Has the American empire struck out?

When the U.S. president, Barack Obama, appointed John Kerry and Chuck Hagel to his new administration, what did he intend? By naming them, Obama sent a message about his policy preferences. And what he also said was that he favored those who had irritated the neoconservatives, thus helping Obama sharpen his own image.

That was always Obama’s main problem. He has spent too much time affirming what he isn’t, fighting against the legacy of George W. Bush, while failing to underline what he really stands for himself, especially in foreign policy. The president hopes that once Kerry and Hagel are approved, he can tell us more about himself. But how likely is that? Is there really any sharpness to the eternally shifting Obama?

One thing apparent is that Kerry and Hagel, though men of character, are not endowed with a strategic vision. Both are used to the maneuvers habitual in Congress. Their life has been shaped more often by compromise than by any sense of the ultimate goal. Rarely in the past few years has either man formulated a broad policy vision. They are known for how out of step they were with the Bush White House, not for how they hope to rewrite America’s role in the world.

This was particularly true in the Middle East. Hagel is famous primarily for criticizing the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq and Iran. For a Republican after 9/11, this required courage. He has been accused by Israel’s supporters of not being dedicated enough to the relationship with the Jewish state. This Hagel’s defenders deny, but even if correct, it says little about his long-term ambitions for America’s armed forces, or the policies he will adopt at the Pentagon. It seems absurd to argue, for instance, that he will cut military cooperation with Israel, even if he is less eager to go to war with Iran than others.

As for Kerry, he sought to thrust the U.S. in directions opposed by the Bush administration. Yet we cannot underestimate how beneficial it is that he failed. Kerry’s efforts to spur cooperation with Syria went nowhere. The man he thought he could sell as a legitimate partner of Washington, namely Bashar Assad, has become toxic, a mass murderer who even Kerry will avoid mentioning these days. Yet, quicker than most, the senator sensed the mood change after April 2011, swerving away from Assad when the killing began in Syria, calculating that it might undermine his sway in Washington.

One can debate Hagel’s and Kerry’s choices, but what we cannot debate, simply because there is nothing on the table to debate, is how they will make use of their new role. Both men have bucked the consensus in Washington, but nowhere do we get a sense of what this might mean in their new positions. Kerry’s thinking outside the box on Syria showed how little he grasped realities in that country, namely how eager were the Syrians to impose change at the top.

Assume that his criticism of Bush was justified, though one would have thought that all the ex-president’s talk about democracy in the Arab world showed that his worldview had something going for it. Bush is an easy target, and in Obama’s America, those like Hagel have been reborn as visionaries, men bold enough to have taken on Bush and his staff. If what Obama wants is a man who will shoot down prevailing wisdom, fine, but once again it hardly offers us a worldview, or about what to expect in terms of military or diplomatic strategy in the years to come.

Perhaps that is what is most distressing in Obama’s Washington. There is a lot of attitude and a willingness to challenge past policies, but without any direction or ultimate purpose. Strategy is not a thing Americans do particularly well, and since the end of the Cold War, American officials have rarely thought two or three steps ahead, devising policies to advance strategic objectives. More often they have tended to look only at the next step, deciding on policy and action based on the current context.

That’s not bad when it reflects the dynamics of an accountable democratic order, whereby officials will shift tack depending on how their policies are received. But it’s also true that when overseas policies are almost entirely driven by domestic attitudes, themselves usually formed by media, it becomes very difficult to decide on long-term aims, or even specify what is important and what isn’t.

That will be the challenge for Hagel and Kerry. Hagel, some believe, will have as one of his roles a radical cutback in American military spending. Perhaps, but if so, foreign policy will have to adapt accordingly, which is Kerry’s role. Less money for the military, for instance, will delimit precisely what the Obama administration means by the “pivot to Asia,” sold mainly as a pivot away from the Middle East. But if there are not enough resources for anywhere but Asia, that means that Kerry will have to work heartily to show the other regions of the world that America is still relevant.

