Posts
Syrian Endgame
America should press Damascus to let go of Lebanon.
BY MICHAEL YOUNG
Wednesday, May 2, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
BEIRUT--This week Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is meeting in the Egyptian resort of Sharm al-Sheikh with representatives of states having an interest in Iraq. Among the participants will be Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. The gathering comes amid reports that Ms. Rice's State Department wants a breakthrough in relations with Tehran before President Bush's departure from office. Ms. Rice did not rule out meeting with Mr. Mottaki, although Iran's deputy foreign minister subsequently lowered expectations that any negotiations would take place.
Anxiously watching developments is another neighbor of Iraq: Syria. The regime of President Bashar Assad is uncertain as to how an Iranian-American rapprochement might affect its own future. While Syria is a close ally of Iran, the U.S. has been pushing for Damascus' isolation, insisting that Syria must change its behavior in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories, and, most importantly, in Lebanon. But it is in Lebanon that Syria has shown the least inclination to concede anything. That's why the U.S. must use any future conversation with Iran, assuming it goes well, as leverage to consolidate Lebanon's fragile independence.
Syria has two priorities, both of which have contributed to increasing its censure internationally and in the Arab world. The first is regime survival. The Syrians feel threatened by the approaching formation of a tribunal to deal with the February 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. Syria is considered the main suspect in the crime, and in their most recent report, United Nations investigators preparing the legal case lent substantial credence to that assertion.
Up to now the Syrians have successfully pushed their allies in Beirut to block creation of the tribunal through a Lebanese constitutional process. U.N. officials and the five permanent members of the Security Council have indicated that if this continues, the tribunal will be set up under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Even Russia has said it would not veto this.
A second Syrian aim is to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon. After the Lebanon war ended last summer, Syria encouraged its ally Hezbollah to mount an effective coup against the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. This failed after it led to growing Sunni-Shiite hostility, prompting Iranian and Saudi intervention to prevent an escalation that would have harmed their own interests.
Syria also appears to be trying to abort Lebanon's presidential election later this year, setting the stage for the creation of two rival governments in Beirut. Last week, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal warned against this eventuality. Syria is continuing to supply weapons to Hezbollah, in breach of Security Council Resolution 1701, as well as to other groups, and it still refuses to recognize Lebanese sovereignty, establish an embassy in Beirut, or delineate borders with its neighbor.
Mr. Assad understands that if relations between the U.S. and Iran improve in the coming months, Syria might be left dangling. That's one reason why he is so keen to reassert himself in Lebanon, which gives Syria regional relevance.
Similarly, the Lebanese government and parliamentary majority, which oppose a Syrian return, are wary the U.S. might sell them out on Syria's and Iran's behalf. That's a possibility, but a more likely outcome, given the broad Arab and international opposition to Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs, is that it is Mr. Assad who will have to bend.
The U.S. attitude toward Syria seems to be a bureaucratic compromise within the Bush administration: There are those in Vice President Dick Cheney's office and at the National Security Council who mistrust a dialogue with Iran, but the war in Iraq is now too much of a headache to avoid exploring new policies. So Ms. Rice is moving ahead with Iran, hoping it will have positive repercussions in Iraq, even as she covers herself on her right by refusing to indulge Syria.
This is why Syrian officials have frantically been trying to prove their worth in Washington recently by underlining their distance from Tehran and showing goodwill toward peace negotiations with Israel. Mr. Assad realizes that talks between Israel and Syria would make him a choice American partner, buy him valuable breathing space with respect to the Hariri tribunal (for who would want to upset Syria if its president were chatting about peace?), and widen his margin of maneuver against those opposing him in Lebanon.
The idea of dealing with Syria for the sake of a Syrian-Israeli peace has been making some headway in the U.S. The only problem is that its proponents have systematically failed to define credible safeguards to deny a Syrian comeback in Lebanon. There is nothing wrong in principle with engaging Syria, though Mr. Assad has tended to view offers of engagement as a sign of weakness by his interlocutors, therefore a pretext not to surrender anything. But at this juncture the Syrian regime must be made to understand that Lebanon is off the table, once and for all.
There also happens to be the fact that a political murder was committed, and Syrian behavior has not been reassuring in that regard. That's why three conditions must govern any contact with the Assad regime.
First, Syria must prove it accepts the Hariri tribunal by discontinuing efforts to thwart its endorsement in Lebanon. This also means eventually allowing Syrian officials to stand before the tribunal if they are implicated. Until now, Mr. Assad and his lieutenants have said Syrian suspects would only appear before Syrian courts. Second, Syria must respect U.N. resolutions on Lebanon, including Resolutions 1559 and 1701. This means, among other things, ending Syrian destabilization efforts and the arming of Hezbollah and other groups. And third, Damascus must formally accept Lebanese sovereignty and agree to the opening of embassies and a delineation of the border with Lebanon.
While it is by no means clear that the U.S. and Iran would in the current climate agree to move toward some form of engagement, the consequences if they did could substantially alter what happens in the Middle East. Maybe Mr. Assad is gambling on U.S.-Iranian discord, and maybe that gamble will pay off. However, if Iran decides that now is a good time to begin a normalization process with Washington, the Syrian president would be better off accepting that Lebanon is lost for good, and that he can gain much regionally and internationally from that acknowledgment.
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Avoiding the chaos of two governments
Avoiding the chaos of two governments
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Is it true that Michel Aoun recently visited Damascus and was told he would be asked by Emile Lahoud to form a government after the president's departure? Though Aoun earlier indicated he would not take such a step unless he were guaranteed the presidency, the version put out by the majority is that the Syrians didn't give him a choice. He could not be president, but he could be prime minister - following a custom of naming Christians to the post during times of crises over the presidency.
Of course Aoun would deny this. That the source of the story is the majority invites caution. However, two developments have set off alarm bells. The first is that the Saudi foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, warned last week of the possibility that Lebanon might find itself with two parallel governments once Lahoud's term ended, and his statement was allegedly made in response to information that Aoun had met with the Syrians.
Second, both Aoun and pro-Syrian politicians have set the stage for such an eventuality. In response to a question from Abu Dhabi television as to what would happen if there were no presidential election, Aoun said last week, "A resolution lies in the hands of the president of the republic ... [as] the government is illegal and unable to pursue the work of the presidency." When Aoun was asked whether he thought it possible that there would be two rival governments, he answered: "I don't believe in the possibility of two governments, for what will be the limits of each? There will be a balance of power on the ground that will decide the issue."
Former Prime Minister Omar Karami, one of several weathervanes reflecting Syrian intentions, said last week: "What President Lahoud is saying resembles what President Amine Gemayel did before his departure from the presidential palace, namely that he will name a prime minister and form a new government through constitutional mechanisms." The fact that Karami is a Sunni is important, since this supposedly adds legitimacy to the temporary naming of a Maronite as prime minister.
Both statements are highly dangerous. The implications of Aoun's statement are clear. If a balance of power will decide the issue of two parallel governments, then the only forces capable of affecting that balance "on the ground" are the Lebanese Army and Hizbullah. So, the general is threatening to return Lebanon to 1988, when he headed a military government and tried to solve the country's problems through the use of force. If history repeats itself as farce, then Aoun's acquiescence in such an insane plan, assuming it is his plan, would return us to a very bloody farce indeed, which could destroy the army, lead to civil war, and almost certainly break Lebanon apart - perhaps irredeemably this time with the various communities now thinking in existential terms.
On Tuesday, Aoun went further in underlining that he has no real intention of coming to power as a compromise candidate. He denounced as "conspirators" those who reject parliamentary elections today, meaning the majority, and irresponsibly offered as an alternative the election of a president by popular vote. One has to wonder about the general's supporters, who lustily applauded the idea. Only moments earlier Aoun had put on his miter and talked about the Christian presence in the Middle East. Aoun's lieutenants, lowering their secularist mask, have frequently underlined that they are the best qualified to defend Christian interests. If so, a historic bulwark of that protection has been avoiding a popular election that would allow Lebanon's Muslim majority to choose Christian candidates. One can dispute that rationale, but Aoun's proposal is a scheme to take power, in the knowledge that he can't do so through Parliament, not an effort to recast the system of representativeness.
Much of what Aoun does or says in the months ahead will be prompted by his devouring ambition to become president. The general may be a master blunderer at times, and his egotism may yet destroy the political system he so wants to dominate, but at this juncture it's more useful to employ other means to try bringing Aoun in from the cold. He has no intention of giving up on the presidency, but as his project becomes more difficult to implement, those around the general might become uneasy. Better a deal in which Aoun has a say on Lahoud's successor, they might argue, than to put all his chips on an all-or-nothing bid to reach Baabda.
Take the allegation that Aoun has agreed to form an interim government. Even if it's true that the Syrians imposed this on him, the general would certainly prefer to be president than head of a government that will be opposed by most Lebanese and the international community. He was in that position once before, and while Aoun is not one to learn from his mistakes, he knows well the disadvantages of finding himself isolated.
March 14 should play along with Aoun. Once the Hariri tribunal is endorsed, the pressure will be on the majority to break the deadlock over the government. Indefinitely denying veto power to the opposition will not be easy. At the same time, the opposition will find it difficult to bring down any new government through mass resignations in order to impose its presidential favorite. After months of debilitating stalemate, neither side has much latitude to initiate a new round of political infighting, even if that's the Syrian ambition. Moreover, while Hizbullah has suggested that the real difficulties between them and the majority are clashing visions for Lebanon's future and disagreement over holding early parliamentary elections, by refocusing on the government the majority can place the burden of normalization on the opposition.
That's why the majority should offer Aoun the number of portfolios he's long been demanding, even if that creates problems with the Lebanese Forces. However, a requirement would be that Aoun gain mainly from Lahoud's quota, since the president is on his way out. Once he's locked into the system, Aoun might also find himself locked into its logic. That could provide a valuable channel to induce him to participate in selecting a new president, once it becomes clear the majority will not vote for Aoun. That doesn't mean the general won't use his stake in government as leverage to succeed Lahoud, but the price he pays for doing so will be high if he's seen as his putting his interests before those of the country.
The plan is full of holes, but could work as a blueprint to build on. Aoun has become a destructive instrument of Syrian power, directly or indirectly, because he has no incentive to be anything else, and no institutional position to defend. The odds are that the general will view any concession made to him as further affirmation of his right to be president. This is not someone who understands or likes the baroque compromises of the political system. But the way to agree with Aoun, or smother him, is to make him part of that system and see how he reacts.
