbollah. Syria has also gained a stake in Hamas, along with Iran, and therefore can hinder Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. And Mr Assad has opened up to Turkey, which has served as a mediator between Syria and Israel, allowing him to circumvent Arab or Iranian opposition to talks if required.
The irony is that Syria, on its own, suffers from glaring political vulnerabilities. Its influence in Iraq is largely restricted to subverting the country's security; on the Palestinian track, it is Iran, not Damascus, that is footing Hamas's bills; on the ground in Lebanon, Syria has had to depend heavily on Hizbollah during recent years, while its own partisans are feeble; and when it comes to Israel, Syria has consistently avoided a military confrontation, and remained silent when the Israelis destroyed an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007.
Yet Mr Assad has persuaded one and all, including the Saudis, that Syria is a major player. Being a good illusionist can do wonders, but it also explains why Syria is so often difficult to trust.
The volatile nature of those dynamics has complicated ties between Riyadh and Damascus, when the Saudi regime would have preferred more clarity. At the heart of Saudi worries is Iraq, while at the centre of Syria's preoccupations is Lebanon.
Earlier this month the two countries sought to reach an understanding that might advance their interests in both places. At a summit in Damascus, followed by a visit to Beirut, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Bashar Assad of Syria agreed to a deal that went something like this: Syria would collaborate with the Saudis in derailing the appointment of Nouri al Maliki as prime minister of Iraq, while the Saudis would push Saad Hariri, Lebanon's prime minister who is politically beholden to Riyadh, to end his government's co-operation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established to try suspects in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Syria remains the major suspect in the crime.
In Lebanon, the two Arab leaders endorsed a statement that Lebanese disputes would be settled in the framework of the national unity government. This was regarded as an effort to avert violence in light of Hizbollah's threats that all options were open to the party to undermine Lebanese support for the tribunal, which its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, had described as an "Israeli project".
The understanding stabilised Lebanon, but not for long. Each side felt the other had not respected its engagements. Syria, with few means to shape Iraqi affairs and facing Iranian and American backing for Mr al Maliki's return, rallied to that option. In turn the Syrians accused the Saudis of failing to push Mr Hariri to abandon the tribunal, even though they had compelled the prime minister to make a statement to a Saudi newspaper casting doubt on the institution's work and virtually declaring Syria innocent of his father's killing.
Despite the strains, the Syrians and Saudis will probably try to preserve their understanding. The Saudis are deeply uneasy that Mr al Maliki may come back, and even more so that this was facilitated by Iran and blessed by the United States.
For Riyadh, the new situation only consolidates an Iranian-led Shiite order in Baghdad, even if one can dispute that Mr al Maliki is Tehran's stooge. Consequently, the Saudis hope to gain by maintaining open channels to Syria, since both need to retain a hand in Iraqi affairs as part of their regional leverage.
In Lebanon, the situation is thornier. The Saudis have effectively signed off on a Syrian political revival there, hoping this will contain Hizbollah. However, Riyadh holds a weak hand. The Syrians have spent more time undercutting Mr Hariri than they have treating him as an ally. Thanks to the tension over the special tribunal, Mr Assad has been playing Mr Hariri off against Hizbollah to Syria's advantage, while strengthening his ties with Iran. Indeed, last week the Syrian president made a much-publicised visit to Tehran, reiterating the closeness of the Syrian-Iranian relationship.
The Saudis are gambling that Syrian self-interest will prevail in Lebanon. Mr Assad wants to dominate alone, they believe, and seeks once again to make Lebanon more a Syrian than an Iranian card. That may be true, and it is why Mr Hariri continues to defend his reconciliation with Syria, even though last weekend the Syrian judiciary issued arrest warrants for Lebanese officials and journalists, most of whom are close to the prime minister. The problem with the Saudi calculation is that if Mr Assad does reassert Syrian hegemony in Beirut, Mr Hariri and the Saudis will be marginalised.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Saudis were at the heart of the Arab balancing game, their principal objective to ward instability away from the kingdom's borders while ensuring that no one rival gained the upper hand in the region. Syria took advantage of this, earning Saudi approval for its military takeover of Lebanon, while also aligning itself with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, against the Arab consensus. For Hafez Assad this served several purposes: it allowed him to counterbalance his great foe, Saddam Hussein; it made gaining Syrian approval more expensive for the Arab states; and it allowed Assad to manoeuvre between the Arabs and Iran, permitting him to exploit their enmities.