But how relevant does America really want to be? Obama has been a revolutionary president in deciding that the empire had to greatly slash its ambitions, or else it would go bankrupt. He may be right, but the implications are dramatic. Does he see the U.S. as British officials did Britain in 1947, a country incapable of sustaining its overseas presence due to national insolvency? In a way yes, but can the United States really afford to retreat into its shell?

The questions Obama raises are worthy ones. They have to be discussed by Americans, who must ask whether the empire is ending. Meanwhile, Chuck Hagel and John Kerry will be the face of America’s reach. Their actions will elucidate whether the empire is no more.

Lebanon's Christian rivals unite only in their mutual decline

There seems to be no proposal too outlandish for many of Lebanon's Christians, as they contemplate a future in which their role in their country is bound to diminish.

Since the end of the war in 1990, Christians have had to deal with a Lebanon vastly changed by the 15 years of conflict. Christians were a major force in 1975, when the fighting began, but by the time it ended they were fighting themselves, in a destructive confrontation between the Lebanese Army, led by Michel Aoun, and the Lebanese Forces militia, led by Samir Geagea.

Both Mr Aoun and Mr Geagea are still around, leading lights in the Christian community. No wonder their followers remain apart. The split was reinforced by the decision of both men in 2006, after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005, to go their separate ways. Mr Aoun aspired to be president and allied himself with the Shia Hizbollah, while Mr Geagea stuck with the Sunni leader, Saad Hariri.

Mr Aoun's calculation was that a powerful Hizbollah would hoist him into the presidency, against the will of the parliamentary majority. This proved a mistake, as the party finally voted for the army commander, Michel Suleiman. Nor was Hizbollah persuaded by Mr Aoun. They backed him when pressed, knowing this would keep Christians divided, but when Mr Suleiman emerged as a consensus candidate, Hizbollah endorsed him.

The episode highlighted how secondary the Christians - particularly the largest Christian community, the Maronites - have become when facing the principal rivalry shaping Lebanese affairs, namely that between Sunnis and Shia. Electorally, Mr Aoun has done well because he can rely on Hizbollah voters. Similarly, in several districts Mr Geagea needs Sunni votes to send his candidates to parliament.

And yet, several months ago, both Mr Aoun and Mr Geagea reacted favourably to a proposal presented by a gathering of Greek Orthodox luminaries. Pushed mainly by the former deputy speaker of parliament, Elie Firzli, a close ally of Syria, the plan was for a law saying voters could cast ballots only for candidates from their sects. Under this system, Lebanon would be organised as a single electoral district with proportional representation deciding who entered parliament.

Many condemned the law for enhancing sectarianism and barring collaboration between Christians and Muslims. It was seen as signalling an end to a multi-confessional Lebanon. These accusations were alarmist, but the core of the warnings was true. If sects can no longer function together in the electoral system, then what is Lebanon coming to? What are the unifying factors for a country already divided along communal lines? Critics were distressed that an instrument of cross-sectarian partnership was being abandoned so Christians would feel more at ease.

Ironically, Mr Firzli's plan duped nobody. Many in the March 14 coalition, which opposes the current government, saw the scheme as an effort to undermine their alliances, particularly between Mr Geagea and Saad Hariri, the former prime minister. That was indeed the aim. But Mr Aoun and Mr Geagea were also aware of generalised displeasure among their co-religionists over the fact that many Christians were entering parliament thanks to non-Christian voters.

There were more prosaic reasons from Mr Aoun's backing of the proposal. It had the endorsement of his ally Hizbollah. Under the Orthodox law, Hizbollah and its comrades would be expected to do well in elections scheduled for this summer. The party would benefit from the majority of Shia votes, while Mr Aoun, even without Hizbollah's backing, would win a substantial share of Christian votes, and might defeat Mr Geagea in many districts.

