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Michel Aoun can cut the Gordian knot
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, March 29, 2007
Lebanon is locked in stalemate as the majority and opposition remain encamped behind their red lines. But there is a way out, and the solution lies in the hands of that volatile man in Rabieh. Michel Aoun can break Lebanon's debilitating impasse, and would gain because of it. Here's how.
For months, Aoun's strategy has been to impose himself as the Maronite no one can circumvent. Until recently, the general sustained himself thanks to Christian frustration with the 2005 election law and the subsequent quadripartite agreement that left Christian politicians and groups either marginalized or playing a secondary role.
That beef was justifiable, but things began to disintegrate when Aoun found himself in the same camp as Syria's allies, even as the bombings and assassinations continued. The events of last January 23, when Aoun's supporters prevented people from getting to work, was a political disaster, only compounded by the ongoing fiasco of the Downtown sit-in, which has proven to be a trap for everyone - opposition and majority alike.
With this in mind, it is plain that Michel Aoun will not be president. He cannot be elected by Hizbullah alone, though the party will use Aoun until the last minute as a bargaining chip to slip in someone else. The majority has no incentive to vote for Aoun because he has spent the past months alienating its leaders. And there is no prospect that the general - who distils polarization like no other - will be a compromise candidate, as even Aoun's own ally Elie Skaff recognized publicly several weeks ago.
However, if Aoun's ambition to be president has been dashed, his ability to play a leading role in selecting someone else for the job remains stronger than ever, thanks to the general's control over a sizable parliamentary bloc. Aoun holds the balance of power allowing him to effectively be the kingmaker of any new president. Moreover, by distancing himself from the predominantly Shiite opposition, he would force Hizbullah's leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to overhaul their strategy, as neither man wants the current standoff to appear like it is the Shiites against the rest.
This could even force Berri to open the doors of Parliament. More importantly, if Aoun joins with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, the three could together ensure that Christians have a leading say in who will be elected, and what his or her agenda will be.
Aoun and his followers insist that their main objective is to return the Christian community to its rightful place. If so, the general should bite the bullet and fight the lesser battle he can win in helping select a credible successor to President Emile Lahoud, rather than scrape though a nasty presidential try of his own that Aoun is sure to lose.
Why should this matter? Partly because Aoun's failure to reach Baabda will have a negative impact on the Christian community, whose interests the general claims he wants to advance. If Aoun plays all-or-nothing politics, Christians will react in one of two ways, or a combination thereof: they will abandon Aoun and blame him for his recklessness; or they will embrace his loss as their own, and internalize his lament that Christians no longer have a say in Lebanon. In both cases the result will be that the weight of the largest Christian bloc in Parliament is wasted, and Christians will lose any voice they might have on the presidency.
Many Aounists, when you scratch below the surface, are aware that Hizbullah will never agree to disarm and fully integrate into the political system. By the same token, Hizbullah has no deep sympathy for Aoun or his aims, which fundamentally contradict those of the party. Aoun may argue today that Hizbullah's weapons are defensible, at a time when, as he sees it, there is a power vacuum at the level of government; but it is doubtful that a President Aoun could coexist with a party presiding over a state within a state, defended by an Iranian-funded private army.
There are no legs in that alliance, and for the moment Aoun and Hizbullah are merely using each other. The thing is, Nasrallah intends to sell Aoun out at the appropriate moment to get something in exchange on the presidency; but Aoun will get nothing from Hizbullah. If anything, his partnership with the party has doomed his presidential chances.
So here's a plan Aoun might want to consider. He should start by holding a far-reaching dialogue with Geagea under the auspices of the Maronite patriarch. This would aim to reach a common set or principles that any future president would have to adhere to - at least if he wants the approval of his coreligionists. Aoun would have to sacrifice his ambition to be elected to the highest office himself, but he would also be in the driving seat to impose a preferred alternative.
Geagea's advantage would be that he could buy himself a wider margin of maneuver in his alliance with Saad Hariri and the Future movement. This would not imply breaking that relationship, which remains a foundation for any effort to establish an independent post-Syrian Lebanese state; but it would enhance the Lebanese Forces' credibility as a more autonomous organization.
Once that happens, Aoun would formally ditch the Hizbullah alliance, though he needn't break definitively with the party. On the contrary, he could put himself forward as the prime mediator with Nasrallah. Aoun would then ask for an "acceptable" share of portfolios in the government. This could either reflect his parliamentary weight, or there could be a tradeoff between the number of ministers and the nature of the ministries offered the Aounists.
This would be a tricky stage, and would require agreement with Geagea and Sfeir beforehand on Christian representation. In exchange, Aoun would endorse an early timetable for parliamentary approval of the Hariri tribunal. He would then announce his decision to abandon the Downtown protests and fold his tents.
A vital ingredient would be Aoun's formally giving up his demand for early elections. The general still believes that such elections are his ticket to the presidency. Because the opposition might get a greater number of seats in Parliament, he feels, his presidential chances would improve.
But Aoun's calculation is based on the erroneous assumptions that Lebanon is capable of organizing elections at this divisive time, or even of uniting around an election law; that the opposition is sure to gain under any new law; and that the Aounists still retain the popular support they enjoyed in Mount Lebanon in 2005. Aoun would do better to use his bloc more creatively instead of gambling on an election that nobody wants, and that Hizbullah is only setting as a condition for a settlement in order to keep Aoun on board and obstruct agreement on the tribunal.
With his bloc the swinging vote in Parliament, Aoun would be in a very powerful position as gatekeeper to the president. And with Geagea and Sfeir on his side, he could write a good part of the presidential program. More significantly, Christian unanimity would mean that any new head of state could not easily ignore Aoun once in office (the obsession of all Lebanese kingmakers), since this would only isolate him in the Maronite community. But first, Aoun must take the toughest decision of all: embrace modesty and accept that Baabda is his paradise lost.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
Friday, March 30, 2007
Thursday, March 29, 2007
Michel Aoun can cut the Gordian knot
Lebanon is locked in stalemate as the majority and opposition remain encamped behind their red lines. But there is a way out, and the solution lies in the hands of that volatile man in Rabieh. Michel Aoun can break Lebanon's debilitating impasse, and would gain because of it. Here's how.
For months, Aoun's strategy has been to impose himself as the Maronite no one can circumvent. Until recently, the general sustained himself thanks to Christian frustration with the 2005 election law and the subsequent quadripartite agreement that left Christian politicians and groups either marginalized or playing a secondary role. That beef was justifiable, but things began to disintegrate when Aoun found himself in the same camp as Syria's allies, even as the bombings and assassinations continued. The events of last January 23, when Aoun's supporters prevented people from getting to work, was a political disaster, only compounded by the ongoing fiasco of the Downtown sit-in, which has proven to be a trap for everyone - opposition and majority alike.
With this in mind, it is plain that Michel Aoun will not be president. He cannot be elected by Hizbullah alone, though the party will use Aoun until the last minute as a bargaining chip to slip in someone else. The majority has no incentive to vote for Aoun because he has spent the past months alienating its leaders. And there is no prospect that the general - who distils polarization like no other - will be a compromise candidate, as even Aoun's own ally Elie Skaff recognized publicly several weeks ago.
However, if Aoun's ambition to be president has been dashed, his ability to play a leading role in selecting someone else for the job remains stronger than ever, thanks to the general's control over a sizable parliamentary bloc. Aoun holds the balance of power allowing him to effectively be the kingmaker of any new president. Moreover, by distancing himself from the predominantly Shiite opposition, he would force Hizbullah's leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to overhaul their strategy, as neither man wants the current standoff to appear like it is the Shiites against the rest. This could even force Berri to open the doors of Parliament. More importantly, if Aoun joins with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, the three could together ensure that Christians have a leading say in who will be elected, and what his or her agenda will be.
Aoun and his followers insist that their main objective is to return the Christian community to its rightful place. If so, the general should bite the bullet and fight the lesser battle he can win in helping select a credible successor to President Emile Lahoud, rather than scrape though a nasty presidential try of his own that Aoun is sure to lose.
Why should this matter? Partly because Aoun's failure to reach Baabda will have a negative impact on the Christian community, whose interests the general claims he wants to advance. If Aoun plays all-or-nothing politics, Christians will react in one of two ways, or a combination thereof: they will abandon Aoun and blame him for his recklessness; or they will embrace his loss as their own, and internalize his lament that Christians no longer have a say in Lebanon. In both cases the result will be that the weight of the largest Christian bloc in Parliament is wasted, and Christians will lose any voice they might have on the presidency.