Today, Bashar Assad is replicating his father's policies, but he has more to play with. Syria's rapport with a powerful Iran has bought it valuable space with respect to the Arab states, so that in the past five years Mr Assad reimposed his writ in Lebanon over Saudi and Egyptian opposition thanks to his alliance with Hizbollah. Syria has also gained a stake in Hamas, along with Iran, and therefore can hinder Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. And Mr Assad has opened up to Turkey, which has served as a mediator between Syria and Israel, allowing him to circumvent Arab or Iranian opposition to talks if required.
The irony is that Syria, on its own, suffers from glaring political vulnerabilities. Its influence in Iraq is largely restricted to subverting the country's security; on the Palestinian track, it is Iran, not Damascus, that is footing Hamas's bills; on the ground in Lebanon, Syria has had to depend heavily on Hizbollah during recent years, while its own partisans are feeble; and when it comes to Israel, Syria has consistently avoided a military confrontation, and remained silent when the Israelis destroyed an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007.
Yet Mr Assad has persuaded one and all, including the Saudis, that Syria is a major player. Being a good illusionist can do wonders, but it also explains why Syria is so often difficult to trust.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
For laughs
Just wanted to share the following e-mail from Amazon with the readers of this blog. If anything, it shows that readers of Michael Young have quite a wide range of interests:-)
Dear Amazon.com Customer,
We've noticed that customers who have purchased or rated books by Michael Young have also purchased Circadian Rhythms: Methods and Protocols (Methods in Molecular Biology) by Ezio Rosato. For this reason, you might like to know that Circadian Rhythms: Methods and Protocols (Methods in Molecular Biology) will be released on November 2, 2010. You can pre-order yours by following the link below.
Product Description
This is an in-depth examination of circadian biology, presented by leading researchers in the field. Methods for analysis of rhythmic readouts in select model organisms are included. This cutting-edge collection of protocols is adaptable for research at every level, and represents the huge strides that chronobiologists have made over the past two decades. Circadian biologists at all research levels will realize tremendous benefit from this extraordinary collection.
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
An arresting development
Last week an amusing rumor circulated in Beirut. It went like this: The former head of the General Security Directorate, Jamil as-Sayyed, irritated the Syrians by using his meeting with President Bashar al-Assad to lend weight to his subsequent public attack against Saad al-Hariri. Assad had not appreciated being turned into a tool for the assault because he did not share Sayyed’s hostility toward Hariri.
Now we know better, given that Syria’s judiciary issued arrest warrants on Sunday for 33 people, most of them officials and journalists close to Hariri, as well as against Detlev Mehlis, the first commissioner of the United Nations team investigating Rafik al-Hariri’s assassination. Here is the other face of Syria’s double game in Lebanon: On the one side it claims to support Saad Hariri and appears reluctant to allow Hezbollah to politically cripple the prime minister; on the other, Damascus has systematically undermined Hariri itself.
Those around Hariri have questioned what Syrian behavior says about the Saudi-Syrian understanding over Lebanon finalized in meetings earlier this summer between King Abdullah and Assad. However, this attitude is naïve. Syria’s prime consideration in Lebanon for decades has been to rule alone, and the Saudis signed off on the understanding to gain advantages elsewhere, above all in Iraq, where Riyadh hoped that Syria might help it derail Nouri al-Maliki’s prime ministerial bid. That the Syrians failed in this regard was never going to make Assad reconsider the Lebanese part of the bargain.