However, Mr Geagea also felt a need to go along with the Orthodox proposal, because he realised that not doing so might cost him Christian loyalty. Recently, the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, created a parliamentary subcommittee to agree to a new election law. Mr Berri, an ally of Hizbollah, grandly announced in 2012 that he would approve of any law to which the Christians agreed, knowing full well that they would agree to nothing. The subcommittee was supposed to discuss a range of options, including a proportional representation bill approved by the government.

Recently the Christian parties - the Lebanese Forces, its allies in the Kataeb Party, the Aounists and the Marada movement, which is close to Mr Aoun and Syria - announced that they backed the Orthodox proposal. This was a tactical necessity, since all had to show they were for a plan permitting Christians to choose Christians. However, Mr Geagea's attitude, like that of the Kataeb, angered those in the mainly Sunni Future Movement of Mr Hariri, who see the Orthodox proposal as a means of weakening Mr Hariri and March 14.

Yet faced with growing hostility to the idea, from Future, from many of the major Muslim religious leaders, as well as from the Maronite Mr Suleiman and independent Christians in March 14, most of the Christians in the parliamentary subcommittee appeared to step back from the Orthodox proposal. Importantly, Maronite Patriarch Bishara Rai also seemed unenthusiastic. The scheme is not dead, but seems unlikely to be adopted.

Less remote is the prospect that the Christians will continue to adapt poorly to their decline in Lebanese society. As they rush to reaffirm themselves, Christians are easy prey for those benefiting from their divisions. One can understand their frustration, but the way to counter this is to have confidence in their future role in Lebanon. Yet a continued sense of doom seems inevitable for those Christians who fail to realise that influence is not just a matter of numbers.

Only 'plan' Assad has is to wait out misery of his making

Days before Bashar Al Assad's speech last Sunday, pro-Syrian Lebanese media outlets raised expectations of what would be offered. Al Akhbar, a pro-Hizbollah newspaper, said that Mr Al Assad would offer a five-point transition plan that would bring a new government into place, led by Haytham Manna, an opposition figure who favours dialogue with the regime.

Mr Al Assad did no such thing. His aim was different: to dash all hopes that he would be flexible, and in that way show that he was still confident of victory. He offered, instead, a three-point plan conceding very little. His opponents, whom he labelled "terrorists", would begin by laying down their weapons, while their foreign backers must stop aiding them. The government would then initiate a dialogue to prepare a charter, which would be submitted to a national referendum. After this legislative elections would be held.

In a third stage, a broad unity government would be formed. It would organise a national reconciliation conference and issue a general amnesty for those detained during the conflict. No doubt the amnesty will be based on what the security apparatus reports about the detained, the same apparatus that is at the vanguard of repression.

Needless to say, the Syrian opposition saw nothing in the plan to interest them. Even the United Nations-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, has offered more, putting forth a proposal that would see a new government formed with full powers, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. This would, in theory, precipitate Mr Al Assad's departure. The Syrian president's plan, by making no concessions on the presidency, was effectively a rejection of Mr Brahimi's scheme, which today lies in tatters.

And yet what does Mr Al Assad have to offer as a realistic way out of his country's mess? Absolutely nothing. That is why his unwillingness to consider more realistic political options will prolong the butchery. He may find it useful to show confidence at a time of generalised despair, but no one is duped by Mr Al Assad's bravado. When the president's most ardent supporters can see that his plan is unworkable, this must further undermine their confidence.

They know well that Mr Al Assad's forces are not winning against the revolt. It has been months since the regime promised to take back Aleppo, but to no avail. Instead, since then large swathes of the north and north-east have been lost, with rebels now challenging the regime in the suburbs of Damascus. The army is abandoning territory everywhere, so that the president's bravado only promises more suffering, not the beginning of the end of Syria's misery.

It would be a mistake to view his speech as detached from reality. Such a verdict suggests that Mr Al Assad doesn't realise what's going on around him. But deception is par for the course for the current leader of a regime that has mutilated the truth for some 43 years, since his father, Hafez Al Assad, took power in 1970. Bashar Al Assad has very consciously manipulated reality to send a message that he is still in power, and that he will not give it up under present circumstances.