Many Aounists, when you scratch below the surface, are aware that Hizbullah will never agree to disarm and fully integrate into the political system. By the same token, Hizbullah has no deep sympathy for Aoun or his aims, which fundamentally contradict those of the party. Aoun may argue today that Hizbullah's weapons are defensible, at a time when, as he sees it, there is a power vacuum at the level of government; but it is doubtful that a President Aoun could coexist with a party presiding over a state within a state, defended by an Iranian-funded private army. There are no legs in that alliance, and for the moment Aoun and Hizbullah are merely using each other. The thing is, Nasrallah intends to sell Aoun out at the appropriate moment to get something in exchange on the presidency; but Aoun will get nothing from Hizbullah. If anything, his partnership with the party has doomed his presidential chances.
So here's a plan Aoun might want to consider. He should start by holding a far-reaching dialogue with Geagea under the auspices of the Maronite patriarch. This would aim to reach a common set or principles that any future president would have to adhere to - at least if he wants the approval of his coreligionists. Aoun would have to sacrifice his ambition to be elected to the highest office himself, but he would also be in the driving seat to impose a preferred alternative. Geagea's advantage would be that he could buy himself a wider margin of maneuver in his alliance with Saad Hariri and the Future movement. This would not imply breaking that relationship, which remains a foundation for any effort to establish an independent post-Syrian Lebanese state; but it would enhance the Lebanese Forces' credibility as a more autonomous organization.
Once that happens, Aoun would formally ditch the Hizbullah alliance, though he needn't break definitively with the party. On the contrary, he could put himself forward as the prime mediator with Nasrallah. Aoun would then ask for an "acceptable" share of portfolios in the government. This could either reflect his parliamentary weight, or there could be a tradeoff between the number of ministers and the nature of the ministries offered the Aounists. This would be a tricky stage, and would require agreement with Geagea and Sfeir beforehand on Christian representation. In exchange, Aoun would endorse an early timetable for parliamentary approval of the Hariri tribunal. He would then announce his decision to abandon the Downtown protests and fold his tents.
A vital ingredient would be Aoun's formally giving up his demand for early elections. The general still believes that such elections are his ticket to the presidency. Because the opposition might get a greater number of seats in Parliament, he feels, his presidential chances would improve. But Aoun's calculation is based on the erroneous assumptions that Lebanon is capable of organizing elections at this divisive time, or even of uniting around an election law; that the opposition is sure to gain under any new law; and that the Aounists still retain the popular support they enjoyed in Mount Lebanon in 2005. Aoun would do better to use his bloc more creatively instead of gambling on an election that nobody wants, and that Hizbullah is only setting as a condition for a settlement in order to keep Aoun on board and obstruct agreement on the tribunal.
With his bloc the swinging vote in Parliament, Aoun would be in a very powerful position as gatekeeper to the president. And with Geagea and Sfeir on his side, he could write a good part of the presidential program. More significantly, Christian unanimity would mean that any new head of state could not easily ignore Aoun once in office (the obsession of all Lebanese kingmakers), since this would only isolate him in the Maronite community. But first, Aoun must take the toughest decision of all: embrace modesty and accept that Baabda is his paradise lost.
For months, Aoun's strategy has been to impose himself as the Maronite no one can circumvent. Until recently, the general sustained himself thanks to Christian frustration with the 2005 election law and the subsequent quadripartite agreement that left Christian politicians and groups either marginalized or playing a secondary role. That beef was justifiable, but things began to disintegrate when Aoun found himself in the same camp as Syria's allies, even as the bombings and assassinations continued. The events of last January 23, when Aoun's supporters prevented people from getting to work, was a political disaster, only compounded by the ongoing fiasco of the Downtown sit-in, which has proven to be a trap for everyone - opposition and majority alike.
With this in mind, it is plain that Michel Aoun will not be president. He cannot be elected by Hizbullah alone, though the party will use Aoun until the last minute as a bargaining chip to slip in someone else. The majority has no incentive to vote for Aoun because he has spent the past months alienating its leaders. And there is no prospect that the general - who distils polarization like no other - will be a compromise candidate, as even Aoun's own ally Elie Skaff recognized publicly several weeks ago.
However, if Aoun's ambition to be president has been dashed, his ability to play a leading role in selecting someone else for the job remains stronger than ever, thanks to the general's control over a sizable parliamentary bloc. Aoun holds the balance of power allowing him to effectively be the kingmaker of any new president. Moreover, by distancing himself from the predominantly Shiite opposition, he would force Hizbullah's leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to overhaul their strategy, as neither man wants the current standoff to appear like it is the Shiites against the rest. This could even force Berri to open the doors of Parliament. More importantly, if Aoun joins with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, the three could together ensure that Christians have a leading say in who will be elected, and what his or her agenda will be.
Aoun and his followers insist that their main objective is to return the Christian community to its rightful place. If so, the general should bite the bullet and fight the lesser battle he can win in helping select a credible successor to President Emile Lahoud, rather than scrape though a nasty presidential try of his own that Aoun is sure to lose.
Why should this matter? Partly because Aoun's failure to reach Baabda will have a negative impact on the Christian community, whose interests the general claims he wants to advance. If Aoun plays all-or-nothing politics, Christians will react in one of two ways, or a combination thereof: they will abandon Aoun and blame him for his recklessness; or they will embrace his loss as their own, and internalize his lament that Christians no longer have a say in Lebanon. In both cases the result will be that the weight of the largest Christian bloc in Parliament is wasted, and Christians will lose any voice they might have on the presidency.
Many Aounists, when you scratch below the surface, are aware that Hizbullah will never agree to disarm and fully integrate into the political system. By the same token, Hizbullah has no deep sympathy for Aoun or his aims, which fundamentally contradict those of the party. Aoun may argue today that Hizbullah's weapons are defensible, at a time when, as he sees it, there is a power vacuum at the level of government; but it is doubtful that a President Aoun could coexist with a party presiding over a state within a state, defended by an Iranian-funded private army. There are no legs in that alliance, and for the moment Aoun and Hizbullah are merely using each other. The thing is, Nasrallah intends to sell Aoun out at the appropriate moment to get something in exchange on the presidency; but Aoun will get nothing from Hizbullah. If anything, his partnership with the party has doomed his presidential chances.
So here's a plan Aoun might want to consider. He should start by holding a far-reaching dialogue with Geagea under the auspices of the Maronite patriarch. This would aim to reach a common set or principles that any future president would have to adhere to - at least if he wants the approval of his coreligionists. Aoun would have to sacrifice his ambition to be elected to the highest office himself, but he would also be in the driving seat to impose a preferred alternative. Geagea's advantage would be that he could buy himself a wider margin of maneuver in his alliance with Saad Hariri and the Future movement. This would not imply breaking that relationship, which remains a foundation for any effort to establish an independent post-Syrian Lebanese state; but it would enhance the Lebanese Forces' credibility as a more autonomous organization.
Once that happens, Aoun would formally ditch the Hizbullah alliance, though he needn't break definitively with the party. On the contrary, he could put himself forward as the prime mediator with Nasrallah. Aoun would then ask for an "acceptable" share of portfolios in the government. This could either reflect his parliamentary weight, or there could be a tradeoff between the number of ministers and the nature of the ministries offered the Aounists. This would be a tricky stage, and would require agreement with Geagea and Sfeir beforehand on Christian representation. In exchange, Aoun would endorse an early timetable for parliamentary approval of the Hariri tribunal. He would then announce his decision to abandon the Downtown protests and fold his tents.
A vital ingredient would be Aoun's formally giving up his demand for early elections. The general still believes that such elections are his ticket to the presidency. Because the opposition might get a greater number of seats in Parliament, he feels, his presidential chances would improve. But Aoun's calculation is based on the erroneous assumptions that Lebanon is capable of organizing elections at this divisive time, or even of uniting around an election law; that the opposition is sure to gain under any new law; and that the Aounists still retain the popular support they enjoyed in Mount Lebanon in 2005. Aoun would do better to use his bloc more creatively instead of gambling on an election that nobody wants, and that Hizbullah is only setting as a condition for a settlement in order to keep Aoun on board and obstruct agreement on the tribunal.
With his bloc the swinging vote in Parliament, Aoun would be in a very powerful position as gatekeeper to the president. And with Geagea and Sfeir on his side, he could write a good part of the presidential program. More significantly, Christian unanimity would mean that any new head of state could not easily ignore Aoun once in office (the obsession of all Lebanese kingmakers), since this would only isolate him in the Maronite community. But first, Aoun must take the toughest decision of all: embrace modesty and accept that Baabda is his paradise lost.