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Is it true that Michel Aoun recently visited Damascus and was told he would be asked by Emile Lahoud to form a government after the president's departure? Though Aoun earlier indicated he would not take such a step unless he were guaranteed the presidency, the version put out by the majority is that the Syrians didn't give him a choice. He could not be president, but he could be prime minister - following a custom of naming Christians to the post during times of crises over the presidency.
Of course Aoun would deny this. That the source of the story is the majority invites caution. However, two developments have set off alarm bells. The first is that the Saudi foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, warned last week of the possibility that Lebanon might find itself with two parallel governments once Lahoud's term ended, and his statement was allegedly made in response to information that Aoun had met with the Syrians.
Second, both Aoun and pro-Syrian politicians have set the stage for such an eventuality. In response to a question from Abu Dhabi television as to what would happen if there were no presidential election, Aoun said last week, "A resolution lies in the hands of the president of the republic ... [as] the government is illegal and unable to pursue the work of the presidency." When Aoun was asked whether he thought it possible that there would be two rival governments, he answered: "I don't believe in the possibility of two governments, for what will be the limits of each? There will be a balance of power on the ground that will decide the issue."
Former Prime Minister Omar Karami, one of several weathervanes reflecting Syrian intentions, said last week: "What President Lahoud is saying resembles what President Amine Gemayel did before his departure from the presidential palace, namely that he will name a prime minister and form a new government through constitutional mechanisms." The fact that Karami is a Sunni is important, since this supposedly adds legitimacy to the temporary naming of a Maronite as prime minister.
Both statements are highly dangerous. The implications of Aoun's statement are clear. If a balance of power will decide the issue of two parallel governments, then the only forces capable of affecting that balance "on the ground" are the Lebanese Army and Hizbullah. So, the general is threatening to return Lebanon to 1988, when he headed a military government and tried to solve the country's problems through the use of force. If history repeats itself as farce, then Aoun's acquiescence in such an insane plan, assuming it is his plan, would return us to a very bloody farce indeed, which could destroy the army, lead to civil war, and almost certainly break Lebanon apart - perhaps irredeemably this time with the various communities now thinking in existential terms.
On Tuesday, Aoun went further in underlining that he has no real intention of coming to power as a compromise candidate. He denounced as "conspirators" those who reject parliamentary elections today, meaning the majority, and irresponsibly offered as an alternative the election of a president by popular vote. One has to wonder about the general's supporters, who lustily applauded the idea. Only moments earlier Aoun had put on his miter and talked about the Christian presence in the Middle East. Aoun's lieutenants, lowering their secularist mask, have frequently underlined that they are the best qualified to defend Christian interests. If so, a historic bulwark of that protection has been avoiding a popular election that would allow Lebanon's Muslim majority to choose Christian candidates. One can dispute that rationale, but Aoun's proposal is a scheme to take power, in the knowledge that he can't do so through Parliament, not an effort to recast the system of representativeness.
Much of what Aoun does or says in the months ahead will be prompted by his devouring ambition to become president. The general may be a master blunderer at times, and his egotism may yet destroy the political system he so wants to dominate, but at this juncture it's more useful to employ other means to try bringing Aoun in from the cold. He has no intention of giving up on the presidency, but as his project becomes more difficult to implement, those around the general might become uneasy. Better a deal in which Aoun has a say on Lahoud's successor, they might argue, than to put all his chips on an all-or-nothing bid to reach Baabda.
Take the allegation that Aoun has agreed to form an interim government. Even if it's true that the Syrians imposed this on him, the general would certainly prefer to be president than head of a government that will be opposed by most Lebanese and the international community. He was in that position once before, and while Aoun is not one to learn from his mistakes, he knows well the disadvantages of finding himself isolated.
March 14 should play along with Aoun. Once the Hariri tribunal is endorsed, the pressure will be on the majority to break the deadlock over the government. Indefinitely denying veto power to the opposition will not be easy. At the same time, the opposition will find it difficult to bring down any new government through mass resignations in order to impose its presidential favorite. After months of debilitating stalemate, neither side has much latitude to initiate a new round of political infighting, even if that's the Syrian ambition. Moreover, while Hizbullah has suggested that the real difficulties between them and the majority are clashing visions for Lebanon's future and disagreement over holding early parliamentary elections, by refocusing on the government the majority can place the burden of normalization on the opposition.
That's why the majority should offer Aoun the number of portfolios he's long been demanding, even if that creates problems with the Lebanese Forces. However, a requirement would be that Aoun gain mainly from Lahoud's quota, since the president is on his way out. Once he's locked into the system, Aoun might also find himself locked into its logic. That could provide a valuable channel to induce him to participate in selecting a new president, once it becomes clear the majority will not vote for Aoun. That doesn't mean the general won't use his stake in government as leverage to succeed Lahoud, but the price he pays for doing so will be high if he's seen as his putting his interests before those of the country.
The plan is full of holes, but could work as a blueprint to build on. Aoun has become a destructive instrument of Syrian power, directly or indirectly, because he has no incentive to be anything else, and no institutional position to defend. The odds are that the general will view any concession made to him as further affirmation of his right to be president. This is not someone who understands or likes the baroque compromises of the political system. But the way to agree with Aoun, or smother him, is to make him part of that system and see how he reacts.
Wednesday, May 2, 2007
Syrian Endgame: America should press Damascus to let go of Lebanon
BEIRUT--This week Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is meeting in the Egyptian resort of Sharm al-Sheikh with representatives of states having an interest in Iraq. Among the participants will be Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. The gathering comes amid reports that Ms. Rice's State Department wants a breakthrough in relations with Tehran before President Bush's departure from office. Ms. Rice did not rule out meeting with Mr. Mottaki, although Iran's deputy foreign minister subsequently lowered expectations that any negotiations would take place.
Anxiously watching developments is another neighbor of Iraq: Syria. The regime of President Bashar Assad is uncertain as to how an Iranian-American rapprochement might affect its own future. While Syria is a close ally of Iran, the U.S. has been pushing for Damascus' isolation, insisting that Syria must change its behavior in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories, and, most importantly, in Lebanon. But it is in Lebanon that Syria has shown the least inclination to concede anything. That's why the U.S. must use any future conversation with Iran, assuming it goes well, as leverage to consolidate Lebanon's fragile independence.
Syria has two priorities, both of which have contributed to increasing its censure internationally and in the Arab world. The first is regime survival. The Syrians feel threatened by the approaching formation of a tribunal to deal with the February 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. Syria is considered the main suspect in the crime, and in their most recent report, United Nations investigators preparing the legal case lent substantial credence to that assertion.
Up to now the Syrians have successfully pushed their allies in Beirut to block creation of the tribunal through a Lebanese constitutional process. U.N. officials and the five permanent members of the Security Council have indicated that if this continues, the tribunal will be set up under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Even Russia has said it would not veto this.
A second Syrian aim is to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon. After the Lebanon war ended last summer, Syria encouraged its ally Hezbollah to mount an effective coup against the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. This failed after it led to growing Sunni-Shiite hostility, prompting Iranian and Saudi intervention to prevent an escalation that would have harmed their own interests.
Syria also appears to be trying to abort Lebanon's presidential election later this year, setting the stage for the creation of two rival governments in Beirut. Last week, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal warned against this eventuality. Syria is continuing to supply weapons to Hezbollah, in breach of Security Council Resolution 1701, as well as to other groups, and it still refuses to recognize Lebanese sovereignty, establish an embassy in Beirut, or delineate borders with its neighbor.
Mr. Assad understands that if relations between the U.S. and Iran improve in the coming months, Syria might be left dangling. That's one reason why he is so keen to reassert himself in Lebanon, which gives Syria regional relevance.
Similarly, the Lebanese government and parliamentary majority, which oppose a Syrian return, are wary the U.S. might sell them out on Syria's and Iran's behalf. That's a possibility, but a more likely outcome, given the broad Arab and international opposition to Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs, is that it is Mr. Assad who will have to bend.
The U.S. attitude toward Syria seems to be a bureaucratic compromise within the Bush administration: There are those in Vice President Dick Cheney's office and at the National Security Council who mistrust a dialogue with Iran, but the war in Iraq is now too much of a headache to avoid exploring new policies. So Ms. Rice is moving ahead with Iran, hoping it will have positive repercussions in Iraq, even as she covers herself on her right by refusing to indulge Syria.
This is why Syrian officials have frantically been trying to prove their worth in Washington recently by underlining their distance from Tehran and showing goodwill toward peace negotiations with Israel. Mr. Assad realizes that talks between Israel and Syria would make him a choice American partner, buy him valuable breathing space with respect to the Hariri tribunal (for who would want to upset Syria if its president were chatting about peace?), and widen his margin of maneuver against those opposing him in Lebanon.
The idea of dealing with Syria for the sake of a Syrian-Israeli peace has been making some headway in the U.S. The only problem is that its proponents have systematically failed to define credible safeguards to deny a Syrian comeback in Lebanon. There is nothing wrong in principle with engaging Syria, though Mr. Assad has tended to view offers of engagement as a sign of weakness by his interlocutors, therefore a pretext not to surrender anything. But at this juncture the Syrian regime must be made to understand that Lebanon is off the table, once and for all.
There also happens to be the fact that a political murder was committed, and Syrian behavior has not been reassuring in that regard. That's why three conditions must govern any contact with the Assad regime.
First, Syria must prove it accepts the Hariri tribunal by discontinuing efforts to thwart its endorsement in Lebanon. This also means eventually allowing Syrian officials to stand before the tribunal if they are implicated. Until now, Mr. Assad and his lieutenants have said Syrian suspects would only appear before Syrian courts. Second, Syria must respect U.N. resolutions on Lebanon, including Resolutions 1559 and 1701. This means, among other things, ending Syrian destabilization efforts and the arming of Hezbollah and other groups. And third, Damascus must formally accept Lebanese sovereignty and agree to the opening of embassies and a delineation of the border with Lebanon.
While it is by no means clear that the U.S. and Iran would in the current climate agree to move toward some form of engagement, the consequences if they did could substantially alter what happens in the Middle East. Maybe Mr. Assad is gambling on U.S.-Iranian discord, and maybe that gamble will pay off. However, if Iran decides that now is a good time to begin a normalization process with Washington, the Syrian president would be better off accepting that Lebanon is lost for good, and that he can gain much regionally and internationally from that acknowledgment.