Some may see strength in this defiance, but more likely Mr Al Assad simply refuses to go because he knows the reaction of the three principle pillars of his power: his Alawite community, its political-military elite, and his own family. By negotiating his departure, the Syrian president would, first, have to persuade these three circles, who would almost certainly oppose his exit, as this would pose an existential threat to them as well as to their influence in Syria.

In that case, what did Mr Al Assad hope to gain by making a speech fraught with conscious denial about the reality of his situation? For starters, the president appears to believe that he has not reached a breaking point, and that he still has enough military leverage and foreign backing to hold out for a better deal. By better deal, Mr Al Assad probably understands an arrangement allowing him and the Alawite elite to play a significant role in any transition process.

Indeed, while the opposition has made gains, it continues to face foreign doubts, with arms and ammunition deliveries from abroad having apparently been reduced. The opposition regards this as an effort to perpetuate the war between it and the Syrian regime. This will only make opposition groups more reluctant to turn against allied organisations such as the Al Nusra Front, which the United States has described as a terrorist organisation with ties to Al Qaeda.

The complexity of the Syrian conflict may create more problems for the opposition than for Mr Al Assad. All he has to do is stay in power and resist an onslaught against Damascus. The opposition coalition, in contrast, must prove it can take over Syria's leadership, persuade governments abroad that it is not allied with terrorists, and above all, persuade Syrians and non-Syrians that it has a sensible political plan, one that integrates all those who fear that Mr Al Assad's downfall will bring with it great hardship for Syria's minorities.

Mr Al Assad's speech was a dud, but the president continues to play on the doubts directed against his enemies. For as long as the opposition is not given the means to win a military victory, these doubts will dog them. By complicating the conflict, therefore making it more bloody, Mr Al Assad hopes to find an exit. It may not work, but that's how one should read the president's speech. It pushed Syria deeper into a mire that the regime alone hopes to exploit.

With a perfect storm, perfect failure

The incompetence of the Lebanese state, it is true, is the result of decades of training. At no time was this more obvious than in recent days, as Lebanon has struggled with the devastation from a storm in the Eastern Mediterranean.

With greater imagination, the leaders of March 14 might have legitimately demanded the government’s resignation for its shortcomings. The Mikati government has dealt with the effects of the storm with the same ineptitude as its predecessors. This is a default setting for the state, which waits until disasters happen before taking measures to address or alleviate the outcome.

It’s not as if we did not know ahead of time that the storm was coming. There were several days to take steps to prevent some of the worst consequences. It may be impossible to prevent the Litani River from flooding, but did the government plan ahead to prepare for more manageable contingencies? How is it that rescuers have not found a child lost Monday, Youssef Rakan Fadl? The search will be resumed tomorrow by a “specialized team” that has just arrived in Lebanon, we are told. In the interim, his family has been on its own.

Specialized or not, no team is likely to find alive a child who was swept away by the waters four days earlier. Where is Lebanon’s rapid response system? And if we do not have one, then isn’t it time to admit that we are no better than a third-rate state, one that should devote more time to improving governance than it does to ensuring that ministers have impunity and that their patrons are content?

Myriad pressures have been building. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees says that some 180,000 Syrians are receiving assistance in Lebanon. This is potentially catastrophic for a country that fears a rise in salaries would undermine the national currency. Nor is it enough to attribute our woes to outdated or depleted infrastructure. What about all the roadwork during the 1990s? Our new highways are as likely to be flooded as older byways.

To make up for the abysmal tourist season, which forced many establishments to close down, the government has embarked on a campaign to encourage Lebanese and foreigners to make purchases in Lebanon’s stores. But why would tourists flock to Lebanon if the country cannot even clear streets of water after rainfall? The scheme is interesting: 50 percent reductions on items for 50 days. But as critics have argued, the tourists did not stay away from Lebanon in 2012 because prices were high. They didn’t come, because they were little reassured about the government’s ability to deal with crisis. Will the latest debacle persuade them otherwise?