Sunday, March 18, 2007
Deal with Syria, but first impose Lebanese sovereignty
Add Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht to the list of dignitaries who have left Damascus biting their fists in frustration. After meeting with his Syrian counterpart, Walid al-Moallem, on Tuesday, de Gucht said he was "disappointed" that Syria would not surrender its nationals to a mixed tribunal being set up to try suspects in Rafik Hariri’s assassination. Moallem added: "If the United Nations wants anything of Syria, then it must talk to Syria and base the statutes of the tribunal on Syrian law."
That’s revealing coming from a regime that supposedly had nothing to do with Hariri’s murder, and that often affirms its "non-involvement" in the resultant judicial process. Thanks to Syria’s continued refusal to concede anything on the tribunal, the Lebanese crisis continues. This coming weekend the Syrians will get a chance to practice more of their brand of diplomacy when Iraq’s neighbors meet in Baghdad to discuss the country’s future. The United States should not give Syria an opportunity there to break free from the tribunal, which provides the only real leverage over President Bashar Assad to change his regime’s behavior.
It is perhaps understandable that a number of policymakers and analysts in the US feel the Bush administration’s present policy of isolating Syria is going nowhere. Their framework for saying so is Iraq. My friend David Ignatius expressed this view in the commentary published above, pointing out that the "administration should also start a real dialogue with Syria - and in the process shelve any half-baked ideas about regime change that may be lurking in the Old Executive Office Building. The Syrians pose a deadly threat in Lebanon, which is all the more reason to be talking with them." Isolation, the argument goes, also isolates the US. If Washington negotiates, it can use its weight to bring about desirable outcomes.
There are several problems with this assumption when it comes to Syria. The first is that opening a new page with Syria is premature. If the aim of negotiations is to advance one’s aims, then Syria has shown no willingness to consider those of the US and the UN - who told Syria in late 2004 that it was time to end its interference in Lebanon’s affairs and recognize Lebanese sovereignty. To talk now, while the Syrians threaten Lebanon on a daily basis, would validate their claim that threats work, and that Syria can bring envoys to its door by spawning instability in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. That’s precisely the wrong message to send. The right message is that Syria can only put an end to its isolation once it accepts international law - which in Lebanon means accepting the tribunal and giving up on the dream of reimposing its hegemony over the country.
That’s why defending the Hariri tribunal is so essential. The body has international backing, which means that the credibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council is tied into its success. By initiating a dialogue with Syria, by therefore implying that the crime the tribunal is seeking to punish shouldn’t reflect badly on relations with Damascus, the US would empty the tribunal of its meaning. Why give up this weapon when it can make future negotiations more successful?
The quid pro quo demanded of Assad would be a simple one, and the Saudis and the Egyptians have already floated it in one way or another: Any effort to narrow the Hariri tribunal’s statutes, or even to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria, requires that Syria first change its conduct in Lebanon. Nor is isolation of Syria necessarily failing. Even Syrian allies like Iran and Russia can see that Assad’s stance on the tribunal is untenable and might cost them politically. Iran is said to have agreed with Saudi Arabia on the principle of establishing the tribunal, even if it won’t take a position that might alienate Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin allegedly told the Saudis that if the tribunal were blocked in Lebanon, Russia might abstain in a Security Council vote to place it under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
A second problem with the invitation to dialogue with Assad is that there is no evidence Syria will get the message and alter its behavior. Here is the Catch-22: If you engage Syria, Assad will assume this is due to his intransigence, which will encourage him to remain intransigent in the expectation that this will bring more rewards. The Saudis and Egyptians know the pitfalls of this logic, but also see the Syrians caught in a more sinister vicious circle: Because Assad is weak he must export instability, which is only isolating him further in the region, making him even weaker.
The Europeans, never shy about engaging Syria for the sake of engagement, particularly with so many troops deployed in South Lebanon, are also beginning to see the light. De Gucht’s regrets echoed those of the European Union’s representative in Beirut, Patrick Laurent. He recently admitted that the EU had "tried everything [with Syria], as did many others, employing both gentle means and pressure." To no avail.
A third reason to be wary of engaging Syria is that Assad doesn’t have the confidence to carry through on many of the demands that would be made of him. The Syrian president can intimidate his domestic foes, but his authority rests on a narrower power base than his father’s. He can talk to the Israelis, but it’s doubtful that he can reach a final deal with them, since peace would mean substantially dismantling the security apparatus that keeps him in office. He can pretend to help stabilize Iraq, but knows that actually doing so would mean that Syria becomes less relevant. He can claim to have played a positive role in the Mecca accord between the Palestinian factions, but he knows that this only came after he failed to sponsor such an agreement himself. Today, Assad fears a Hamas exit from the Syrian orbit, which is one reason why he has been trying to place pro-Syrian groups in a Palestinian national unity government.
And, most important, Assad knows that if he were to give up on Lebanon finally and unconditionally, he might face the wrath of those within his own regime who silently blame him for the debacle of 2005. But this all begs the question: Why, therefore, should Syria abandon Lebanon at all, or capitulate in Iraq and in the Palestinian territories, if nothing is to be gained from these concessions?
The reason is that Assad, though weak, would thus be able to win his long-term political survival. Such steps would buy him Arab and international forbearance. A new attitude would mean less resistance to a narrowing of the Hariri tribunal’s statutes, more vital investment in Syria, a beneficial Syrian relationship with the US and the EU; and, once Assad can broaden his power base, peace with Israel. But building up Assad’s confidence and then expecting him to relinquish his cards makes no sense. If a power struggle with Syria is unavoidable, so be it. With major Arab states, the US, the UN and the Europeans on the same wavelength, it will be tough for Assad to impose his will - unless the bell of dialogue saves him first.
That’s why the US should remind Syria at the Baghdad conference that deeper contacts remain undesirable. Dealing with Iran on Iraq may be inevitable; dealing with Syria is not, particularly after Assad burned more bridges to the Sunnis by trying and failing to seize control of the Iraqi Baath Party. The Syrians have to be made to realize that their regime can only last if they make fundamental concessions in the region. Assad is too brittle to demand more than recognition of his survival.
That’s revealing coming from a regime that supposedly had nothing to do with Hariri’s murder, and that often affirms its "non-involvement" in the resultant judicial process. Thanks to Syria’s continued refusal to concede anything on the tribunal, the Lebanese crisis continues. This coming weekend the Syrians will get a chance to practice more of their brand of diplomacy when Iraq’s neighbors meet in Baghdad to discuss the country’s future. The United States should not give Syria an opportunity there to break free from the tribunal, which provides the only real leverage over President Bashar Assad to change his regime’s behavior.
It is perhaps understandable that a number of policymakers and analysts in the US feel the Bush administration’s present policy of isolating Syria is going nowhere. Their framework for saying so is Iraq. My friend David Ignatius expressed this view in the commentary published above, pointing out that the "administration should also start a real dialogue with Syria - and in the process shelve any half-baked ideas about regime change that may be lurking in the Old Executive Office Building. The Syrians pose a deadly threat in Lebanon, which is all the more reason to be talking with them." Isolation, the argument goes, also isolates the US. If Washington negotiates, it can use its weight to bring about desirable outcomes.
There are several problems with this assumption when it comes to Syria. The first is that opening a new page with Syria is premature. If the aim of negotiations is to advance one’s aims, then Syria has shown no willingness to consider those of the US and the UN - who told Syria in late 2004 that it was time to end its interference in Lebanon’s affairs and recognize Lebanese sovereignty. To talk now, while the Syrians threaten Lebanon on a daily basis, would validate their claim that threats work, and that Syria can bring envoys to its door by spawning instability in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. That’s precisely the wrong message to send. The right message is that Syria can only put an end to its isolation once it accepts international law - which in Lebanon means accepting the tribunal and giving up on the dream of reimposing its hegemony over the country.
That’s why defending the Hariri tribunal is so essential. The body has international backing, which means that the credibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council is tied into its success. By initiating a dialogue with Syria, by therefore implying that the crime the tribunal is seeking to punish shouldn’t reflect badly on relations with Damascus, the US would empty the tribunal of its meaning. Why give up this weapon when it can make future negotiations more successful?
The quid pro quo demanded of Assad would be a simple one, and the Saudis and the Egyptians have already floated it in one way or another: Any effort to narrow the Hariri tribunal’s statutes, or even to improve relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria, requires that Syria first change its conduct in Lebanon. Nor is isolation of Syria necessarily failing. Even Syrian allies like Iran and Russia can see that Assad’s stance on the tribunal is untenable and might cost them politically. Iran is said to have agreed with Saudi Arabia on the principle of establishing the tribunal, even if it won’t take a position that might alienate Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin allegedly told the Saudis that if the tribunal were blocked in Lebanon, Russia might abstain in a Security Council vote to place it under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
A second problem with the invitation to dialogue with Assad is that there is no evidence Syria will get the message and alter its behavior. Here is the Catch-22: If you engage Syria, Assad will assume this is due to his intransigence, which will encourage him to remain intransigent in the expectation that this will bring more rewards. The Saudis and Egyptians know the pitfalls of this logic, but also see the Syrians caught in a more sinister vicious circle: Because Assad is weak he must export instability, which is only isolating him further in the region, making him even weaker.