Anxiously watching developments is another neighbor of Iraq: Syria. The regime of President Bashar Assad is uncertain as to how an Iranian-American rapprochement might affect its own future. While Syria is a close ally of Iran, the U.S. has been pushing for Damascus' isolation, insisting that Syria must change its behavior in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories, and, most importantly, in Lebanon. But it is in Lebanon that Syria has shown the least inclination to concede anything. That's why the U.S. must use any future conversation with Iran, assuming it goes well, as leverage to consolidate Lebanon's fragile independence.
Syria has two priorities, both of which have contributed to increasing its censure internationally and in the Arab world. The first is regime survival. The Syrians feel threatened by the approaching formation of a tribunal to deal with the February 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. Syria is considered the main suspect in the crime, and in their most recent report, United Nations investigators preparing the legal case lent substantial credence to that assertion.
Up to now the Syrians have successfully pushed their allies in Beirut to block creation of the tribunal through a Lebanese constitutional process. U.N. officials and the five permanent members of the Security Council have indicated that if this continues, the tribunal will be set up under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Even Russia has said it would not veto this.
A second Syrian aim is to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon. After the Lebanon war ended last summer, Syria encouraged its ally Hezbollah to mount an effective coup against the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. This failed after it led to growing Sunni-Shiite hostility, prompting Iranian and Saudi intervention to prevent an escalation that would have harmed their own interests.
Syria also appears to be trying to abort Lebanon's presidential election later this year, setting the stage for the creation of two rival governments in Beirut. Last week, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal warned against this eventuality. Syria is continuing to supply weapons to Hezbollah, in breach of Security Council Resolution 1701, as well as to other groups, and it still refuses to recognize Lebanese sovereignty, establish an embassy in Beirut, or delineate borders with its neighbor.
Mr. Assad understands that if relations between the U.S. and Iran improve in the coming months, Syria might be left dangling. That's one reason why he is so keen to reassert himself in Lebanon, which gives Syria regional relevance.
Similarly, the Lebanese government and parliamentary majority, which oppose a Syrian return, are wary the U.S. might sell them out on Syria's and Iran's behalf. That's a possibility, but a more likely outcome, given the broad Arab and international opposition to Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs, is that it is Mr. Assad who will have to bend.
The U.S. attitude toward Syria seems to be a bureaucratic compromise within the Bush administration: There are those in Vice President Dick Cheney's office and at the National Security Council who mistrust a dialogue with Iran, but the war in Iraq is now too much of a headache to avoid exploring new policies. So Ms. Rice is moving ahead with Iran, hoping it will have positive repercussions in Iraq, even as she covers herself on her right by refusing to indulge Syria.
This is why Syrian officials have frantically been trying to prove their worth in Washington recently by underlining their distance from Tehran and showing goodwill toward peace negotiations with Israel. Mr. Assad realizes that talks between Israel and Syria would make him a choice American partner, buy him valuable breathing space with respect to the Hariri tribunal (for who would want to upset Syria if its president were chatting about peace?), and widen his margin of maneuver against those opposing him in Lebanon.
The idea of dealing with Syria for the sake of a Syrian-Israeli peace has been making some headway in the U.S. The only problem is that its proponents have systematically failed to define credible safeguards to deny a Syrian comeback in Lebanon. There is nothing wrong in principle with engaging Syria, though Mr. Assad has tended to view offers of engagement as a sign of weakness by his interlocutors, therefore a pretext not to surrender anything. But at this juncture the Syrian regime must be made to understand that Lebanon is off the table, once and for all.
There also happens to be the fact that a political murder was committed, and Syrian behavior has not been reassuring in that regard. That's why three conditions must govern any contact with the Assad regime.
First, Syria must prove it accepts the Hariri tribunal by discontinuing efforts to thwart its endorsement in Lebanon. This also means eventually allowing Syrian officials to stand before the tribunal if they are implicated. Until now, Mr. Assad and his lieutenants have said Syrian suspects would only appear before Syrian courts. Second, Syria must respect U.N. resolutions on Lebanon, including Resolutions 1559 and 1701. This means, among other things, ending Syrian destabilization efforts and the arming of Hezbollah and other groups. And third, Damascus must formally accept Lebanese sovereignty and agree to the opening of embassies and a delineation of the border with Lebanon.
While it is by no means clear that the U.S. and Iran would in the current climate agree to move toward some form of engagement, the consequences if they did could substantially alter what happens in the Middle East. Maybe Mr. Assad is gambling on U.S.-Iranian discord, and maybe that gamble will pay off. However, if Iran decides that now is a good time to begin a normalization process with Washington, the Syrian president would be better off accepting that Lebanon is lost for good, and that he can gain much regionally and internationally from that acknowledgment.
Thursday, April 26, 2007
Two openings March 14 might consider
Two openings March 14 might consider
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, April 26, 2007
It's never easy to discern movement in the midst of glacial stalemate, but the ice has definitely budged in the past 10 days in Lebanon. The Hariri tribunal is almost certain to be established, whether through Lebanese institutions or through the United Nations Security Council; and the heat is building up on the opposition to agree to a presidential election amid a widening consensus that Emile Lahoud, whatever else happens, will not remain in office beyond the end of his term.
Many more difficulties lie ahead, but the visit to Beirut last week of Nicolas Michel, the UN's chief legal adviser, was a decisive step in the establishment of the tribunal. Michel sent as explicit a message as the opposition and Syria will ever receive that the tribunal is coming, whatever their displeasure. However, it was Russia's deputy foreign minister, Alexander Sultanov, who lowered the knife on Syria by indicating that Moscow would not veto recourse to Chapter 7 in the event the tribunal remained blocked in Lebanon.
Sultanov's message to Syrian President Bashar Assad probably went like this: Accept the tribunal through the Lebanese constitutional process, since you can then influence what happens; but once it reaches the UN, there's little we can do to help you. There are no signs, however, that Assad intends to change direction.
Hizbullah and other opposition groups have sounded apocalyptic when mentioning the possible domestic impact of a Chapter 7 tribunal. One Hizbullah parliamentarian took the gold by predicting it might lead to civil war. Precisely why the passage of a tribunal over which all Lebanese allegedly agree should lead to war remains a mystery.
But Hizbullah, for all its frustration with the majority, has very little latitude, or desire, to provoke a conflict that would lead to sectarian meltdown. That's why the party has mainly directed its vitriol against a Druze, Walid Jumblatt, and a Maronite, Samir Geagea, not against Saad Hariri and the Sunni community that is most insistent about the need to see the tribunal formed. A Sunni-Shiite clash is a red line that Iran will not cross.
Similarly, Hizbullah has indicated that its focus is now on early legislative elections to replace what it considers an illegitimate Parliament. This implies the presidential election might not be held on time, since Parliament elects the president. The party's logic is confusing. If a new president takes office, then constitutionally the current Siniora government will fall, an objective the opposition has spent over four months trying to achieve.
On the other hand, if the opposition blocks the election, then it will be blamed for carrying the country into a political vacuum. A scheme being floated by the opposition is for Lahoud to name an interim government headed by Michel Aoun. However, not only would this be unconstitutional, Aoun has reportedly said he would not accept such a poisoned apple unless he were guaranteed the presidency.
Hizbullah remains militarily powerful, but its political inflexibility is proving disastrous. The party and the Amal movement can thank Syrian intransigence for that. Because Assad refuses to concede anything on the Hariri tribunal, we may be nearing the time when Hizbullah and Amal have to tell the Syrians they've done all they can on Syria's behalf, but that they now need to shore up their declining domestic position.
In order to maintain the initiative, but also to block any outside effort to sow domestic conflict over the Hariri tribunal, March 14 needs to do more. It should open up in two directions: toward the Shiite community, over Hizbullah's head; and toward Aoun, who has been oddly silent in recent weeks, perhaps in recognition of the fact that his vision for Lebanon and that of his transitory ally, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, are irreconcilable - at least if Nasrallah's April 8 speech is the benchmark.
With respect to the Shiites, the majority might want to think of putting on the table a quid pro quo: a timetable to discuss constitutional reforms and a redistribution of political power among all communities, in particular the Shiites, in exchange for Hizbullah's willingness to accept a timetable for its disarmament. Since the majority is calling for Hizbullah's disarmament under Taif, it can also discuss what Taif focused on: political reform.
The idea would be to compel Hizbullah to explain to its own community why retaining its weapons is preferable to the Shiites' gaining a larger share of political representation through peaceful means. At the same time, creating a schedule for Hizbullah's disarmament need not mean insisting on a short deadline. As in the Northern Ireland peace process through which the IRA surrendered its weapons, it can take years.
At the same time, the majority can do more to break Aoun away from Hizbullah and from the smaller pro-Syrian groups, with whom he has no affinity. The main hurdle is Aoun's stubborn insistence that he alone must become president. This might not change.
However, the majority can tell the general publicly that while it will never accept him in Baabda, it will agree to a candidate that he names in cooperation with other major Maronite representatives, such as Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and Geagea. Needless to say, Aoun, because he controls the balance in Parliament for a two-thirds majority, would have much more say in the matter than Sfeir or Geagea, and could substantially shape the president's agenda.
Admittedly, that's not as easy as it sounds. With most Maronite politicians fantasizing over the presidency, there will be growing cracks within the majority over who succeeds Lahoud. But the value of giving Aoun a choice role in the selection process is that it would minimize dejection among the general's supporters if he is not elected.
While Aoun's popularity among Christians has declined, it is not insignificant; nor is it in the interest of March 14 to allow the community to succumb to the despondency that defined it during the 1990s. If Aoun were given the means to advance his program through a candidate that he and other Christian representatives could choose, he would have less leeway to argue that he is personally indispensable for a Christian revival.
These two steps - putting on the table political reform that would advantage Shiites in parallel with Hizbullah's disarmament, and building bridges to Michel Aoun - could help the majority consolidate the gains it has recently made. Now is the time for March 14 to press ahead, but also to show the opposition that it can only lose by perpetuating deadlock.