Even those who support parties represented in the government hardly seem convinced. A television crew ventured into the disaster zone of Hay al-Sellom, in Beirut’s southern suburbs. There they met an old woman whose house had been flooded. She began by thanking Hezbollah for its help, before complaining of the poor response of the state. It was odd to hear her remarks, for what she really meant was that a government dominated by Hezbollah had done nothing for her, while the party itself had. It’s remarkable how easily people will distinguish between the two. But then a system that discourages any sense of official collective responsibility does that to you.

Have we ever seen a Lebanese minister accept blame for errors by his ministry? When the public works minister, Ghazi Aridi, says that the destruction in Hay al-Sellom was “due to the population in that area” who have built along the Al-Ghadir river, we must pause. Yes, the state is little respected in Hezbollah’s stronghold, so that if it were to warn against construction along the river, it would be ignored. But that doesn’t prevent the state from issuing such warnings publicly, to show that it has a better grasp of future realities than the population.

Nor is it a good idea for Aridi to blame the population for a natural catastrophe, especially when the state has taken no precautions to alleviate the worst of that catastrophe. Or indeed when the state, through its lamentable oversight over public works projects, has virtually ensured that the infrastructure in place to avert flooding is wholly inadequate. For instance, the Beirut-Jounieh highway was closed Tuesday. At best, the highway is a procession of lakes when there is rain, even though work on it remains unfinished.

The key to addressing storms like the one that just came through Lebanon is foresight. Certainly, one cannot expect the state to perform miracles. But when it comes to supervising and fixing man-made structures that are not performing as they must, then the state has a responsibility to act. More can be done to inform the public of likely problems ahead of time, and prepare contingency plans if these take place. And when manpower is insufficient, the emergency services must plan to collaborate with the Army.

One of the worst storms in Lebanon’s recent memory occurred in February 1983. At the time, the multinational forces had to free villagers trapped by snow in the area of Qartaba, and people died in their cars at Dahr al-Baydar. Little has changed in three decades. The state is still unprepared, its response mostly ad hoc and unsatisfactory, and the impact on the Lebanese far worse than it needs to be.

Najib Mikati is a respectable man, but if he deserves to resign, it is for his government’s deficiencies in what was a storm everyone expected and for which ministers should have been ready.

In Syria, evil now has a number

The United Nations human rights commissioner, Navi Pillay, did not tell us much that we didn’t already suspect. And yet the reaction to a report put out by a UN commission claiming that some 60,000 people have been killed in the Syrian conflict since March 2011 can only be shock. It means that an average of almost 3,000 people were killed monthly, mostly victims of President Bashar Assad’s followers.

The figure is considerably higher than that estimated by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, which places the death toll at around 45,000. The new figure for deaths may still be too low. Last year already, a well-informed Lebanese politician told me that death estimates had been underestimated, since they did not include the thousands of Syrians who had disappeared and were presumed dead.

These numbers lead to two questions. First, what is being done internationally to punish those responsible for the carnage? And second, morally speaking, what does the death toll tell us about the international community’s response to the Syrian conflict?

To the first question, the answer can be summed up in two words: Not enough. Syria has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This means that any decision to refer Syrian officials to the court requires, first, a request by the UN Security Council to begin an ICC investigation. With both Russia and China having refused to condemn Assad during the period when most of the killings were committed, it is unlikely that they would turn around and initiate an investigation that may implicate them in the regime’s abuses. That makes improbable any resort to the ICC.

Option B is to create a special tribunal specifically focused on Syria. If it’s a UN court, once again it would require Security Council approval. However, if the Arab League wanted to set up such a body, as proposed by Aryeh Neier, the former president of the Open Society Institute, technically it could do so. However, how likely are Arab states to go down that path? Given the implication of many Arab leaders in crimes against their own populations, probably near to nil.

With this in mind, it’s possible that Assad will never stand before a judicial institution and answer for the actions of his army and security forces. Still, the Syrian president will always have to look over his shoulder, since someone will be tempted to take matters into his or her own hands and kill Assad themselves, wherever he resides.