The Syrian president sees open pastures ahead for resurrecting Syrian domination. The arrest warrants represent a new level of Syrian escalation, apparently in response to the Saudis’ inability or unwillingness to make Hariri give up on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Playing the Sunnis off against the Shia through the tribunal is Syria’s main ticket back into Lebanese affairs. While Assad may not sanction a military strike by Hezbollah against Hariri, as this would deny Damascus the latitude to continue playing the Sunni card, other options are open, including provoking tension on the ground.
What does this tell us about the Syrian-Saudi understanding? Is it finished? Things appear to be more complicated. The Syrians gain from the understanding and are likely to preserve it since they are now able to continuously reinterpret its guidelines to their own advantage. They have abandoned the anti-Maliki scheme; they are keeping Hariri weak; and Damascus has just reaffirmed its relationship with Tehran, days before Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled to fly to Lebanon on an official visit.
The problem for the Saudis is that there is not much they can do about Syrian behavior. They offered Assad a green light back into Lebanon, but never stopped to ask what would happen if the Syrians failed to fulfill their end of the bargain. As things stand today, the Saudis need Assad in Lebanon to stand as a barrier between Hezbollah and the Sunnis, while Assad needs the Saudis far less. Hariri is effectively Syria’s hostage, and his only means of leverage, a refusal to give up on the tribunal, is proving highly contentious.
Making matters worse is that even if Hariri does what the Syrians want him to on the tribunal, that will only invite onerous Syrian demands later. Once he loses the tribunal, the Syrians could easily topple his government by asking more than a third of ministers to resign (and Adnan al-Sayyed Hussein, supposedly from President Michel Sleiman’s quota, would comply). Damascus could then compel Walid Jumblatt to side with Hezbollah and the Aounists in parliament, turning the minority into a majority. This would allow Assad to impose a Lebanese government in which Hariri’s power is greatly reduced. If Hariri refuses, Syria could bring in a more pliable prime minister, taking control of the state and security apparatus.
It’s difficult to see how the Saudis, or all those who have publicly defended Lebanese sovereignty, including the United States and France, might halt this process. Onetime Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt are no longer what they used to be. If the Arab states give him trouble today, Assad can simply shift direction and widen his margin of maneuver by dealing with Iran or Turkey.
The Lebanese have been worried about what might happen in the streets if Beirut does not end its collaboration with the Special Tribunal. But that is only the façade for a broader power play by Syria to reimpose its writ in Lebanon. The Saudis feel duped, but is anyone particularly surprised? We could have told them they would be long before Lebanese sovereignty was thrown on the auction block.
Now we know better, given that Syria’s judiciary issued arrest warrants on Sunday for 33 people, most of them officials and journalists close to Hariri, as well as against Detlev Mehlis, the first commissioner of the United Nations team investigating Rafik al-Hariri’s assassination. Here is the other face of Syria’s double game in Lebanon: On the one side it claims to support Saad Hariri and appears reluctant to allow Hezbollah to politically cripple the prime minister; on the other, Damascus has systematically undermined Hariri itself.
Those around Hariri have questioned what Syrian behavior says about the Saudi-Syrian understanding over Lebanon finalized in meetings earlier this summer between King Abdullah and Assad. However, this attitude is naïve. Syria’s prime consideration in Lebanon for decades has been to rule alone, and the Saudis signed off on the understanding to gain advantages elsewhere, above all in Iraq, where Riyadh hoped that Syria might help it derail Nouri al-Maliki’s prime ministerial bid. That the Syrians failed in this regard was never going to make Assad reconsider the Lebanese part of the bargain.
The Syrian president sees open pastures ahead for resurrecting Syrian domination. The arrest warrants represent a new level of Syrian escalation, apparently in response to the Saudis’ inability or unwillingness to make Hariri give up on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Playing the Sunnis off against the Shia through the tribunal is Syria’s main ticket back into Lebanese affairs. While Assad may not sanction a military strike by Hezbollah against Hariri, as this would deny Damascus the latitude to continue playing the Sunni card, other options are open, including provoking tension on the ground.