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, April 26, 2007
It's never easy to discern movement in the midst of glacial stalemate, but the ice has definitely budged in the past 10 days in Lebanon. The Hariri tribunal is almost certain to be established, whether through Lebanese institutions or through the United Nations Security Council; and the heat is building up on the opposition to agree to a presidential election amid a widening consensus that Emile Lahoud, whatever else happens, will not remain in office beyond the end of his term.
Many more difficulties lie ahead, but the visit to Beirut last week of Nicolas Michel, the UN's chief legal adviser, was a decisive step in the establishment of the tribunal. Michel sent as explicit a message as the opposition and Syria will ever receive that the tribunal is coming, whatever their displeasure. However, it was Russia's deputy foreign minister, Alexander Sultanov, who lowered the knife on Syria by indicating that Moscow would not veto recourse to Chapter 7 in the event the tribunal remained blocked in Lebanon.
Sultanov's message to Syrian President Bashar Assad probably went like this: Accept the tribunal through the Lebanese constitutional process, since you can then influence what happens; but once it reaches the UN, there's little we can do to help you. There are no signs, however, that Assad intends to change direction.
Hizbullah and other opposition groups have sounded apocalyptic when mentioning the possible domestic impact of a Chapter 7 tribunal. One Hizbullah parliamentarian took the gold by predicting it might lead to civil war. Precisely why the passage of a tribunal over which all Lebanese allegedly agree should lead to war remains a mystery.
But Hizbullah, for all its frustration with the majority, has very little latitude, or desire, to provoke a conflict that would lead to sectarian meltdown. That's why the party has mainly directed its vitriol against a Druze, Walid Jumblatt, and a Maronite, Samir Geagea, not against Saad Hariri and the Sunni community that is most insistent about the need to see the tribunal formed. A Sunni-Shiite clash is a red line that Iran will not cross.
Similarly, Hizbullah has indicated that its focus is now on early legislative elections to replace what it considers an illegitimate Parliament. This implies the presidential election might not be held on time, since Parliament elects the president. The party's logic is confusing. If a new president takes office, then constitutionally the current Siniora government will fall, an objective the opposition has spent over four months trying to achieve.
On the other hand, if the opposition blocks the election, then it will be blamed for carrying the country into a political vacuum. A scheme being floated by the opposition is for Lahoud to name an interim government headed by Michel Aoun. However, not only would this be unconstitutional, Aoun has reportedly said he would not accept such a poisoned apple unless he were guaranteed the presidency.
Hizbullah remains militarily powerful, but its political inflexibility is proving disastrous. The party and the Amal movement can thank Syrian intransigence for that. Because Assad refuses to concede anything on the Hariri tribunal, we may be nearing the time when Hizbullah and Amal have to tell the Syrians they've done all they can on Syria's behalf, but that they now need to shore up their declining domestic position.
In order to maintain the initiative, but also to block any outside effort to sow domestic conflict over the Hariri tribunal, March 14 needs to do more. It should open up in two directions: toward the Shiite community, over Hizbullah's head; and toward Aoun, who has been oddly silent in recent weeks, perhaps in recognition of the fact that his vision for Lebanon and that of his transitory ally, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, are irreconcilable - at least if Nasrallah's April 8 speech is the benchmark.
With respect to the Shiites, the majority might want to think of putting on the table a quid pro quo: a timetable to discuss constitutional reforms and a redistribution of political power among all communities, in particular the Shiites, in exchange for Hizbullah's willingness to accept a timetable for its disarmament. Since the majority is calling for Hizbullah's disarmament under Taif, it can also discuss what Taif focused on: political reform.
The idea would be to compel Hizbullah to explain to its own community why retaining its weapons is preferable to the Shiites' gaining a larger share of political representation through peaceful means. At the same time, creating a schedule for Hizbullah's disarmament need not mean insisting on a short deadline. As in the Northern Ireland peace process through which the IRA surrendered its weapons, it can take years.
At the same time, the majority can do more to break Aoun away from Hizbullah and from the smaller pro-Syrian groups, with whom he has no affinity. The main hurdle is Aoun's stubborn insistence that he alone must become president. This might not change.
However, the majority can tell the general publicly that while it will never accept him in Baabda, it will agree to a candidate that he names in cooperation with other major Maronite representatives, such as Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and Geagea. Needless to say, Aoun, because he controls the balance in Parliament for a two-thirds majority, would have much more say in the matter than Sfeir or Geagea, and could substantially shape the president's agenda.
Admittedly, that's not as easy as it sounds. With most Maronite politicians fantasizing over the presidency, there will be growing cracks within the majority over who succeeds Lahoud. But the value of giving Aoun a choice role in the selection process is that it would minimize dejection among the general's supporters if he is not elected.
While Aoun's popularity among Christians has declined, it is not insignificant; nor is it in the interest of March 14 to allow the community to succumb to the despondency that defined it during the 1990s. If Aoun were given the means to advance his program through a candidate that he and other Christian representatives could choose, he would have less leeway to argue that he is personally indispensable for a Christian revival.
These two steps - putting on the table political reform that would advantage Shiites in parallel with Hizbullah's disarmament, and building bridges to Michel Aoun - could help the majority consolidate the gains it has recently made. Now is the time for March 14 to press ahead, but also to show the opposition that it can only lose by perpetuating deadlock.
Monday, April 23, 2007
Duck Soup: What a satirical weekly can tell us about France’s elections
As France prepares to vote in the first round of its presidential election on April 22, an indispensable guide to a campaign mostly low on drama but high in potential meaning has been the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaine. With its slogan "The freedom of the press wears itself out only when it is not used," the newspaper has been an obstinate investigator of the notoriously mendacious French political elite. Why a similar such newspaper does not exist in the United States merits examination.
Founded in 1915 by Maurice and Jeanne Marechal, Le Canard Enchaine got its name through both parody and pun—fitting for a newspaper that lampoons at will and most of whose headlines play with words. When politician George Clemenceau’s newspaper L’Homme Libre (The Free Man) was closed down, he renamed it L’Homme Enchaine (The Man in Chains). The Marechals riffed on that title in naming their own newspaper Le Canard Enchaine, literally "The Duck in Chains," bearing in mind that in French slang, a "canard" means a newspaper.
French political culture has always tended to be more freewheeling than that in most other Western countries (though a special place should perhaps be reserved for Italy). For example, major politicians of all persuasions have at one time or other been indicted or accused of illegal party financing, even of taking bribes, including President Jacques Chirac. A politician innocent of extra-marital affairs is the object of high mockery, and it is with considerable disbelief that the French still contemplate the reportedly irreproachable Charles de Gaulle. And betrayal is so accepted a norm of political life, that few are those politicians without a knife in their back and another in their hand.
None of this is particularly unique to France, but Le Canard Enchaine has played a paradoxical role in addressing issues of political immorality. It has highlighted the worse offenses of French politicians, but it has also, and unintentionally, helped institutionalize their behavior by showing that everybody does it. The newspaper acts as a safety valve of sorts, because it hits out in all directions against France’s schools of scandal.
Take the newspaper’s report in its February 28 issue that presidential front runner Nicolas Sarkozy had, as mayor of Neuilly, saved the equivalent of around $360,000 in his purchase and remodeling of a duplex apartment on the luxurious Ile de Jatte, in his own constituency. He managed to do so because the company developing the apartment building allegedly sold him the property at below-market price and made costly changes to the Sarkozy residence for free. It so happens that the company, Groupe Lasserre, is a major developer in Neuilly. The implication was obvious: Lasserre did Sarkozy a favor because it needed the mayor’s support for its other Neuilly investments.
This was pretty damaging stuff, and Sarkozy’s unimpressive official response was promptly shredded to pieces by the Canard. But did the candidate suffer any lasting damage? Apparently not, as he still remains the favorite to win in the first round of the election, against the Socialist candidate Segolene Royal, the centrist Francois Bayrou, the far-right National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, and a gaggle of lesser lights.
One reason why the impact of the story may have been subdued is that in its next issue, the Canard had a troubling report on Royal. According to the newspaper, she and her partner, Socialist Party boss Francois Hollande, underestimated by a factor of three the value of a vacation home they own in the south of France for tax purposes. The story wrapped around a cartoon of a bikinied Royal, sitting poolside at the home, an issue of the Canard in hand, asking Hollande, who is preparing to dive in with a ducky floater around his waste: "Francois, why are they all after my two-room home?"
And just to make sure no one got off untarnished, two weeks later the newspaper had a similar story on Le Pen, showing how he, too, had probably wildly underestimated the tax value of his properties and revenues. Aside from showing that French politicians can be as sane as the rest of us when it comes to evading income and property tax, the pieces both harmed the candidates and neutralized that harm by making everyone look just as bad. Anyway, which Frenchman, once the initial envy had washed away, could begrudge someone fleecing the state?
Its investigative gifts aside, the Canard’s real attraction is its wicked humor. The newspaper’s shambling, faux early 20th-century layout (it is always eight pages long) helps in that regard, projecting an image of splendid apathy when it comes to modern form. Adding to that is the decision of the editors to avoid putting the publication online for now, as they insist that "our job is to inform and entertain our readers, with newsprint and ink."
Most of the Canard’s puns are untranslatable, but those that are are pretty good. Sarkozy’s decision to throw out management at the France 3 public television station if he wins the election brought in this headline: Sarkozy wants a "menage a France 3," with "menage" roughly meaning an "overhaul" in French. A story on a school linked to Opus Dei that engaged in illegal labor practices earned the headline, "The Da Vinci Code of Work." Or what about the cartoon of Bayrou, whom the paper has dubbed "the horse whisperer" because of his passion for rural life, telling his horse: "If I’m not in the second round, I’ll vote for..." Bayrou’s supporters, if the candidate doesn’t make it through himself, might hold a key swing vote in the second round between the top two vote-getters, so the horse would seem to be a nose ahead on the rest of us.
You have to wonder why a similar national publication doesn’t exist in the U.S. The popularity of The Onion, or the fact that a magazine like Spy managed to have considerable influence during the 1980s, suggest that Americans aren’t all that satire-resistant. Satirical political journalism is as old as the republic itself, and publicists, writers, and journalists such as Mark Twain, H.L. Mencken, Russell Baker, and Art Buchwald have always used wittiness to make serious political points. The blogosphere, with its indifference to hierarchy and its distaste for filtering commentary, has taken that a step further. But satire and humor are not necessarily the same thing. There is a subversiveness to satire that has seemed to jar with the increasing tendency of Americans in general, and the mainstream media in particular, to take their politics very straight. To place chronicles of corruption, hypocrisy, and vice in the pages of essentially humorous publications would only detract from the profound indignation we’re expected to feel whenever crimes or misdemeanors are exposed. The U.S. may be as corrupt as anybody, but public office is routinely being peddled as something that must be morally righteous, even if few things are more annoying than listening to politicians pretending to believe that canard.