As for the second question, pertaining to international responsibility for the deaths in Syria, the best observation came from Pillay herself. She recently remarked that “Collectively, we have fiddled at the edges while Syria burns.” That’s putting it mildly. The Security Council has been deadlocked for over a year on Syrian matters, thanks primarily to Russian and Chinese obstructionism.

Even the United States has shown indifference to the plight of Syria. President Barack Obama claimed that he had gotten involved in the uprising against Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi because he would not allow a massacre of the population of Benghazi by Qaddafi’s armed forces. Yet Syria has seen a secession of Benghazis, with civilians, above all children, routinely targeted by Assad’s men. Where has Obama been? Missing mainly, keen to ensure that he would be re-elected on the grounds that he removed the United States from the Mideastern labyrinths into which President George W. Bush had taken the country after September 11, 2001.

Obama will pay a price for his standoffishness. The Syrians opposition already holds America partly responsible for the death toll in Syria. As they see it, Obama was in a position to stop the killing, but didn’t do so. This may be shaky on legal grounds, but it is persuasive on moral grounds. For 21 months, Washington has largely stood by while the butchery has continued, expressing its fear of a Jihadist takeover of opposition ranks as justification for its shameful immobility.

Obama’s bankruptcy has been almost as bad as that of the Russian, Iranian and Chinese leaderships, or indeed that of Arab leaders, for instance Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq, who should know better for having once suffered from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Assad has lasted for as long as he has because he is surrounded by counterparts as unconcerned about what constitutes evil as he is.

But with 60,000 deaths, most of them caused by the regime, evil now has a number that can no longer be ignored. Lebanon’s 15-year civil war led to the death of some 120,000 to 130,000 people, according to some estimates. For Syria to lose half that number in less than two years is astonishing, a grim illustration of the savagery of Assad rule.

That tens of thousands of people should die because a small clique of people won’t surrender power and influence is as good a definition of malevolence as we can conjure up. Assad will not escape the dead, whose fate has sealed his. A cell may be preferable for a man who will walk the streets in constant fear, the memory of his victims following him wherever he goes, 60,000 uneasy spirits seeking revenge.

Endgame in Syria increases pressure on Al Maliki in Iraq

The recent protests against Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, by Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar province, is worrisome in light of the conflict in Syria. The impending overthrow of Bashar Al Assad by Syria's Sunnis risks reinvigorating their brethren in Iraq, who have been displeased with what they view as Mr Maliki's sectarian Shiite agenda.

Sunnis began demonstrating in Anbar last week, following the arrest of bodyguards assigned to a Sunni politician from the province, the finance minister, Rafeh Al Issawi. In remarks to the protesters, Mr Al Issawi said "injustice, marginalisation, discrimination and double standards, as well as the politicisation of the judiciary system and a lack of respect for partnership, the law and the constitution ... have all turned our [Sunni] neighbourhoods in Baghdad into huge prisons surrounded by concrete blocks".

The protesters have used the language of the Arab uprisings. That is why the revolt in Syria represents a challenge to sectarian relations in Iraq. Once President Al Assad goes, so too does Iran's headlock on the Levant. Iraq's Sunnis, especially the tribes straddling the border between Iraq and Syria, will have an incentive to follow the path of their Syrian co-religionists and demand greater equality from the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad.

This, combined with greater Kurdish demands for autonomy, could pose a serious challenge to the Iraqi Shia, who would be wary of seeing Gulf states, above all Saudi Arabia, assisting Iraq's Sunnis, as they have Sunnis in Syria. In the worst-case scenario, we would witness a return to the sectarian clashes of a few years ago, even though most Iraqis have no desire to go back to those dark days.

Events in Syria could lead to a profound realignment of power in Iraq, unless Mr Al Maliki plays his cards right and absorbs Sunni discontent through a more inclusive Iraqi political structure. Until now, however, the prime minister has done little to ameliorate sectarian or ethnic relations, while Iranian influence has sparked much uneasiness among the country's Sunnis, as well as among Iraq's Arab neighbours.