What does this tell us about the Syrian-Saudi understanding? Is it finished? Things appear to be more complicated. The Syrians gain from the understanding and are likely to preserve it since they are now able to continuously reinterpret its guidelines to their own advantage. They have abandoned the anti-Maliki scheme; they are keeping Hariri weak; and Damascus has just reaffirmed its relationship with Tehran, days before Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled to fly to Lebanon on an official visit.
The problem for the Saudis is that there is not much they can do about Syrian behavior. They offered Assad a green light back into Lebanon, but never stopped to ask what would happen if the Syrians failed to fulfill their end of the bargain. As things stand today, the Saudis need Assad in Lebanon to stand as a barrier between Hezbollah and the Sunnis, while Assad needs the Saudis far less. Hariri is effectively Syria’s hostage, and his only means of leverage, a refusal to give up on the tribunal, is proving highly contentious.
Making matters worse is that even if Hariri does what the Syrians want him to on the tribunal, that will only invite onerous Syrian demands later. Once he loses the tribunal, the Syrians could easily topple his government by asking more than a third of ministers to resign (and Adnan al-Sayyed Hussein, supposedly from President Michel Sleiman’s quota, would comply). Damascus could then compel Walid Jumblatt to side with Hezbollah and the Aounists in parliament, turning the minority into a majority. This would allow Assad to impose a Lebanese government in which Hariri’s power is greatly reduced. If Hariri refuses, Syria could bring in a more pliable prime minister, taking control of the state and security apparatus.
It’s difficult to see how the Saudis, or all those who have publicly defended Lebanese sovereignty, including the United States and France, might halt this process. Onetime Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt are no longer what they used to be. If the Arab states give him trouble today, Assad can simply shift direction and widen his margin of maneuver by dealing with Iran or Turkey.
The Lebanese have been worried about what might happen in the streets if Beirut does not end its collaboration with the Special Tribunal. But that is only the façade for a broader power play by Syria to reimpose its writ in Lebanon. The Saudis feel duped, but is anyone particularly surprised? We could have told them they would be long before Lebanese sovereignty was thrown on the auction block.
Friday, October 1, 2010
Apocalypse now? Maybe not
Hezbollah has been spreading word that it may soon implement an apocalyptic scenario to prevent Lebanese collaboration with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Will the party carry through on that threat? Everything is possible, but this would be no easy task.
The scenario, in its multiple variations, involves Hezbollah’s militarily taking over predominantly Muslim areas of Beirut or Lebanon (the different versions don’t define precisely which), place its adversaries under house arrest, then accuse them of collaborating with Israel for supporting the Special Tribunal, which Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has labeled an “Israeli project.” Hezbollah would also ask the Lebanese army to control mainly Christian areas and detain politicians there backing the tribunal. The end result would be a coup of sorts, followed by the formation of a pliable government.
Some point to comments by Hezbollah’s Nawwaf al-Moussawi as rationalizing such a coup. Moussawi recently declared, “[T]he period that will follow the [tribunal] indictment will not be the same as the one before, and any group in Lebanon that might endorse this indictment will be treated as one of the tools of the US-Israeli invasion, and will suffer the same fate as the invader.”
Nothing can be ruled out with Hezbollah, but there are serious problems with this scheme, if the party indeed intends to carry it out. Would such a strike come before or after indictments are issued by the tribunal? There is a big difference. If the party acts before, it would have a hard time justifying and sustaining an operation based on an as-yet-nonexistent accusation. Hezbollah would only further incriminate itself, while the army might refuse to go along.
The essential question that Hezbollah would have to answer is where Syria stands on a military putsch. The party mistrusts the Syrians, and for good reason. The priority of President Bashar al-Assad today is to reassert Syrian domination over Lebanon. While he has no desire to enter into a confrontation with Hezbollah or Iran, Assad wants Lebanon once again to be primarily a Syrian card, therefore less of an Iranian one. Assad’s alleged advice to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that he postpone his visit to South Lebanon in October, if true, might indicate the Syrian president is delineating his territory.