Maybe America is more satire resistant than it used to be, or maybe the theory has no legs. Still, few are the satirical pins available to deflate those monuments of hot air that American elected officials have become. The mainstream media seem everywhere caught in chains of solemnity.
Founded in 1915 by Maurice and Jeanne Marechal, Le Canard Enchaine got its name through both parody and pun—fitting for a newspaper that lampoons at will and most of whose headlines play with words. When politician George Clemenceau’s newspaper L’Homme Libre (The Free Man) was closed down, he renamed it L’Homme Enchaine (The Man in Chains). The Marechals riffed on that title in naming their own newspaper Le Canard Enchaine, literally "The Duck in Chains," bearing in mind that in French slang, a "canard" means a newspaper.
French political culture has always tended to be more freewheeling than that in most other Western countries (though a special place should perhaps be reserved for Italy). For example, major politicians of all persuasions have at one time or other been indicted or accused of illegal party financing, even of taking bribes, including President Jacques Chirac. A politician innocent of extra-marital affairs is the object of high mockery, and it is with considerable disbelief that the French still contemplate the reportedly irreproachable Charles de Gaulle. And betrayal is so accepted a norm of political life, that few are those politicians without a knife in their back and another in their hand.
None of this is particularly unique to France, but Le Canard Enchaine has played a paradoxical role in addressing issues of political immorality. It has highlighted the worse offenses of French politicians, but it has also, and unintentionally, helped institutionalize their behavior by showing that everybody does it. The newspaper acts as a safety valve of sorts, because it hits out in all directions against France’s schools of scandal.
Take the newspaper’s report in its February 28 issue that presidential front runner Nicolas Sarkozy had, as mayor of Neuilly, saved the equivalent of around $360,000 in his purchase and remodeling of a duplex apartment on the luxurious Ile de Jatte, in his own constituency. He managed to do so because the company developing the apartment building allegedly sold him the property at below-market price and made costly changes to the Sarkozy residence for free. It so happens that the company, Groupe Lasserre, is a major developer in Neuilly. The implication was obvious: Lasserre did Sarkozy a favor because it needed the mayor’s support for its other Neuilly investments.
This was pretty damaging stuff, and Sarkozy’s unimpressive official response was promptly shredded to pieces by the Canard. But did the candidate suffer any lasting damage? Apparently not, as he still remains the favorite to win in the first round of the election, against the Socialist candidate Segolene Royal, the centrist Francois Bayrou, the far-right National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, and a gaggle of lesser lights.
One reason why the impact of the story may have been subdued is that in its next issue, the Canard had a troubling report on Royal. According to the newspaper, she and her partner, Socialist Party boss Francois Hollande, underestimated by a factor of three the value of a vacation home they own in the south of France for tax purposes. The story wrapped around a cartoon of a bikinied Royal, sitting poolside at the home, an issue of the Canard in hand, asking Hollande, who is preparing to dive in with a ducky floater around his waste: "Francois, why are they all after my two-room home?"
And just to make sure no one got off untarnished, two weeks later the newspaper had a similar story on Le Pen, showing how he, too, had probably wildly underestimated the tax value of his properties and revenues. Aside from showing that French politicians can be as sane as the rest of us when it comes to evading income and property tax, the pieces both harmed the candidates and neutralized that harm by making everyone look just as bad. Anyway, which Frenchman, once the initial envy had washed away, could begrudge someone fleecing the state?
Its investigative gifts aside, the Canard’s real attraction is its wicked humor. The newspaper’s shambling, faux early 20th-century layout (it is always eight pages long) helps in that regard, projecting an image of splendid apathy when it comes to modern form. Adding to that is the decision of the editors to avoid putting the publication online for now, as they insist that "our job is to inform and entertain our readers, with newsprint and ink."
Most of the Canard’s puns are untranslatable, but those that are are pretty good. Sarkozy’s decision to throw out management at the France 3 public television station if he wins the election brought in this headline: Sarkozy wants a "menage a France 3," with "menage" roughly meaning an "overhaul" in French. A story on a school linked to Opus Dei that engaged in illegal labor practices earned the headline, "The Da Vinci Code of Work." Or what about the cartoon of Bayrou, whom the paper has dubbed "the horse whisperer" because of his passion for rural life, telling his horse: "If I’m not in the second round, I’ll vote for..." Bayrou’s supporters, if the candidate doesn’t make it through himself, might hold a key swing vote in the second round between the top two vote-getters, so the horse would seem to be a nose ahead on the rest of us.
You have to wonder why a similar national publication doesn’t exist in the U.S. The popularity of The Onion, or the fact that a magazine like Spy managed to have considerable influence during the 1980s, suggest that Americans aren’t all that satire-resistant. Satirical political journalism is as old as the republic itself, and publicists, writers, and journalists such as Mark Twain, H.L. Mencken, Russell Baker, and Art Buchwald have always used wittiness to make serious political points. The blogosphere, with its indifference to hierarchy and its distaste for filtering commentary, has taken that a step further. But satire and humor are not necessarily the same thing. There is a subversiveness to satire that has seemed to jar with the increasing tendency of Americans in general, and the mainstream media in particular, to take their politics very straight. To place chronicles of corruption, hypocrisy, and vice in the pages of essentially humorous publications would only detract from the profound indignation we’re expected to feel whenever crimes or misdemeanors are exposed. The U.S. may be as corrupt as anybody, but public office is routinely being peddled as something that must be morally righteous, even if few things are more annoying than listening to politicians pretending to believe that canard.
Maybe America is more satire resistant than it used to be, or maybe the theory has no legs. Still, few are the satirical pins available to deflate those monuments of hot air that American elected officials have become. The mainstream media seem everywhere caught in chains of solemnity.
The blogosphere’s foreign informant
What is it about the blogosphere that can transform perfectly credible academics into unethical hit men? The object of my inquiry is one Joshua Landis, an assistant professor at the University of Oklahoma who hosts a widely read, once respectable Weblog called Syria Comment.
I make no pretense of maintaining the high road here. My question is prompted by Landis’ putting up a post on his blog last week that made serious and unsubstantiated allegations about me. Nor is this the first or second time this happens. Landis was so pleased with his text that he e-mailed it to various correspondents for dissemination. On Sunday, Landis asked for my permission to post a rebuttal I had sent him. I agreed. But when I next checked his site, he was telling readers he wanted "passions to cool" before posting his response to my unposted comments. I mentioned his promise unkept; he offered an unpersuasive excuse, saying my rejoinder would go up on Wednesday. That calculated delay made any rebuttal meaningless, so I asked him to forget about it.
Having been denied a timely chance to respond on his site, I do so here. Why should a row matter? It matters to me because in the polarized Lebanese atmosphere, fabricated accusations can be irresponsible, even dangerous. The theme of Landis’ post is that Lebanon’s Shiites, since they are under-represented in Parliament, are comparable to black slaves in America. For some reason Landis makes me the embodiment of those Lebanese denying Shiites their rights. This is troubling for being visibly personal in intent, given how inconsequential I am in the matter of Shiite power; but also because I’ve repeatedly argued that the Taif agreement needs overhauling so Shiites receive a greater stake in the system. I wrote last summer that "Taif was designed to build a post-war state. It should be re-tooled to bring the Shiite community back into the Lebanese fold."
Landis builds his case on false pretences. He writes that I believe "the Shiite Crescent is the true enemy of the West and liberty in the region." I responded that he might want to supply a quote, since I rarely use the term "Shiite Crescent," negatively or positively, find the idea simplistic, and have written so. Landis states that I back disarmament of "the Shiites" in South Lebanon by international forces. I again requested a quote. None was forthcoming, possibly because I’ve argued that such a step would be disastrous. In June 2005 I wrote here that "no one wants to see [Hizbullah] disarmed by force, nor is that a sensible option ... [And] no one in Washington or Paris, let alone at United Nations headquarters, is contemplating going down such a reckless path."
Most disturbing, Landis writes: "Young once said to me that if Taif were rewritten and Christians were allocated less than their present 50 percent share of Parliamentary seats, he might be forced to leave Lebanon." Landis made this up, and I can confirm that through the four other people present at the dinner where the subject was broached. I wouldn’t make such a statement because I disagree with it.
Here is what I wrote in The Daily Star in August 2005, in a piece on how Taif might be used advantageously to reform Lebanon’s political system: "What is expected, first, of Christians, is to collectively initiate a process realistically assessing where they stand now ... In that sense, the Taif agreement ... offers guidelines to a system gradually moving away from political confessionalism: administrative decentralization, but also the elimination of a 50-50 ratio of Christians to Muslims in Parliament, and the creation of a Senate - probably evenly divided between the religious communities - to deal with major national issues."
Landis confused our conversation with an exchange published on his blog, in which I plainly made reference to how I thought Christians in general might respond to elimination of the 50-50 ratio. I never mentioned how I myself would react - an issue pertinent here because Landis’ reference to my being "forced to leave" implies that I somehow fear paying a personal price if Muslims are granted a greater share of power. In fact, a peaceful transfer of power through the removal of the 50-50 quota in Parliament, provided there are institutional guarantees to reassure Christians, is the only long-term hope for the Christian community.
These illustrations, and others, are typical of Landis’ style. He chronically puts harmful words into the mouths of others, with no evidence for his sleights of hand. But when such behavior drifts into articles in respected publications, it becomes a different matter altogether, pointing to a far more worrisome abandonment of academic integrity.
Take a piece on the Syrian opposition that Landis co-authored in the Winter 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly. In it he asserted that the Damascus Declaration, an October 2005 document signed by Syrian opposition figures calling for democratic change, "grew out of a clandestine trip to Morocco only a few months earlier by intellectual Michel Kilo to meet with [the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin] Bayanuni to discuss a new initiative to unite forces."