A breakdown of communal relations in Iraq would also test the United States. President Barack Obama has stayed clear of the political situation in the country, and has no desire to expend any more American power there. And yet Iraq, like Syria, could become another front against Iran. Washington ignores events there at its own peril. Sectarian animosity could invite outside intervention, making continued US regional disengagement impossible.

At the same time, the Obama administration appears to have little latitude to persuade Mr Al Maliki to be more accommodating of his political foes. Even the recent stroke suffered by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani provoked little public reaction in Washington, though Mr Talibani often acted as a valuable mediator between Mr Al Maliki and those opposed to him, especially the Kurds.

In the absence of such mediation, the Sunni-Shia relationship may further deteriorate, affecting all of the countries with a stake in Iraq. Iran has long seen the close linkage between what goes on in Syria and events in Iraq. That is why it has been so active, with its Lebanese Hizbollah allies, in bolstering Mr Al Assad. For officials in Tehran, Mr Al Assad's defeat could undermine Iranian dominance of Iraq.

Like Syria, Iraq will face before long the need to reach a new compact to govern sectarian ties. Civil peace depends on it. It is the nature of the Iraqi political condition, as it is of the Syrian and Lebanese conditions, to incarnate what goes on in the region, making Sunni and Shia coexistence a necessity.

The problem is that such an accommodation is a priority for no one.

Iran is badly placed to mediate between the communities. In fact, the fear is that Tehran, once it loses a valuable partner in Damascus, may opt to reinforce Shia power in Iraq, which can only exacerbate communal relations. Similarly, the Sunni Arab states are more preoccupied with neutralising Iran than they are with working out compromises between Sunnis and Shia.

As for the United States, it has adopted a hands-off approach to developments in Iraq and Syria. We should expect little different from Mr Obama down the road. He has spent 21 months not taking a decisive position on Syria, despite the carnage there. This behaviour is unlikely to change in the one place the president has always made it a point of honour to disregard, namely Iraq.

And yet the situation in Syria now more than ever requires a regional approach to conflict resolution. The problem is that because no one seems capable of imposing an integrated regional approach, sectarian relations are bound to get worse before they get better.

In that case, each Arab country will have to find a solution of its own to prevent the sectarian rift from widening. This may not be as absurd as it sounds. Iraqis, like the people of Syria and Lebanon, realise what a Sunni-Shia war implies, and no one wants to go down that path if it can be averted.

But without a regional contribution, the chances of success are limited. Unless Iran and Saudi Arabia talk, perhaps with some kind of US sanction, local actors will not be able to take far-reaching measures for communal reconciliation. And yet no one benefits from sectarian animosity. A Sunni victory in Syria will mean little if Alawites fight a new power structure in Damascus, just as the Shia cannot run Iraq in the face of Sunni rejection of Baghdad's authority.

Stability in the Middle East will come only when the two Muslim communities find a way to live with one another. Until then, the embers of sectarian tension will remain with us, ready to ignite the region at the first fear of an existential threat.

Hug Hezbollah to death if necessary

Turkey’s assessment is that the regime of President Bashar Assad will survive another three months. If that’s true, it may undercut Hezbollah’s strategy in Lebanon, namely to use summer elections in order to gird the party with the legitimacy of state institutions, in that way protecting its weapons. Hezbollah will not disappear, but the party must pursue more modest objectives, or it may lose everything.

Hezbollah has already stated that it seeks a proportional law for the elections, hoping this will bring it a parliamentary majority with its allies, so it can choose a president in 2014. Hezbollah assumes that Saad Hariri would lose more seats than the party under a proportional system. And yet March 14 and Walid Jumblatt’s bloc control the majority of parliamentarians who favor the 1960 law. This assumes that Christian parties in March 14 will accept the law as a basis for elections. If no broad agreement over a new law is reached, the 1960 law will prevail, and Hezbollah in all probability will lose.