The Europeans, never shy about engaging Syria for the sake of engagement, particularly with so many troops deployed in South Lebanon, are also beginning to see the light. De Gucht’s regrets echoed those of the European Union’s representative in Beirut, Patrick Laurent. He recently admitted that the EU had "tried everything [with Syria], as did many others, employing both gentle means and pressure." To no avail.
A third reason to be wary of engaging Syria is that Assad doesn’t have the confidence to carry through on many of the demands that would be made of him. The Syrian president can intimidate his domestic foes, but his authority rests on a narrower power base than his father’s. He can talk to the Israelis, but it’s doubtful that he can reach a final deal with them, since peace would mean substantially dismantling the security apparatus that keeps him in office. He can pretend to help stabilize Iraq, but knows that actually doing so would mean that Syria becomes less relevant. He can claim to have played a positive role in the Mecca accord between the Palestinian factions, but he knows that this only came after he failed to sponsor such an agreement himself. Today, Assad fears a Hamas exit from the Syrian orbit, which is one reason why he has been trying to place pro-Syrian groups in a Palestinian national unity government.
And, most important, Assad knows that if he were to give up on Lebanon finally and unconditionally, he might face the wrath of those within his own regime who silently blame him for the debacle of 2005. But this all begs the question: Why, therefore, should Syria abandon Lebanon at all, or capitulate in Iraq and in the Palestinian territories, if nothing is to be gained from these concessions?
The reason is that Assad, though weak, would thus be able to win his long-term political survival. Such steps would buy him Arab and international forbearance. A new attitude would mean less resistance to a narrowing of the Hariri tribunal’s statutes, more vital investment in Syria, a beneficial Syrian relationship with the US and the EU; and, once Assad can broaden his power base, peace with Israel. But building up Assad’s confidence and then expecting him to relinquish his cards makes no sense. If a power struggle with Syria is unavoidable, so be it. With major Arab states, the US, the UN and the Europeans on the same wavelength, it will be tough for Assad to impose his will - unless the bell of dialogue saves him first.
That’s why the US should remind Syria at the Baghdad conference that deeper contacts remain undesirable. Dealing with Iran on Iraq may be inevitable; dealing with Syria is not, particularly after Assad burned more bridges to the Sunnis by trying and failing to seize control of the Iraqi Baath Party. The Syrians have to be made to realize that their regime can only last if they make fundamental concessions in the region. Assad is too brittle to demand more than recognition of his survival.
Sunday, March 4, 2007
Sy Hersh: the dark side of spun a lot
It’s become a habit to greet whatever journalist Seymour Hersh writes with reverence. However, after his ludicrous claim last summer that Israel’s war in Lebanon was a trial run for an American bombing of Iran - an accusation undermined by postwar narratives showing the confused way Israel and the United States responded to the conflict - my doubts hardened. In his latest New Yorker piece, Hersh maintains that he has unearthed more dirt on the Bush administration: The US is involved in containing Iran by directly or indirectly "bolstering Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda."
The broad tropes of Hersh’s arguments are correct. The US has indeed abandoned the neoconservative approach to the Middle East (which Hersh so loathed), to return to political "realism" based on imposing a balance of power. Much like the US did during the 1980s when it supported Iraq in its war against Iran, the Bush administration is today using Sunnis against Shiites (though in Iraq it is mainly using Shiites against Sunnis). The policy is risky - fiddling with sectarianism may ultimately backfire - but the problem with Hersh is that he offers little hard evidence for many of his controversial assertions. In fact his discussion of Lebanon in particular and his broader charge that the administration is engaging in clandestine activities without proper legislative approval are ill-informed or partial. The New Yorker has signed off on a piece shoddily constructed, often tendentious, and driven almost entirely by Hersh’s sources (most of the more significant ones left unnamed), rather than his own independent confirmation of the details.
Let’s start with Lebanon, where the American and Saudi effort to counter Iran and its allies is in full swing. Today, the US and the kingdom, but also much of the international community and the Muslim world, are shoring up the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, which has for the past three months been facing a serious challenge to its authority from the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah. We learn from Hersh that, in the context of this struggle against Hizbullah, "representatives of the Lebanese government" have supplied weapons and money to a Palestinian Sunni extremist group called Fatah al-Islam, which allegedly broke off from its pro-Syrian parent group, Fatah al-Intifada, before moving to North Lebanon. Fatah al-Intifada was created by the Syrian regime in the early 1980s to oppose Yasser Arafat. Hersh also points out that "the largest" of the Sunni groups, Esbat al-Ansar, located in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon, in South Lebanon, "has received arms and supplies from Lebanese internal-security forces and militias associated with the Siniora government."
What is Hersh’s evidence for these extraordinary statements? Which "militias" is he referring to? In the ongoing Lebanese standoff, Hizbullah has used the term to describe pro-government supporters, without ever substantiating that such militias even exist. The Fatah al-Islam story is based entirely on a quote by one Alistair Crooke, a former MI6 agent, who, we learn, "was told" that weapons were offered to the group, "presumably to take on Hizbullah." The passage on Esbat al-Ansar is not even sourced.
The Fatah al-Islam story is instructive, because it shows a recurring flaw in Hersh’s reporting, namely his investigative paralysis when it comes to Syria. In articles past, Hersh has acted as a conduit for those defending the post-9/11 intelligence collaboration between the US and Syria, and lamenting the Bush administration’s subsequent isolation of Damascus in the run-up to and aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Most Lebanese analysts believe that Fatah al-Islam, far from being aided by the Lebanese government, is in fact a Syrian plant, deployed to Lebanon to be used by the Assad regime to destabilize the country and prevent formal endorsement by the Siniora government of a court to try suspects in the February 2005 assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri. Syria is the main suspect in the crime.
Nowhere does Hersh mention two items that were all over the Beirut media: that the Lebanese authorities have arrested several of the group’s members, and that the Lebanese and Palestinian security services have collaborated in opposing Fatah al-Islam in the northern Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi. The mainstream Palestinian leadership in Lebanon has criticized the entry of such groups into the country, fearing this will provoke tension between Palestinians and the Lebanese state. Fatah al-Islam’s leader, Abu Khaled al-Amleh, is said to be under house arrest in Damascus, but for a number of Lebanese analysts who closely follow Palestinian affairs the story is bogus, designed only to provide Syria with plausible deniability.
As for Hersh’s Esbat al-Ansar allegation, so little is said that it’s difficult to know where to begin a refutation. The history of Esbat al-Ansar is convoluted, but the group was, as French researcher Bernard Rougier notes in a book on the rise of militant Islam in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, "the first armed group to claim a Salafist-Islamist orientation in ... Ain al-Hilweh." Where Hersh stumbles is in his lack of knowledge of Lebanese-Palestinian relations. First of all, it’s not clear to whom he’s comparing Esbat al-Ansar when describing it as "the largest" Sunni Islamist group. According to Palestinian sources, the group includes no more than 70-80 men. If the Lebanese government, and Sunnis in particular, were to collaborate with anyone in the camps, it would be with the main Palestinian organizations, particularly Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah movement, which are more powerful militarily and represent far more people than Esbat al-Ansar.
Second, in its dealings with the Palestinians, the Lebanese government tends to work through the mainstream Palestinian parties, given that the camps are largely autonomous areas. This may vary depending on the region, but the idea that Lebanon’s internal security forces would directly arm Esbat al-Ansar, which is hostile to Fatah, is not credible. The Lebanese would not spoil their relationship with Fatah over Esbat al-Ansar, and it is utterly implausible that Esbat al-Ansar could or would "take on Hizbullah," with which the group was close in the mid-1980s, before it moved away from Iran, toward Salafist-Islamism. Nowhere does Hersh prove his point; worse, nowhere are readers given a larger context that would affirm how weak his contentions are.