This item was quite damaging to Kilo, who had been languishing in Adra prison for having purportedly colluded with Syria’s enemies. Where did Landis get this information? In reading the article you see that the authors have footnoted an article by Andrew Tabler, which I happen to have read. But as an astute reader reminded me, Tabler only wrote that "two unnamed members" of the Syrian civil society movement had met with Bayanouni. There is no mention of Kilo at all in the piece, because Tabler could not confirm his presence in Morocco. One of two things happened: Either Landis read Tabler as carelessly as he reads everything else he quotes, which still doesn’t explain how Kilo’s name slipped in; or, knowing the impact of what he was saying, Landis mentioned Kilo intentionally, effectively justifying his arrest, then dishonestly attributed this to Tabler.
I’m increasingly inclined to believe the latter. My theory, and take it for what it’s worth, is that Landis’ ambition is to be the premier mediator with and interpreter of Syria in American academic and policy-making circles - a latter-day Patrick Seale. In this context, and again this is just a coagulating hypothesis, Landis has frequently used his blog to prove his worth to the Syrians - perhaps to enjoy better access. He has also maligned those offering perspectives different than his own. In the post where he went after me, Landis harshly attacked the An-Nahar Washington correspondent, Hisham Melhem, as well. My conviction is that Landis felt he had to discredit us both, mainly because we fear that Lebanon will pay if the US engages Syria. As he once, revealingly, put it to me: "Your anti-Syrian line is the most coherent and best packaged." I would dispute the term "anti-Syrian" and find his use of the word "packaged" peculiar. Perhaps I’m just not partial to Syria’s leadership.
Is court scribe really a role an academic should aspire to? And what does it say about Landis that he has consistently promoted the idea that the United States should sign off on renewed Syrian control over Lebanon in exchange for a deal with Damascus in Iraq? What kind of esteem does a scholar invite by wanting to return a recently emancipated, fairly democratic country to its former subjugation by a foreign dictatorship?
Consider Landis’ oblique, but very clear message in a PBS interview last November. It merits being quoted in full: "Syria is demanding a number of things. They’re demanding the Golan Heights back that was occupied in 1967 by Israel. They want influence in Lebanon, and they don’t want Iraq to fall apart ... And, you know, the United States and Syria have dealt together for two decades. And the US in ’91, when it first went to war against Iraq in the Gulf, had Syria on its side, because in a sense it said, ’You can keep Lebanon in your sphere of influence.’ And Syria said, ’Yes,’ they kept Lebanon in their sphere of influence. And what happened to Lebanon during that period? It repaired itself in the Civil War. It grew. [Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri ... rebuilt Lebanon. It was pro-Western. Because of Syrian influence ... in Lebanon [it] does not mean that the country turns into ... a small Iran on the Mediterranean. It means that Syrian interests are taken into concern, and it doesn’t mean the end." Hariri might dispute the last observation. Then again, at a Brookings Institution conference Landis once famously remarked that the late prime minister had "died."
One can cite copious contradictions in his posts, as the calculations change. Sometimes Landis will write that Syria is "doing the complete job of guarding [the Iraqi] border"; at other times, he will observe: "By refusing to deal with Syria, the US guaranteed that [Bashar] Assad would not police mujaheddin going in and out of [Iraq] and would work to undermine the US in Iraq." Sometimes Landis will tell the Council on Foreign Relations that the "Christians in Lebanon are talking about how Israel would be a much better partner than Syria and that they should make peace with Israel"; elsewhere he will affirm that the most popular Christian leader is Michel Aoun, who is close to Hizbullah, and will refer to the "Maronite-Shiite alliance that really frustrated the Sunnis."
I’ve long been a believer in the revolutionary potential of blogs, and was a regular visitor to Landis’ site when he used it as a platform to popularize his academic research. But something happened along the way. From an egghead unknown to the public, Landis morphed into a slapdash cyber-pundit, a pamphleteer, a willing agent of influence. Now he always seems to be hawking something. The thing is, his overall value has dived.
-----
The posting of Joshua Landis was posted on March 10, 2007 and is published on http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=182 and copied below:
The isolation of Syria appears to be breaking as Damascus seeks deals with the Saudis and the Lebanese, writes Nicholas Blanford. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana will travel to Syria soon, marking a resumption of high-level contacts between Damascus and the Europeans. The prospect of a thaw with Syria has caused howls of protest from Lebanon's obstructionists who continue to believe that America's plan for changing the Middle East is working. They call on the US to ratchet up military and economic pressure on Iran and Syria in the benighted belief that reform of the Greater Middle East is on the horizon. Michael Young insists in the Daily Star that Syria is on the verge of breaking. He believes Syria will change its policies and fall in line with the US. This is the identical line that Junblatt and Raghida Dergham have been trumpeting.
The biggest assets of the obstructionists is US Ambassador Feltman, who has been working assiduously to keep a deal from being struck in Lebanon. He refuses to allow the Syrians satisfaction on their demand that the establishment of the International tribunal be delayed until after a Lebanon deal is clinched. His fear is that if the Lebanese opposition gets a 19+11 cabinet sharing formula before the Lebanese government signs over permission for an international tribunal, it will never get established. To avoid such a prospect, the US is willing to sacrifice Lebanon's future and any prospects of economic growth for the country. Stagnation and paralysis will continue to be the order of the day in Lebanon. With a deal, all the participants gain. Feltman has a most unusual arrangement with Secretary Rice; he has a weekly video conference with the Secretary - access of the like only the Ambassador to Iraq can boast. Colonel Pat Lang writes:
"Everyone was happy, even giddy about the prospect of a typically muddled but non-violent solution to the impasse in Lebanon. Today the leaders say "not so fast." What happened overnight? Was it Feltman that happened? Was it Rice? Was it our unending malicious meddling in other people's business?"
Michael Young is particularly outraged because his good friend David Ignatius recommended negotiating with Syria and Iran. Ignatius writes that a senior Bush administration official explained: "We think our Iraq strategy is consistent with Baker-Hamilton. We want to get to the same place, but not on the same time-line." Ignatius proposes that Baker be appointed to begin negotiations with Syria and Israel because the administration's hard line tactics have failed. Ignatius does not believe that Iran and Syria are about to crack.
Martin Kramer supports Michael Young in his belief that the Shiite Crescent is the true enemy of the West and liberty in the region, but his animus is directed at the Iranian end of the crescent, which most directly threatens Israel, and not the Syrian end. In a MERIA article, A New Middle East: Islamism and Terrorism, he argues that only by destroying Iran's nuclear ambitions and arrogant attempts to exploit the Palestinian and Lebanese problems can the West bring peace to the region.
The only problem with this analysis is that it is has led to a long list of failures and the needless death of thousands of Iraqis and Americans. Michael Young recommended the invasion of Iraq in 2003, claiming that the "consociational" Lebanese model of government that has served his country so well would bring peace and happiness to Iraq and quickly be replicated throughout the Middle East. It has taken the West four long years of watching Iraq descend into ferocious civil war to come to grips with the short comings of this analysis. In 2006, Young advocated keeping the incompetent Lahoud as president of Lebanon rather than giving Michel Aoun a chance at elections. (Aoun was the most popular candidate in Lebanon at the time.) This obstructionism led directly to the summer war between Lebanon and Israel. With no prospects of a non-violent adjustment to Lebanon's lopsided power-sharing formula, Hizbullah and its opposition allies fell back on the old formula of "resistance" and demonstrations. When war broke out, Young began excitedly prognosticating that Israel could break Hizbullah and international forces disarm it. He insisted the Shiite party did not represent authentic Lebanese demands, being merely a creature of Iran and Syria. Again, Young's dreams didn't materialize. Instead, the inconclusive war led to paralysis in Lebanon as Hizbullah and the Siniora government stand face to face, each unwilling to bow to the demands of the other. Rather that admit that he has misjudged the opposition or the ability of American and Israeli power to reshape the hearts and minds of Middle Easterners, Young continues to insist that Syria and Hizbullah will buckle if only the US will inflict a bit more pain on them.
Rather than come to grips with the real flaws of Lebanon's democracy, Michael Young, like many other Lebanese, believes that the use of force by foreign powers can preserve the skewed status quo in Lebanon. He wants international forces to disarm the Shiites in the South, and the US to inflict more pain on Syria. The Lebanese obstructionist solution is to import violence into Lebanon and the region. They refuse to allow a "typically muddled but non-violent solution to the impasse." Importing foreign armies to keep the Shiites in their place will only lead to further war and extremism on both sides.
What is wrong with the "consociational" system that is held up as the epitome of Lebanese democracy and power-sharing? Quite simply, it treats Shiites like slaves. In pre-civil war America, black slaves were counted as half a white person. In Lebanon they are accorded the same political weight. Although Shiites are estimated to make up some 40% of the population, the Taif Accords, Lebanon's constitutional arrangement, permit the Shiites only 22% of the seats in parliament.
The defenders of Taif will scoff at this analogy between Lebanese Shiites and American slaves. They will say, "But we don't treat Shiites as slaves. They can vote and they are allocated the third most powerful political office in the land: the President of the Parliament. All true, I admit, but this doesn't obscure the simple fact that Shiites are accorded only half the political worth of other human beings in Lebanon.
Hizbollah and its opposition allies have repeatedly stated that they have no intention of challenging the Taif Accords. Instead they ask for a greater number of cabinet posts. They make these diminutive demands in order not to appear as revolutionaries. They do not want to threaten the Sunnis, who have most to lose from a more equitable power-sharing formula. What the obstructionists fear, however, is that if the governing coalition makes one concession, it will lead to others. It is a slippery slop. If they concede more cabinet positions to the Shiites today, the sons of Hussein will call for a proper census and a reconsideration of Taif tomorrow.
In a recent PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer during which I debated opposite the al-Arabiya reporter Hisham Milhem, I was left speechless when he insisted that the "Shiites wanted to turn Beirut into a Tehran on the Mediterranean." I was not prepared for such super-heated rhetoric. The only way to counter such fear mongering, however, is to shoot back that Beirut today is Mecca on the Mediterranean. Yes, Club Mec. Or, perhaps a cross between the Vatican and Mecca on the Med. Sunnis and Christians enjoy the lion's share of power. The mellifluous and jolly sounding term "consociationalism" cannot hide the ugly fact that Lebanon is a religious state, in which Sunnis and Christians are privileged, politically and economically.