So what are Hezbollah’s options? To delay elections and retain the present government? That is possible, but the downside, especially if Assad is ousted before then, is that this would provoke anger in Lebanon, with few people understanding why there are no elections given that the Syrian conflict is over. This would make Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s position untenable, particularly if Jumblatt bolts. So, that path is hard to envisage, and no doubt foreign embassies would urge the government to hold the elections on time.

The 1960 law would surely govern those elections, as there is almost no likelihood of a consensus over an alternative law before summer. Christians don’t like the 1960 law, which is why Geagea needs to show that he’s unhappy with the law, before ultimately agreeing to it. His final approval of the 1960 law he would probably use to push Saad Hariri to place Lebanese Forces candidates on his lists, and in that way secure a substantial bloc. Perhaps Geagea is hoping that this would allow him to claim that he is the principal Christian representative, in the hope that in 2014 it will propel him into the presidency.

Hezbollah will attempt to rally Christians against the law, but this will not be easy. That’s why Geagea has to be careful and not discredit the 1960 law too much. The election law proposal of the Lebanese Forces has zero chance of being approved, and it is useful only as an instrument that Geagea can use to extract concessions from Hariri on behalf of Geagea’s candidates. Beyond that, Geagea must avoid falling into Hezbollah’s trap of becoming a bettering ram against a 1960 law that the party regards as its ticket to defeat.

What the party would ideally like to do in 2014 is use a parliamentary majority to bring a friendly president to office. The assumption is that the party favorite is Jean Kahwagi, the Army commander. However, once Assad goes, Kahwagi will see his electoral chances virtually disappear. He is regarded as someone too close to Hezbollah and Michel Aoun to be reassuring to March 14. In order to improve his chances, Kahwagi may distance the Army from Hezbollah after Assad falls, so that March 14 finds him more palatable.

But even then, Kahwagi would face two sets of problems: Those backing him may be on the defensive, while the political alliance expected to benefit from the collapse of the Assad regime distrusts him. To reverse the latter mood, the commander will have to take steps to satisfy his critics and alienate his supporters. And second, we would have to watch Michel Aoun’s moves. Aoun may present himself as a presidential candidate, putting Hezbollah in a quandary.

Hezbollah’s inability to impede the 1960 law is at the heart of its dilemma. The party’s problem is that Jumblatt cannot possibly accept a proportional law, which would guarantee his political marginalization. That is why Hezbollah must find a system that satisfies Jumblatt and undermines Hariri. That’s no easy task. There is mistrust between Hariri and Jumblatt, but neither sees an interest in breaking ranks over a new law. They intend to be electoral allies and together have a majority to derail any alternative to the 1960 law.

If Hezbollah cannot impose a new law, and cannot block elections, and cannot elect its favored candidate to the presidency, what is the party to do? The assumption in March 14 is that Assad’s downfall will bring the party running to the negotiating table. That’s doubtful. But what the situation may do is make Hezbollah reckless, as it deploys the one thing it still retains, military power, to keep its political foes in line.

However, Sunnis are no longer willing to stand down. Hezbollah’s intimidation is bound to lead to a new civil war, which Hezbollah cannot hope to win, whatever its prowess. Lebanon would be destroyed in the process, with no one emerging a clear victor.

That’s why March 14 must head off Hezbollah’s actions by pursuing the dialogue that it today deems unnecessary. The party has read events in Syria wrong and is reaching a political dead end. Helping it out of this impasse through negotiations, and not through a frontal assault, is the best way to earn concessions from an over-armed organization.

The party’s political strategy, in light of what the removal of the Assads would mean for Lebanon, will fail. Otherwise we may see violence, which March 14, the prospective beneficiary of change in Syria, must avert at all costs. This means divining Hezbollah’s objectives and ensuring they are neutralized. And if it requires hugging Hezbollah to death, so be it. The party will not melt away, even if the future looks increasingly bleak to its officials.