Hersh errs in trying too hard to somehow tie the Bush administration in with the most militant groups. In fact, it is true that the Lebanese government is allied with Sunni Islamists - most notably Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It may indeed have allowed "some aid," as Hersh writes, to end up in the hands of "emerging" Sunni militant groups, though this is very imprecise language. The reality is that amid the sectarian polarization in Lebanon today, most Sunnis have rallied to the government’s side, against the Shiite Hizbullah. Al-Jamaa is close to Saudi Arabia, and in 2005 the Saudis intervened prior to parliamentary elections that followed the Syrian withdrawal to ensure the group would not vote against candidates in North Lebanon backed by Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s most powerful Sunni leader who enjoys American and Saudi backing. However, Al-Jamaa is nothing like Esbat al-Ansar or Fatah al-Islam; it has integrated into the state and has had members in Parliament. Doubtless it holds views of Israel and the West that the Bush administration would find distasteful, but so too do the Saudi, Jordanian, and Egyptian clergy. Is Hersh suggesting that the US end ties with Riyadh, Amman, and Cairo?
What is going on today is power politics at their most essential. While Hersh may consider his disclosures news, he must make a better case that the American shift to a Sunni-centric policy against Iran is strengthening violent Islamists. The evidence he presents is scant.
What about Hersh’s belief that the Bush administration is illegally hiding aspects of its pro-Sunni regional strategy? "The clandestine operations have been kept secret, in some cases, by leaving the execution of the funding to the Saudis, or by finding other ways to work around the normal congressional appropriations process." The administration’s point man in this endeavor is purportedly Vice President Dick Cheney.
This revelation is noteworthy, but when we turn to the final part of Hersh’s text in which he addresses congressional oversight issues, we find little meat. Unexplainably, the piece jumps from Hersh’s interview with Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to a flashback on how the Iran-Contra affair undermined the oversight process. That’s because two of those involved in the mid-1980s arms-for-hostages deal, Elliott Abrams, a senior official in the US National Security Council, and Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the US who heads his country’s National Security Council, are key players in the tilt toward the Sunnis.
But Iran-Contra was then. When it comes to now, all Hersh can tell us is that "the issue of oversight is beginning to get more attention from Congress." Is that it? Other than quoting unnamed skeptical sources, Hersh doesn’t enlighten us on specific instances where the administration broke laws. He does mention, not for the first time, that US military and special operations teams "have escalated their activities in Iran to gather intelligence" and to pursue Iranian operatives from Iraq. This merits more investigation, but it is not directly related to his more disturbing point that the US is somehow bolstering extreme Sunni Islamists.
Hersh goes on to remind us that any administration, in order to engage in clandestine activities, "must issue a written finding and inform Congress." The argument is a fair one, if the Bush administration has failed to do so. But in that case why does Hersh not mention a Daily Telegraph report published in January, which suggested that "senators and congressmen have been briefed on [a] classified ’non-lethal presidential finding’ that allows the CIA to provide financial and logistical support to the [Lebanese] prime minister, Fouad Siniora" to oppose Hizbullah? Did The New Yorker’s fact checkers miss that one? If Bush is so keen to hide his hand in Lebanon and elsewhere, then this news item implies that the picture is more complicated. And if Hersh disagrees with the Telegraph, shouldn’t his editors have asked him to place a rebuttal in his article?
But the editors, I suspect, weren’t really looking. Sy Hersh has written some remarkable pieces in the past, but his latest is not one of them. It is badly argued, displays shaky knowledge of the details, and seems mainly propelled by antipathy for the Bush administration. When there are serious political repercussions in the Middle East from Hersh’s much-read pieces, it would help for him to know better what he’s talking about.
The broad tropes of Hersh’s arguments are correct. The US has indeed abandoned the neoconservative approach to the Middle East (which Hersh so loathed), to return to political "realism" based on imposing a balance of power. Much like the US did during the 1980s when it supported Iraq in its war against Iran, the Bush administration is today using Sunnis against Shiites (though in Iraq it is mainly using Shiites against Sunnis). The policy is risky - fiddling with sectarianism may ultimately backfire - but the problem with Hersh is that he offers little hard evidence for many of his controversial assertions. In fact his discussion of Lebanon in particular and his broader charge that the administration is engaging in clandestine activities without proper legislative approval are ill-informed or partial. The New Yorker has signed off on a piece shoddily constructed, often tendentious, and driven almost entirely by Hersh’s sources (most of the more significant ones left unnamed), rather than his own independent confirmation of the details.
Let’s start with Lebanon, where the American and Saudi effort to counter Iran and its allies is in full swing. Today, the US and the kingdom, but also much of the international community and the Muslim world, are shoring up the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, which has for the past three months been facing a serious challenge to its authority from the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah. We learn from Hersh that, in the context of this struggle against Hizbullah, "representatives of the Lebanese government" have supplied weapons and money to a Palestinian Sunni extremist group called Fatah al-Islam, which allegedly broke off from its pro-Syrian parent group, Fatah al-Intifada, before moving to North Lebanon. Fatah al-Intifada was created by the Syrian regime in the early 1980s to oppose Yasser Arafat. Hersh also points out that "the largest" of the Sunni groups, Esbat al-Ansar, located in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon, in South Lebanon, "has received arms and supplies from Lebanese internal-security forces and militias associated with the Siniora government."
What is Hersh’s evidence for these extraordinary statements? Which "militias" is he referring to? In the ongoing Lebanese standoff, Hizbullah has used the term to describe pro-government supporters, without ever substantiating that such militias even exist. The Fatah al-Islam story is based entirely on a quote by one Alistair Crooke, a former MI6 agent, who, we learn, "was told" that weapons were offered to the group, "presumably to take on Hizbullah." The passage on Esbat al-Ansar is not even sourced.
The Fatah al-Islam story is instructive, because it shows a recurring flaw in Hersh’s reporting, namely his investigative paralysis when it comes to Syria. In articles past, Hersh has acted as a conduit for those defending the post-9/11 intelligence collaboration between the US and Syria, and lamenting the Bush administration’s subsequent isolation of Damascus in the run-up to and aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Most Lebanese analysts believe that Fatah al-Islam, far from being aided by the Lebanese government, is in fact a Syrian plant, deployed to Lebanon to be used by the Assad regime to destabilize the country and prevent formal endorsement by the Siniora government of a court to try suspects in the February 2005 assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri. Syria is the main suspect in the crime.
Nowhere does Hersh mention two items that were all over the Beirut media: that the Lebanese authorities have arrested several of the group’s members, and that the Lebanese and Palestinian security services have collaborated in opposing Fatah al-Islam in the northern Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared and Baddawi. The mainstream Palestinian leadership in Lebanon has criticized the entry of such groups into the country, fearing this will provoke tension between Palestinians and the Lebanese state. Fatah al-Islam’s leader, Abu Khaled al-Amleh, is said to be under house arrest in Damascus, but for a number of Lebanese analysts who closely follow Palestinian affairs the story is bogus, designed only to provide Syria with plausible deniability.
As for Hersh’s Esbat al-Ansar allegation, so little is said that it’s difficult to know where to begin a refutation. The history of Esbat al-Ansar is convoluted, but the group was, as French researcher Bernard Rougier notes in a book on the rise of militant Islam in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, "the first armed group to claim a Salafist-Islamist orientation in ... Ain al-Hilweh." Where Hersh stumbles is in his lack of knowledge of Lebanese-Palestinian relations. First of all, it’s not clear to whom he’s comparing Esbat al-Ansar when describing it as "the largest" Sunni Islamist group. According to Palestinian sources, the group includes no more than 70-80 men. If the Lebanese government, and Sunnis in particular, were to collaborate with anyone in the camps, it would be with the main Palestinian organizations, particularly Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah movement, which are more powerful militarily and represent far more people than Esbat al-Ansar.
Second, in its dealings with the Palestinians, the Lebanese government tends to work through the mainstream Palestinian parties, given that the camps are largely autonomous areas. This may vary depending on the region, but the idea that Lebanon’s internal security forces would directly arm Esbat al-Ansar, which is hostile to Fatah, is not credible. The Lebanese would not spoil their relationship with Fatah over Esbat al-Ansar, and it is utterly implausible that Esbat al-Ansar could or would "take on Hizbullah," with which the group was close in the mid-1980s, before it moved away from Iran, toward Salafist-Islamism. Nowhere does Hersh prove his point; worse, nowhere are readers given a larger context that would affirm how weak his contentions are.
Hersh errs in trying too hard to somehow tie the Bush administration in with the most militant groups. In fact, it is true that the Lebanese government is allied with Sunni Islamists - most notably Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It may indeed have allowed "some aid," as Hersh writes, to end up in the hands of "emerging" Sunni militant groups, though this is very imprecise language. The reality is that amid the sectarian polarization in Lebanon today, most Sunnis have rallied to the government’s side, against the Shiite Hizbullah. Al-Jamaa is close to Saudi Arabia, and in 2005 the Saudis intervened prior to parliamentary elections that followed the Syrian withdrawal to ensure the group would not vote against candidates in North Lebanon backed by Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s most powerful Sunni leader who enjoys American and Saudi backing. However, Al-Jamaa is nothing like Esbat al-Ansar or Fatah al-Islam; it has integrated into the state and has had members in Parliament. Doubtless it holds views of Israel and the West that the Bush administration would find distasteful, but so too do the Saudi, Jordanian, and Egyptian clergy. Is Hersh suggesting that the US end ties with Riyadh, Amman, and Cairo?