Undoing the mutual fear and resentment which divide the opposition from the governing coalition will not be easy, but obstructing the kind of deal that the Saudis and Egyptians are trying to broker is not the answer. It will invite further violence. Young rightly fears for Lebanon's sovereignty, but only concord among Lebanese can act as proof against foreign influence. Young is one of the smartest hawks in the Lebanese firmament and he has written thoughtfully on the need for a more equitable power-sharing in Lebanon. Now is the time to do it.
At the same time, Michael Young once said to me that if Taif were rewritten and Christians were allocated less than their present 50% share of Parliamentary seats, he might be forced to leave Lebanon. That is a sad comment on the state of Lebanon's consociational system and the prospects for a political deal in the immediate future.
If the United States is sincere about promoting democracy in the most democratic state in the Arab East, burnishing its reputation for justice, and promoting freedom, it cannot stand on the side of counting Shiites as slaves. If any nation in the Middle East has a chance to point the way toward a more tolerant and democratic future, it is Lebanon.
I make no pretense of maintaining the high road here. My question is prompted by Landis’ putting up a post on his blog last week that made serious and unsubstantiated allegations about me. Nor is this the first or second time this happens. Landis was so pleased with his text that he e-mailed it to various correspondents for dissemination. On Sunday, Landis asked for my permission to post a rebuttal I had sent him. I agreed. But when I next checked his site, he was telling readers he wanted "passions to cool" before posting his response to my unposted comments. I mentioned his promise unkept; he offered an unpersuasive excuse, saying my rejoinder would go up on Wednesday. That calculated delay made any rebuttal meaningless, so I asked him to forget about it.
Having been denied a timely chance to respond on his site, I do so here. Why should a row matter? It matters to me because in the polarized Lebanese atmosphere, fabricated accusations can be irresponsible, even dangerous. The theme of Landis’ post is that Lebanon’s Shiites, since they are under-represented in Parliament, are comparable to black slaves in America. For some reason Landis makes me the embodiment of those Lebanese denying Shiites their rights. This is troubling for being visibly personal in intent, given how inconsequential I am in the matter of Shiite power; but also because I’ve repeatedly argued that the Taif agreement needs overhauling so Shiites receive a greater stake in the system. I wrote last summer that "Taif was designed to build a post-war state. It should be re-tooled to bring the Shiite community back into the Lebanese fold."
Landis builds his case on false pretences. He writes that I believe "the Shiite Crescent is the true enemy of the West and liberty in the region." I responded that he might want to supply a quote, since I rarely use the term "Shiite Crescent," negatively or positively, find the idea simplistic, and have written so. Landis states that I back disarmament of "the Shiites" in South Lebanon by international forces. I again requested a quote. None was forthcoming, possibly because I’ve argued that such a step would be disastrous. In June 2005 I wrote here that "no one wants to see [Hizbullah] disarmed by force, nor is that a sensible option ... [And] no one in Washington or Paris, let alone at United Nations headquarters, is contemplating going down such a reckless path."
Most disturbing, Landis writes: "Young once said to me that if Taif were rewritten and Christians were allocated less than their present 50 percent share of Parliamentary seats, he might be forced to leave Lebanon." Landis made this up, and I can confirm that through the four other people present at the dinner where the subject was broached. I wouldn’t make such a statement because I disagree with it.
Here is what I wrote in The Daily Star in August 2005, in a piece on how Taif might be used advantageously to reform Lebanon’s political system: "What is expected, first, of Christians, is to collectively initiate a process realistically assessing where they stand now ... In that sense, the Taif agreement ... offers guidelines to a system gradually moving away from political confessionalism: administrative decentralization, but also the elimination of a 50-50 ratio of Christians to Muslims in Parliament, and the creation of a Senate - probably evenly divided between the religious communities - to deal with major national issues."
Landis confused our conversation with an exchange published on his blog, in which I plainly made reference to how I thought Christians in general might respond to elimination of the 50-50 ratio. I never mentioned how I myself would react - an issue pertinent here because Landis’ reference to my being "forced to leave" implies that I somehow fear paying a personal price if Muslims are granted a greater share of power. In fact, a peaceful transfer of power through the removal of the 50-50 quota in Parliament, provided there are institutional guarantees to reassure Christians, is the only long-term hope for the Christian community.
These illustrations, and others, are typical of Landis’ style. He chronically puts harmful words into the mouths of others, with no evidence for his sleights of hand. But when such behavior drifts into articles in respected publications, it becomes a different matter altogether, pointing to a far more worrisome abandonment of academic integrity.
Take a piece on the Syrian opposition that Landis co-authored in the Winter 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly. In it he asserted that the Damascus Declaration, an October 2005 document signed by Syrian opposition figures calling for democratic change, "grew out of a clandestine trip to Morocco only a few months earlier by intellectual Michel Kilo to meet with [the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin] Bayanuni to discuss a new initiative to unite forces."
This item was quite damaging to Kilo, who had been languishing in Adra prison for having purportedly colluded with Syria’s enemies. Where did Landis get this information? In reading the article you see that the authors have footnoted an article by Andrew Tabler, which I happen to have read. But as an astute reader reminded me, Tabler only wrote that "two unnamed members" of the Syrian civil society movement had met with Bayanouni. There is no mention of Kilo at all in the piece, because Tabler could not confirm his presence in Morocco. One of two things happened: Either Landis read Tabler as carelessly as he reads everything else he quotes, which still doesn’t explain how Kilo’s name slipped in; or, knowing the impact of what he was saying, Landis mentioned Kilo intentionally, effectively justifying his arrest, then dishonestly attributed this to Tabler.
I’m increasingly inclined to believe the latter. My theory, and take it for what it’s worth, is that Landis’ ambition is to be the premier mediator with and interpreter of Syria in American academic and policy-making circles - a latter-day Patrick Seale. In this context, and again this is just a coagulating hypothesis, Landis has frequently used his blog to prove his worth to the Syrians - perhaps to enjoy better access. He has also maligned those offering perspectives different than his own. In the post where he went after me, Landis harshly attacked the An-Nahar Washington correspondent, Hisham Melhem, as well. My conviction is that Landis felt he had to discredit us both, mainly because we fear that Lebanon will pay if the US engages Syria. As he once, revealingly, put it to me: "Your anti-Syrian line is the most coherent and best packaged." I would dispute the term "anti-Syrian" and find his use of the word "packaged" peculiar. Perhaps I’m just not partial to Syria’s leadership.
Is court scribe really a role an academic should aspire to? And what does it say about Landis that he has consistently promoted the idea that the United States should sign off on renewed Syrian control over Lebanon in exchange for a deal with Damascus in Iraq? What kind of esteem does a scholar invite by wanting to return a recently emancipated, fairly democratic country to its former subjugation by a foreign dictatorship?
Consider Landis’ oblique, but very clear message in a PBS interview last November. It merits being quoted in full: "Syria is demanding a number of things. They’re demanding the Golan Heights back that was occupied in 1967 by Israel. They want influence in Lebanon, and they don’t want Iraq to fall apart ... And, you know, the United States and Syria have dealt together for two decades. And the US in ’91, when it first went to war against Iraq in the Gulf, had Syria on its side, because in a sense it said, ’You can keep Lebanon in your sphere of influence.’ And Syria said, ’Yes,’ they kept Lebanon in their sphere of influence. And what happened to Lebanon during that period? It repaired itself in the Civil War. It grew. [Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri ... rebuilt Lebanon. It was pro-Western. Because of Syrian influence ... in Lebanon [it] does not mean that the country turns into ... a small Iran on the Mediterranean. It means that Syrian interests are taken into concern, and it doesn’t mean the end." Hariri might dispute the last observation. Then again, at a Brookings Institution conference Landis once famously remarked that the late prime minister had "died."
One can cite copious contradictions in his posts, as the calculations change. Sometimes Landis will write that Syria is "doing the complete job of guarding [the Iraqi] border"; at other times, he will observe: "By refusing to deal with Syria, the US guaranteed that [Bashar] Assad would not police mujaheddin going in and out of [Iraq] and would work to undermine the US in Iraq." Sometimes Landis will tell the Council on Foreign Relations that the "Christians in Lebanon are talking about how Israel would be a much better partner than Syria and that they should make peace with Israel"; elsewhere he will affirm that the most popular Christian leader is Michel Aoun, who is close to Hizbullah, and will refer to the "Maronite-Shiite alliance that really frustrated the Sunnis."
I’ve long been a believer in the revolutionary potential of blogs, and was a regular visitor to Landis’ site when he used it as a platform to popularize his academic research. But something happened along the way. From an egghead unknown to the public, Landis morphed into a slapdash cyber-pundit, a pamphleteer, a willing agent of influence. Now he always seems to be hawking something. The thing is, his overall value has dived.
-----
The posting of Joshua Landis was posted on March 10, 2007 and is published on http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=182 and copied below:
The isolation of Syria appears to be breaking as Damascus seeks deals with the Saudis and the Lebanese, writes Nicholas Blanford. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana will travel to Syria soon, marking a resumption of high-level contacts between Damascus and the Europeans. The prospect of a thaw with Syria has caused howls of protest from Lebanon's obstructionists who continue to believe that America's plan for changing the Middle East is working. They call on the US to ratchet up military and economic pressure on Iran and Syria in the benighted belief that reform of the Greater Middle East is on the horizon. Michael Young insists in the Daily Star that Syria is on the verge of breaking. He believes Syria will change its policies and fall in line with the US. This is the identical line that Junblatt and Raghida Dergham have been trumpeting.
The biggest assets of the obstructionists is US Ambassador Feltman, who has been working assiduously to keep a deal from being struck in Lebanon. He refuses to allow the Syrians satisfaction on their demand that the establishment of the International tribunal be delayed until after a Lebanon deal is clinched. His fear is that if the Lebanese opposition gets a 19+11 cabinet sharing formula before the Lebanese government signs over permission for an international tribunal, it will never get established. To avoid such a prospect, the US is willing to sacrifice Lebanon's future and any prospects of economic growth for the country. Stagnation and paralysis will continue to be the order of the day in Lebanon. With a deal, all the participants gain. Feltman has a most unusual arrangement with Secretary Rice; he has a weekly video conference with the Secretary - access of the like only the Ambassador to Iraq can boast. Colonel Pat Lang writes:
"Everyone was happy, even giddy about the prospect of a typically muddled but non-violent solution to the impasse in Lebanon. Today the leaders say "not so fast." What happened overnight? Was it Feltman that happened? Was it Rice? Was it our unending malicious meddling in other people's business?"