Syria has made a habit of double-dealing in Lebanon. However, it seems unlikely that it would welcome a debilitating assault against Saad Hariri and the Sunni community. The Syrians have spent years bringing Hariri and the Sunnis back to their door after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The Sunnis, in their fear and loathing of Hezbollah, have been willing to forget the past with Damascus. This has allowed Assad to play the Sunnis off against the Shia to Syria’s greater advantage. In this context it would make no sense for Assad to sign off on a Hezbollah operation that would deny Syria the valuable Sunni relationship it has carefully fostered.
There is also the fact that this time around, any military move by Hezbollah is almost certain to lead to a Sunni-Shia civil war. The Bourj Abi Haidar clash was a foreshadowing of what might happen, and there it was pro-Syrian Sunnis who were involved. The Syrians doubtless benefit from Sunni-Shia tension, and Lebanese politicians close to Damascus, most recently Walid Jumblatt, have declared that a Syrian military return to Lebanon would be welcome if sectarian conflict breaks out. However, for Syria to provoke such a conflict to bring its troops back is risky. Sunni-Shia fighting could quickly become uncontrollable, offers no guarantees that Syria will be given a green light to dispatch its soldiers, and might well spread to Syria.
Assad probably prefers, at least initially, less violent means of reasserting his authority in Lebanon. An indictment against Hezbollah offers this. Despite Damascus’ public hostility to the tribunal, once an accusation comes out, it would permit Assad to position himself between Hariri and Hezbollah, and take from each side. He would have leverage to obtain from Hezbollah key posts in the military-security apparatus the party controls and Syria seeks – command of the army, of military intelligence, of General Security, of airport security, and so forth. And once Assad gets what he wants, he can force concessions from Hariri for having saved him from Hezbollah, while pushing the prime minister (with Saudi backing) to end, or more likely hinder, Lebanese assistance to the tribunal.
Hezbollah knows that that any sectarian conflict it precipitates would only hasten a Syrian military comeback and rally the party’s domestic foes to Syria’s side. Which makes one wonder whether Jumblatt, in welcoming a new Syrian deployment in Lebanon, was not implicitly warning Hezbollah against engaging in reckless action.
If Hezbollah were to ignore these obstacles and pursue a military option against Syrian wishes, this could harm Syrian-Iranian relations. The party does not have such leeway. In the end it would be up to Iran to decide whether Hezbollah negotiates with Damascus or not. And that is why the timing of any Hezbollah move is essential. Once an indictment is out, talks would begin over how to save Hezbollah. The party’s ability to go for its guns might evaporate as its fate swiftly falls into the hands of Damascus and Tehran.
If Tehran were to receive guarantees from Syria that Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal would be preserved, and that Tehran’s deterrent power in southern Lebanon would remain intact (guarantees that Assad would gladly offer), the Iranians could perhaps approve a package deal obliging Hezbollah to surrender some power to Damascus. That is what Nasrallah fears the most, but he may be the prisoner of a trap he cannot escape – a trap the Syrians helped set.
The scenario, in its multiple variations, involves Hezbollah’s militarily taking over predominantly Muslim areas of Beirut or Lebanon (the different versions don’t define precisely which), place its adversaries under house arrest, then accuse them of collaborating with Israel for supporting the Special Tribunal, which Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has labeled an “Israeli project.” Hezbollah would also ask the Lebanese army to control mainly Christian areas and detain politicians there backing the tribunal. The end result would be a coup of sorts, followed by the formation of a pliable government.
Some point to comments by Hezbollah’s Nawwaf al-Moussawi as rationalizing such a coup. Moussawi recently declared, “[T]he period that will follow the [tribunal] indictment will not be the same as the one before, and any group in Lebanon that might endorse this indictment will be treated as one of the tools of the US-Israeli invasion, and will suffer the same fate as the invader.”