What is going on today is power politics at their most essential. While Hersh may consider his disclosures news, he must make a better case that the American shift to a Sunni-centric policy against Iran is strengthening violent Islamists. The evidence he presents is scant.
What about Hersh’s belief that the Bush administration is illegally hiding aspects of its pro-Sunni regional strategy? "The clandestine operations have been kept secret, in some cases, by leaving the execution of the funding to the Saudis, or by finding other ways to work around the normal congressional appropriations process." The administration’s point man in this endeavor is purportedly Vice President Dick Cheney.
This revelation is noteworthy, but when we turn to the final part of Hersh’s text in which he addresses congressional oversight issues, we find little meat. Unexplainably, the piece jumps from Hersh’s interview with Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to a flashback on how the Iran-Contra affair undermined the oversight process. That’s because two of those involved in the mid-1980s arms-for-hostages deal, Elliott Abrams, a senior official in the US National Security Council, and Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi ambassador to the US who heads his country’s National Security Council, are key players in the tilt toward the Sunnis.
But Iran-Contra was then. When it comes to now, all Hersh can tell us is that "the issue of oversight is beginning to get more attention from Congress." Is that it? Other than quoting unnamed skeptical sources, Hersh doesn’t enlighten us on specific instances where the administration broke laws. He does mention, not for the first time, that US military and special operations teams "have escalated their activities in Iran to gather intelligence" and to pursue Iranian operatives from Iraq. This merits more investigation, but it is not directly related to his more disturbing point that the US is somehow bolstering extreme Sunni Islamists.
Hersh goes on to remind us that any administration, in order to engage in clandestine activities, "must issue a written finding and inform Congress." The argument is a fair one, if the Bush administration has failed to do so. But in that case why does Hersh not mention a Daily Telegraph report published in January, which suggested that "senators and congressmen have been briefed on [a] classified ’non-lethal presidential finding’ that allows the CIA to provide financial and logistical support to the [Lebanese] prime minister, Fouad Siniora" to oppose Hizbullah? Did The New Yorker’s fact checkers miss that one? If Bush is so keen to hide his hand in Lebanon and elsewhere, then this news item implies that the picture is more complicated. And if Hersh disagrees with the Telegraph, shouldn’t his editors have asked him to place a rebuttal in his article?
But the editors, I suspect, weren’t really looking. Sy Hersh has written some remarkable pieces in the past, but his latest is not one of them. It is badly argued, displays shaky knowledge of the details, and seems mainly propelled by antipathy for the Bush administration. When there are serious political repercussions in the Middle East from Hersh’s much-read pieces, it would help for him to know better what he’s talking about.
Saturday, February 24, 2007
Learning nothing and forgetting nothing
Earlier this week, two statements neatly summarized the crisis in Lebanon. The first came from the EU’s representative in Beirut, Patrick Laurent; the second from Syria’s official Al-Thawra daily. Both reaffirmed in their own separate ways that the Syrian regime, since its army was forced out of Lebanon in 2005, has chosen to behave like the exiled Bourbons: learning nothing and forgetting nothing.
In an exchange with journalists, Laurent had this to say about Syrian behavior in Lebanon, and about European efforts to "engage" President Bashar Assad: "We tried everything, as did many others, employing both gentle means and pressure," but nothing seemed to work. As if confirming Laurent’s doubts, Al-Thawra, in an editorial Tuesday, called for talks between Damascus and the US covering Lebanon, Palestine, the Golan Heights, and Iraq. "Syria insists on a serious and profound dialogue on all subjects without exception," the newspaper asserted.
Precisely where this extraordinary statement came from was unclear. Syria is a declining power, capable only of spreading instability in its neighborhood to ward off irrelevance. However, this game, which the late President Hafez al-Assad played to perfection, no longer works. By allying itself with an Iran that Saudi Arabia regards as an existential threat, Syria is in no position to make demands of the Arab states, let alone of the United States. The Syrians recently tried to take control of the Iraqi Baath Party, and failed. They tried to midwife a Fatah-Hamas deal in Damascus, and failed again. Assad has even managed to alienate Egypt, by thwarting its peace efforts on the Palestinian front and by ensuring that Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa’s mediation in Lebanon would go nowhere. And in Lebanon, Assad has so angered the Sunni community that the prospect of a Syrian military return seems fanciful.
Most alarming from a Lebanese perspective, the Al-Thawra article showed that Syria has yet to grasp that the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1559 in 2004. In insisting on Syria’s having a say in Lebanon’s future, the newspaper disregarded that the resolution specifically asked Damascus to end its interference in Lebanese affairs.
Assad may have come out of his summit in Tehran last week invigorated by a sense that the Iranians need him in their confrontation with the Bush administration. It was always naive to assume that Iran would pressure Assad on the Hariri tribunal at a time when the nuclear issue was on the verge of reaching a climax at the UN - with more steps possibly coming at the Security Council to impose new sanctions on Tehran.
However, it is precisely because of this that Syria should be careful. Iran’s ultimate guarantee against an American attack isn’t the comradeship of Damascus, but a broad Arab consensus behind the benefits of a dialogue with Iran and the undesirability of an American military response to the nuclear standoff. Iran views its talks with the Saudis as the best means to avoid a war, but also to hinder approval of new UN sanctions and avert a Sunni-Shiite conflict that would cripple Iranian initiatives in the Middle East. In this context, Assad could emerge as a burdensome ally.
The Bush administration is more subtle than it has been given credit for. It authorized the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, realizing that this reflected the central Sunni-Shiite fault line dividing the Middle East. There are some in Washington who would love to bomb Iran, but there is no domestic traction for war, leaving room for diplomacy. This is where the Saudi-Iranian talks fit in. That Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the US, was named point man on the Saudi side surely reassured the Bush administration, particularly Vice President Dick Cheney.
As the Syrians look on, what is going through their minds? Their agenda can be reduced to a single item: undermining the Hariri tribunal. Neither in Iraq nor in the Palestinian areas is Assad indispensable. In Lebanon, Syria presumably faces Iranian "red lines" limiting the kind of intimidation it can employ, which is why the Syrian-Iranian compromise is for more stalemate, punctuated by controlled Hizbullah escalations. The latest scheme is for a civil-disobedience campaign. Yet this may end up backfiring like other opposition efforts did. Shiites would suffer as much as anyone from obstruction of the country’s public administration.
Iran and Syria can agree over raising the heat in Lebanon to squeeze the Saudis. But beyond that the situation becomes more complicated. The Iranians want an advantageous deal in Lebanon, but not a civil war. They also don’t want to break with the Saudis, because there will be more friction with the US and the Arab world in the coming months. An Arab League summit is to be held in Saudi Arabia in March, and there is nothing Iranian leaders would like less than for the predominantly Sunni Arab states to use that event to warn against the "Persian peril." This explains why the Syrians are so eager to act now in Lebanon, to ensure they can get something on the tribunal before eventual progress in the Saudi-Iranian relationship pushes their aims to the backburner. A Saudi-Iranian rapprochement would make it much tougher for Assad to kill the tribunal, whose passage the Saudi leadership considers non-negotiable.
Assad senses that the window of opportunity is closing. His last card is a Lebanese civil war, but it’s not one that Iran and Hizbullah seem willing to play. However, the tribunal won’t disappear. At best, if Syria aborts formal Lebanese endorsement of the institution, this will make the move toward Chapter VII of the UN Charter more likely. Only when Assad truly accepts Resolution 1559 and embraces Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, will he persuade anyone that his regime is worth saving.
In an exchange with journalists, Laurent had this to say about Syrian behavior in Lebanon, and about European efforts to "engage" President Bashar Assad: "We tried everything, as did many others, employing both gentle means and pressure," but nothing seemed to work. As if confirming Laurent’s doubts, Al-Thawra, in an editorial Tuesday, called for talks between Damascus and the US covering Lebanon, Palestine, the Golan Heights, and Iraq. "Syria insists on a serious and profound dialogue on all subjects without exception," the newspaper asserted.