Michael Young is particularly outraged because his good friend David Ignatius recommended negotiating with Syria and Iran. Ignatius writes that a senior Bush administration official explained: "We think our Iraq strategy is consistent with Baker-Hamilton. We want to get to the same place, but not on the same time-line." Ignatius proposes that Baker be appointed to begin negotiations with Syria and Israel because the administration's hard line tactics have failed. Ignatius does not believe that Iran and Syria are about to crack.
Martin Kramer supports Michael Young in his belief that the Shiite Crescent is the true enemy of the West and liberty in the region, but his animus is directed at the Iranian end of the crescent, which most directly threatens Israel, and not the Syrian end. In a MERIA article, A New Middle East: Islamism and Terrorism, he argues that only by destroying Iran's nuclear ambitions and arrogant attempts to exploit the Palestinian and Lebanese problems can the West bring peace to the region.
The only problem with this analysis is that it is has led to a long list of failures and the needless death of thousands of Iraqis and Americans. Michael Young recommended the invasion of Iraq in 2003, claiming that the "consociational" Lebanese model of government that has served his country so well would bring peace and happiness to Iraq and quickly be replicated throughout the Middle East. It has taken the West four long years of watching Iraq descend into ferocious civil war to come to grips with the short comings of this analysis. In 2006, Young advocated keeping the incompetent Lahoud as president of Lebanon rather than giving Michel Aoun a chance at elections. (Aoun was the most popular candidate in Lebanon at the time.) This obstructionism led directly to the summer war between Lebanon and Israel. With no prospects of a non-violent adjustment to Lebanon's lopsided power-sharing formula, Hizbullah and its opposition allies fell back on the old formula of "resistance" and demonstrations. When war broke out, Young began excitedly prognosticating that Israel could break Hizbullah and international forces disarm it. He insisted the Shiite party did not represent authentic Lebanese demands, being merely a creature of Iran and Syria. Again, Young's dreams didn't materialize. Instead, the inconclusive war led to paralysis in Lebanon as Hizbullah and the Siniora government stand face to face, each unwilling to bow to the demands of the other. Rather that admit that he has misjudged the opposition or the ability of American and Israeli power to reshape the hearts and minds of Middle Easterners, Young continues to insist that Syria and Hizbullah will buckle if only the US will inflict a bit more pain on them.
Rather than come to grips with the real flaws of Lebanon's democracy, Michael Young, like many other Lebanese, believes that the use of force by foreign powers can preserve the skewed status quo in Lebanon. He wants international forces to disarm the Shiites in the South, and the US to inflict more pain on Syria. The Lebanese obstructionist solution is to import violence into Lebanon and the region. They refuse to allow a "typically muddled but non-violent solution to the impasse." Importing foreign armies to keep the Shiites in their place will only lead to further war and extremism on both sides.
What is wrong with the "consociational" system that is held up as the epitome of Lebanese democracy and power-sharing? Quite simply, it treats Shiites like slaves. In pre-civil war America, black slaves were counted as half a white person. In Lebanon they are accorded the same political weight. Although Shiites are estimated to make up some 40% of the population, the Taif Accords, Lebanon's constitutional arrangement, permit the Shiites only 22% of the seats in parliament.
The defenders of Taif will scoff at this analogy between Lebanese Shiites and American slaves. They will say, "But we don't treat Shiites as slaves. They can vote and they are allocated the third most powerful political office in the land: the President of the Parliament. All true, I admit, but this doesn't obscure the simple fact that Shiites are accorded only half the political worth of other human beings in Lebanon.
Hizbollah and its opposition allies have repeatedly stated that they have no intention of challenging the Taif Accords. Instead they ask for a greater number of cabinet posts. They make these diminutive demands in order not to appear as revolutionaries. They do not want to threaten the Sunnis, who have most to lose from a more equitable power-sharing formula. What the obstructionists fear, however, is that if the governing coalition makes one concession, it will lead to others. It is a slippery slop. If they concede more cabinet positions to the Shiites today, the sons of Hussein will call for a proper census and a reconsideration of Taif tomorrow.
In a recent PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer during which I debated opposite the al-Arabiya reporter Hisham Milhem, I was left speechless when he insisted that the "Shiites wanted to turn Beirut into a Tehran on the Mediterranean." I was not prepared for such super-heated rhetoric. The only way to counter such fear mongering, however, is to shoot back that Beirut today is Mecca on the Mediterranean. Yes, Club Mec. Or, perhaps a cross between the Vatican and Mecca on the Med. Sunnis and Christians enjoy the lion's share of power. The mellifluous and jolly sounding term "consociationalism" cannot hide the ugly fact that Lebanon is a religious state, in which Sunnis and Christians are privileged, politically and economically.
Undoing the mutual fear and resentment which divide the opposition from the governing coalition will not be easy, but obstructing the kind of deal that the Saudis and Egyptians are trying to broker is not the answer. It will invite further violence. Young rightly fears for Lebanon's sovereignty, but only concord among Lebanese can act as proof against foreign influence. Young is one of the smartest hawks in the Lebanese firmament and he has written thoughtfully on the need for a more equitable power-sharing in Lebanon. Now is the time to do it.
At the same time, Michael Young once said to me that if Taif were rewritten and Christians were allocated less than their present 50% share of Parliamentary seats, he might be forced to leave Lebanon. That is a sad comment on the state of Lebanon's consociational system and the prospects for a political deal in the immediate future.
If the United States is sincere about promoting democracy in the most democratic state in the Arab East, burnishing its reputation for justice, and promoting freedom, it cannot stand on the side of counting Shiites as slaves. If any nation in the Middle East has a chance to point the way toward a more tolerant and democratic future, it is Lebanon.
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Prepare for less attention in Paris
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, April 19, 2007
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Jacques Chirac still has some weeks left in office, but as of this Sunday, when France votes in the first round of its presidential election, the president will begin emptying the closets at the Elysee Palace. Chirac's final act, however, may be to see through a major endeavor of his in recent months: ensuring that a tribunal is formed to sentence those responsible for the assassination of his late friend, Rafik Hariri.
By next week we should know better whether the tribunal will be created under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Much will depend on the impressions that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Sultanov and UN Undersecretary General for Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel take home with them after their visits to the region this week. Chirac's departure is accelerating what happens in New York, partly because he has good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and could help reassure the Kremlin; partly because the transfer of power to a new French president could delay the tribunal approval process, which senior UN officials, the United States, and France don't want to see happen.
Whoever replaces Chirac as president, those in Beirut who regard France as a vital ally in frustrating Syria's designs to regain power in Lebanon will have to brace themselves for less attention in Paris. In a press conference on Monday, after meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the presidential front-runner, Nicolas Sarkozy, pointedly noted: "Lebanon is very important to me, [but] there is more than just Lebanon." March 14 has benefited from the anomaly of Chirac's personalization of his Lebanon policy thanks to his intimacy with the Hariri family. But the implications for Lebanon's future may be more dangerous than we realize.
Chirac's support for Hariri was apparently a key factor behind French efforts in 2004 to be more intrusive in Lebanon. The defining moment came in June of that year, when the French president met with his American counterpart, George W. Bush, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Normandy landings. Though the Americans and French had clashed bitterly over the Iraq invasion, Lebanon emerged as an issue over which the two sides could agree. Bush was keen to put pressure on Syria because of Syrian actions in Iraq. Chirac, who by then had lost all faith in Syrian President Bashar Assad, appeared to be preparing for the upcoming presidential election in Lebanon, an essential moment for Hariri to reassert his influence after years of facing animosity from President Emile Lahoud, Lebanon's security services, and Syria.
Following his meeting with Bush in Paris, Chirac had declared: "We have expressed renewed conviction and belief that Lebanon has to be ensured that its independence and sovereignty are guaranteed." Bush, in turn, affirmed: "The United States and France ... agree that the people of Lebanon should be free to determine their own future, without foreign interference or domination." The culmination of these early rumblings of consensus would come in September, when the Security Council passed Resolution 1559. Among other things, it demanded a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, after Assad had intimidated Hariri and Lebanon's Parliament into voting in favor of an extension for Lahoud.
This was a remarkable turnaround when compared to Chirac's position in 1996, when the president addressed the Lebanese Parliament. He told the assembled parliamentarians that France hoped 1996 could be a year when Syria and Lebanon would each reach a settlement with Israel. Chirac went on to observe that "it's through a just and lasting peace that your country will regain its sovereignty over all its territory, according to United Nations resolutions." At the time, Hariri was a main pillar of the Syrian order in Lebanon, so the French president basically reminded the Lebanese that Syria would only withdraw its forces once peace had been negotiated with Israel - which still occupied much of South Lebanon. Resolution 1559 did away with the open-endedness of Chirac's earlier message.
It was good to have Chirac in office during 2005 and 2006, when Lebanon needed regional and international assistance to get rid of the Syrians, put the Hariri investigation on track, and set up a UN framework to help normalize the country, particularly after the summer war last year. Unfortunately, too much of a good thing in diplomacy can often lead to too much of a bad thing. Domestic politics are often conducted in partisan counterpoint, so that, for example, the Bush administration's isolation of Syria prompted a foolish Democratic opening to Assad when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Damascus recently. Similarly, Chirac's closeness to the Hariri family will almost certainly ensure that a new French administration swings the pendulum in the opposite direction, to compensate for the perceived excesses of the current president.
This is worrisome. It may be too late for Chirac, but Bush needs to better anchor his policy institutionally toward Syria, so it can endure once he leaves office. Policy abhors a vacuum. That's why Bush must define a more systematic approach to containing Syria, which he can justify in the context of a broader Middle East strategy that gains bipartisan support in Washington. Instead, what we now have is a deep rift between Republicans and Democrats over Iraq, which is threatening to undermine the administration's line on other important regional issues in which it has successfully worked within an Arab and international consensus. This includes ending Syria's efforts to reimpose its hegemony over Lebanon.
As for March 14, it should make a priority of pressing its friends in the West to develop a Lebanon policy that lasts beyond the leaders in place. That means talking to those likely to be in power next, and showing that Lebanon means more than justice for Rafik Hariri or tranquility along the border with Israel. Both are important objectives, even critical ones, but the Lebanese have too often suffered from international indifference not to see the advantages of building sympathy that is more lasting.
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