Nothing can be ruled out with Hezbollah, but there are serious problems with this scheme, if the party indeed intends to carry it out. Would such a strike come before or after indictments are issued by the tribunal? There is a big difference. If the party acts before, it would have a hard time justifying and sustaining an operation based on an as-yet-nonexistent accusation. Hezbollah would only further incriminate itself, while the army might refuse to go along.
The essential question that Hezbollah would have to answer is where Syria stands on a military putsch. The party mistrusts the Syrians, and for good reason. The priority of President Bashar al-Assad today is to reassert Syrian domination over Lebanon. While he has no desire to enter into a confrontation with Hezbollah or Iran, Assad wants Lebanon once again to be primarily a Syrian card, therefore less of an Iranian one. Assad’s alleged advice to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that he postpone his visit to South Lebanon in October, if true, might indicate the Syrian president is delineating his territory.
Syria has made a habit of double-dealing in Lebanon. However, it seems unlikely that it would welcome a debilitating assault against Saad Hariri and the Sunni community. The Syrians have spent years bringing Hariri and the Sunnis back to their door after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The Sunnis, in their fear and loathing of Hezbollah, have been willing to forget the past with Damascus. This has allowed Assad to play the Sunnis off against the Shia to Syria’s greater advantage. In this context it would make no sense for Assad to sign off on a Hezbollah operation that would deny Syria the valuable Sunni relationship it has carefully fostered.
There is also the fact that this time around, any military move by Hezbollah is almost certain to lead to a Sunni-Shia civil war. The Bourj Abi Haidar clash was a foreshadowing of what might happen, and there it was pro-Syrian Sunnis who were involved. The Syrians doubtless benefit from Sunni-Shia tension, and Lebanese politicians close to Damascus, most recently Walid Jumblatt, have declared that a Syrian military return to Lebanon would be welcome if sectarian conflict breaks out. However, for Syria to provoke such a conflict to bring its troops back is risky. Sunni-Shia fighting could quickly become uncontrollable, offers no guarantees that Syria will be given a green light to dispatch its soldiers, and might well spread to Syria.
Assad probably prefers, at least initially, less violent means of reasserting his authority in Lebanon. An indictment against Hezbollah offers this. Despite Damascus’ public hostility to the tribunal, once an accusation comes out, it would permit Assad to position himself between Hariri and Hezbollah, and take from each side. He would have leverage to obtain from Hezbollah key posts in the military-security apparatus the party controls and Syria seeks – command of the army, of military intelligence, of General Security, of airport security, and so forth. And once Assad gets what he wants, he can force concessions from Hariri for having saved him from Hezbollah, while pushing the prime minister (with Saudi backing) to end, or more likely hinder, Lebanese assistance to the tribunal.
Hezbollah knows that that any sectarian conflict it precipitates would only hasten a Syrian military comeback and rally the party’s domestic foes to Syria’s side. Which makes one wonder whether Jumblatt, in welcoming a new Syrian deployment in Lebanon, was not implicitly warning Hezbollah against engaging in reckless action.
If Hezbollah were to ignore these obstacles and pursue a military option against Syrian wishes, this could harm Syrian-Iranian relations. The party does not have such leeway. In the end it would be up to Iran to decide whether Hezbollah negotiates with Damascus or not. And that is why the timing of any Hezbollah move is essential. Once an indictment is out, talks would begin over how to save Hezbollah. The party’s ability to go for its guns might evaporate as its fate swiftly falls into the hands of Damascus and Tehran.
If Tehran were to receive guarantees from Syria that Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal would be preserved, and that Tehran’s deterrent power in southern Lebanon would remain intact (guarantees that Assad would gladly offer), the Iranians could perhaps approve a package deal obliging Hezbollah to surrender some power to Damascus. That is what Nasrallah fears the most, but he may be the prisoner of a trap he cannot escape – a trap the Syrians helped set.
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