Precisely where this extraordinary statement came from was unclear. Syria is a declining power, capable only of spreading instability in its neighborhood to ward off irrelevance. However, this game, which the late President Hafez al-Assad played to perfection, no longer works. By allying itself with an Iran that Saudi Arabia regards as an existential threat, Syria is in no position to make demands of the Arab states, let alone of the United States. The Syrians recently tried to take control of the Iraqi Baath Party, and failed. They tried to midwife a Fatah-Hamas deal in Damascus, and failed again. Assad has even managed to alienate Egypt, by thwarting its peace efforts on the Palestinian front and by ensuring that Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa’s mediation in Lebanon would go nowhere. And in Lebanon, Assad has so angered the Sunni community that the prospect of a Syrian military return seems fanciful.
Most alarming from a Lebanese perspective, the Al-Thawra article showed that Syria has yet to grasp that the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1559 in 2004. In insisting on Syria’s having a say in Lebanon’s future, the newspaper disregarded that the resolution specifically asked Damascus to end its interference in Lebanese affairs.
Assad may have come out of his summit in Tehran last week invigorated by a sense that the Iranians need him in their confrontation with the Bush administration. It was always naive to assume that Iran would pressure Assad on the Hariri tribunal at a time when the nuclear issue was on the verge of reaching a climax at the UN - with more steps possibly coming at the Security Council to impose new sanctions on Tehran.
However, it is precisely because of this that Syria should be careful. Iran’s ultimate guarantee against an American attack isn’t the comradeship of Damascus, but a broad Arab consensus behind the benefits of a dialogue with Iran and the undesirability of an American military response to the nuclear standoff. Iran views its talks with the Saudis as the best means to avoid a war, but also to hinder approval of new UN sanctions and avert a Sunni-Shiite conflict that would cripple Iranian initiatives in the Middle East. In this context, Assad could emerge as a burdensome ally.
The Bush administration is more subtle than it has been given credit for. It authorized the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, realizing that this reflected the central Sunni-Shiite fault line dividing the Middle East. There are some in Washington who would love to bomb Iran, but there is no domestic traction for war, leaving room for diplomacy. This is where the Saudi-Iranian talks fit in. That Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the US, was named point man on the Saudi side surely reassured the Bush administration, particularly Vice President Dick Cheney.
As the Syrians look on, what is going through their minds? Their agenda can be reduced to a single item: undermining the Hariri tribunal. Neither in Iraq nor in the Palestinian areas is Assad indispensable. In Lebanon, Syria presumably faces Iranian "red lines" limiting the kind of intimidation it can employ, which is why the Syrian-Iranian compromise is for more stalemate, punctuated by controlled Hizbullah escalations. The latest scheme is for a civil-disobedience campaign. Yet this may end up backfiring like other opposition efforts did. Shiites would suffer as much as anyone from obstruction of the country’s public administration.
Iran and Syria can agree over raising the heat in Lebanon to squeeze the Saudis. But beyond that the situation becomes more complicated. The Iranians want an advantageous deal in Lebanon, but not a civil war. They also don’t want to break with the Saudis, because there will be more friction with the US and the Arab world in the coming months. An Arab League summit is to be held in Saudi Arabia in March, and there is nothing Iranian leaders would like less than for the predominantly Sunni Arab states to use that event to warn against the "Persian peril." This explains why the Syrians are so eager to act now in Lebanon, to ensure they can get something on the tribunal before eventual progress in the Saudi-Iranian relationship pushes their aims to the backburner. A Saudi-Iranian rapprochement would make it much tougher for Assad to kill the tribunal, whose passage the Saudi leadership considers non-negotiable.
Assad senses that the window of opportunity is closing. His last card is a Lebanese civil war, but it’s not one that Iran and Hizbullah seem willing to play. However, the tribunal won’t disappear. At best, if Syria aborts formal Lebanese endorsement of the institution, this will make the move toward Chapter VII of the UN Charter more likely. Only when Assad truly accepts Resolution 1559 and embraces Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, will he persuade anyone that his regime is worth saving.
Thursday, February 15, 2007
Who will blink first, the US or Iran?
Recently, from his perch at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, Germany’s former foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, wrote a commentary warning of the dangers in an American military attack against Iran. His views are significant in that they are shared by many Bush administration critics in the United States and Europe.
With the US Navy building up its offensive capability in and around the Gulf, and President George W. Bush ratcheting up the pressure on Iranians inside Iraq, Fischer concluded: "Basically, there are two possibilities, one positive and one negative. Unfortunately, the positive outcome appears to be the less likely one. If the threat of force ... aims at preparing the ground for serious negotiations with Iran, there can and should be no objection. If, on the other hand, it represents an attempt to prepare the American public for a war against Iran ... the outcome would be an unmitigated disaster."
Fischer is adamant that a war against Iran will plunge the Middle East into an "abyss." It would strengthen the Iranian clergy, put Iranian democrats on the defensive, and ensure that the "the dream of ’regime change’ in Tehran would not come true." He insists that there is still time to secure "a long-term freeze of Iran’s nuclear program," mainly because the country’s level of nuclear development does not call for immediate military action. The US must pursue diplomacy, but this requires an American willingness to talk to Tehran, which "is afraid of regional and international isolation." Iran can be changed from within, Fischer believes, "So why the current threats against Iran?"
Much of what Fischer argues is convincing. The chances that a US military attack would be successful in totally destroying Iran’s nuclear capability are not high. The Iranian backlash in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East could end up causing much greater headaches for the United States than the already trying situation existing today. Regional sectarian polarization between Sunnis and Shiites would rise if Iran were to strike back against America’s Arab allies; Islamists might seize the initiative on both sides of the divide, which would only further damage US effectiveness in the region. Domestically, Bush would have to convince a deeply skeptical Congress and public that bombing Iran is worthwhile. Given the present mood in Washington, this is unlikely.
But there are two problems in Fischer’s analysis and that of other administration critics. First, Iran is plainly intending to build a nuclear device, and in the face of this the international community has repeatedly vacillated. Fischer’s anxieties, which he wears on his sleeve, create a sense that he would prefer to let Iran have an atomic weapon than allow the US to prevent this from happening. That’s because his case is all carrots and no sticks. Fischer accepts that brinkmanship can produce good results, by paving the way toward serious negotiations; but he so undermines the argument in favor of using force, that that psychological merits of employing brinkmanship come to nothing.
Yet sticks can work. There was an exception to international dithering on Iran last December, when the United Nations Security Council passed a sanctions resolution against Tehran. Later this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency will review whether Iran has complied. Though it was watered down, the resolution supposedly took the Iranian leadership by surprise. In a report highlighted by the French daily Le Monde, the foreign affairs committee of the Iranian Parliament warned of the dangers of sanctions, which could force Iran "to modify its national priorities and devote a major part of its resources to preventing an important social upheaval, which may cause a deterioration of the standard of living for a significant portion of the population." President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been severely criticized by other members of Iran’s leadership for having so polarized relations with the international community, that Security Council members were able to find common ground. His authority has been weakened, and recently he and Iran’s nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, disagreed publicly over the president’s prerogatives on nuclear matters.
Ahmadinejad could end up a victim of his overconfidence. His line has been that the US is a paper tiger. It talks tough on Iran, but otherwise is too bogged down in Iraq to pose a danger to Tehran. That rationale has encouraged the president to raise the stakes with Washington, probably tacked on to a calculation that if there were a standoff with the Americans, Ahmadinejad would gain at home. Yet this has divided Iran’s leaders over what policy to pursue. That’s why displaying apprehension, like Fischer does, is the wrong stratagem to adopt with the Iranians. If you’re playing a game of chicken, don’t blink.
A second problem that Fischer and Bush administration detractors need to sort out is what negotiations with Iran would involve. The critics insist the administration should talk, but without explaining what it should talk about, whether the US is in the best position to initiate such a dialogue today, or even whether Iran will take the exchange seriously.
The US may be better off waiting until several factors kick in before talking - particularly if the building of a nuclear weapon is not imminent. Iran will soon face more economic hardship from the steady lowering of oil prices due to Saudi excess production. The Bush administration’s surge option in Baghdad and in Anbar Province has the potential to strengthen its hand if it can improve security in Iraq. In Lebanon, Iran’s ally Hizbullah has seen its margin of maneuver reduced by an angry Sunni counter-reaction to its efforts to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. And throughout the Arab world, Iran is perceived as more of an enemy than ever before. These developments, and others, suggest that the Bush administration might be better off waiting for Iran to float a compromise package first, rather than panicking and doing so itself - handing Iranian hard-liners proof that Washington cannot afford a confrontation.
A US war against Iran is a bad idea. But the essence of brinkmanship is to create the impression that war is a good idea - in fact a smashing one. Bush is stubborn enough, and infuriated enough by Iraq, that the Iranians can’t be quite sure of what he will do next. The US can turn this to its advantage. Yet, until now, it’s also true that the administration has dealt with Iran within the context of an international consensus, through the UN and in accord with its Arab allies - everything it avoided doing before invading Iraq. So, when critics like Fischer cannot acknowledge this change, when they justify using force to open the door to bargaining, then virtually reject, without evidence, that the US might be playing a subtle mind game, you do wonder what their point is: to resolve a crisis that Iran created, or just to knock Bush down a peg?
With the US Navy building up its offensive capability in and around the Gulf, and President George W. Bush ratcheting up the pressure on Iranians inside Iraq, Fischer concluded: "Basically, there are two possibilities, one positive and one negative. Unfortunately, the positive outcome appears to be the less likely one. If the threat of force ... aims at preparing the ground for serious negotiations with Iran, there can and should be no objection. If, on the other hand, it represents an attempt to prepare the American public for a war against Iran ... the outcome would be an unmitigated disaster."
Fischer is adamant that a war against Iran will plunge the Middle East into an "abyss." It would strengthen the Iranian clergy, put Iranian democrats on the defensive, and ensure that the "the dream of ’regime change’ in Tehran would not come true." He insists that there is still time to secure "a long-term freeze of Iran’s nuclear program," mainly because the country’s level of nuclear development does not call for immediate military action. The US must pursue diplomacy, but this requires an American willingness to talk to Tehran, which "is afraid of regional and international isolation." Iran can be changed from within, Fischer believes, "So why the current threats against Iran?"
Much of what Fischer argues is convincing. The chances that a US military attack would be successful in totally destroying Iran’s nuclear capability are not high. The Iranian backlash in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East could end up causing much greater headaches for the United States than the already trying situation existing today. Regional sectarian polarization between Sunnis and Shiites would rise if Iran were to strike back against America’s Arab allies; Islamists might seize the initiative on both sides of the divide, which would only further damage US effectiveness in the region. Domestically, Bush would have to convince a deeply skeptical Congress and public that bombing Iran is worthwhile. Given the present mood in Washington, this is unlikely.
But there are two problems in Fischer’s analysis and that of other administration critics. First, Iran is plainly intending to build a nuclear device, and in the face of this the international community has repeatedly vacillated. Fischer’s anxieties, which he wears on his sleeve, create a sense that he would prefer to let Iran have an atomic weapon than allow the US to prevent this from happening. That’s because his case is all carrots and no sticks. Fischer accepts that brinkmanship can produce good results, by paving the way toward serious negotiations; but he so undermines the argument in favor of using force, that that psychological merits of employing brinkmanship come to nothing.
Yet sticks can work. There was an exception to international dithering on Iran last December, when the United Nations Security Council passed a sanctions resolution against Tehran. Later this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency will review whether Iran has complied. Though it was watered down, the resolution supposedly took the Iranian leadership by surprise. In a report highlighted by the French daily Le Monde, the foreign affairs committee of the Iranian Parliament warned of the dangers of sanctions, which could force Iran "to modify its national priorities and devote a major part of its resources to preventing an important social upheaval, which may cause a deterioration of the standard of living for a significant portion of the population." President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been severely criticized by other members of Iran’s leadership for having so polarized relations with the international community, that Security Council members were able to find common ground. His authority has been weakened, and recently he and Iran’s nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, disagreed publicly over the president’s prerogatives on nuclear matters.
Ahmadinejad could end up a victim of his overconfidence. His line has been that the US is a paper tiger. It talks tough on Iran, but otherwise is too bogged down in Iraq to pose a danger to Tehran. That rationale has encouraged the president to raise the stakes with Washington, probably tacked on to a calculation that if there were a standoff with the Americans, Ahmadinejad would gain at home. Yet this has divided Iran’s leaders over what policy to pursue. That’s why displaying apprehension, like Fischer does, is the wrong stratagem to adopt with the Iranians. If you’re playing a game of chicken, don’t blink.
A second problem that Fischer and Bush administration detractors need to sort out is what negotiations with Iran would involve. The critics insist the administration should talk, but without explaining what it should talk about, whether the US is in the best position to initiate such a dialogue today, or even whether Iran will take the exchange seriously.
The US may be better off waiting until several factors kick in before talking - particularly if the building of a nuclear weapon is not imminent. Iran will soon face more economic hardship from the steady lowering of oil prices due to Saudi excess production. The Bush administration’s surge option in Baghdad and in Anbar Province has the potential to strengthen its hand if it can improve security in Iraq. In Lebanon, Iran’s ally Hizbullah has seen its margin of maneuver reduced by an angry Sunni counter-reaction to its efforts to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. And throughout the Arab world, Iran is perceived as more of an enemy than ever before. These developments, and others, suggest that the Bush administration might be better off waiting for Iran to float a compromise package first, rather than panicking and doing so itself - handing Iranian hard-liners proof that Washington cannot afford a confrontation.
A US war against Iran is a bad idea. But the essence of brinkmanship is to create the impression that war is a good idea - in fact a smashing one. Bush is stubborn enough, and infuriated enough by Iraq, that the Iranians can’t be quite sure of what he will do next. The US can turn this to its advantage. Yet, until now, it’s also true that the administration has dealt with Iran within the context of an international consensus, through the UN and in accord with its Arab allies - everything it avoided doing before invading Iraq. So, when critics like Fischer cannot acknowledge this change, when they justify using force to open the door to bargaining, then virtually reject, without evidence, that the US might be playing a subtle mind game, you do wonder what their point is: to resolve a crisis that Iran created, or just to knock Bush down a peg?
Friday, February 2, 2007
When Don Quixote takes to the streets
So today is a "day of change," to quote Suleiman Franjieh. He could be right. That’s because, as of tomorrow, Hizbullah may have much greater latitude to maneuver without considering the interests of its Christian allies - Michel Aoun and Franjieh himself. Both men are eager to be the opposition’s cannon fodder, and will emerge from the fracas with their reputation tarnished further. Not for the first time, Aoun is helping ensure that Christians will end up marginalized.
The Saudis and the Iranians are in the process of putting together a package deal to end the Lebanese crisis. Neither wants a Sunni-Shiite war in the streets of Beirut, yet somehow Aoun has failed to grasp the implications of this. He remains entirely focused on the fact that their arrangement might undermine his ambition to become president. The Saudi-Iranian project remains very much alive, despite Aoun’s warning on Sunday that Lebanon should not seek a solution from the outside. As usual, the general is moving against the grain of regional and international developments; as usual he is gearing himself up for a fall.
Both Hizbullah and Amal are giving Aoun enough rope to hang himself with. In his interview with Al-Manar on Friday, Hizbullah’s secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, set as a new opposition condition the holding of early parliamentary elections, before a presidential election. Aoun couldn’t have been foolish enough to believe that Nasrallah was serious. Or could he? Nasrallah knows the demand has no chance of being met, but the condition was apparently added to block something he was unhappy with in the Saudi-Iranian draft. Indeed, by Saturday unidentified sources, certainly from the opposition, were leaking to Al-Hayat that the main obstacle to a resolution of the stalemate was Michel Aoun.
On top of that, today Aoun’s and Franjieh’s followers will reportedly be alone in the trenches. While Shiite areas will go on strike, sources in Amal and Hizbullah have said that neither of the parties is committed to blocking roads in and around beirut - unlike the Christian groups. A Sunni-Shiite confrontation will thus be averted, while Aoun and Franjieh march on, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, two soldiers in pursuit of Christian irrelevance.
Nasrallah will let Aoun fall into the ravine, mainly because the general has become a burden. At the same time, Hizbullah will prop Aoun up until he reaches the edge. Nasrallah doesn’t want a messy divorce with the Aounists, who can still be very useful against the majority. If Aoun is ridiculed today, if his calls for a strike fail, if his only tactic is to bully people into not going to work, then soon Nasrallah might be able to tell the general: "Look, I tried, to the extent that I was willing to back your demand for early elections. But your influence is limited and I really must avoid allowing my differences with the Sunnis to get out of hand."
Most disappointing has been the performance of Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir. Now more than ever he must take a sturdier position on those Christians in opposition. Instead, he remains blandly impartial. In his Sunday homily, Sfeir directed condemnation against both the majority and the opposition, in particular against their "tenacity" at a time when Lebanon was sinking fast. That was understandable, but also unfair just before the majority-led government prepared to bring Lebanon billions of dollars in foreign financing. The patriarch was probably reluctant to add insult to Aoun’s and Franjieh’s almost certain injury today. Yet it is within his mandate, even his duty, to warn the Maronite community of the dangers ahead. And when two leaders are taking the lead in a mad adventure that is sure to bomb, and when Maronites in general can expect to feel the harmful backlash of that decision, Sfeir cannot evade taking a clearer stance.
Aoun’s dream of becoming president lies shattered. This showed in a speech on Sunday, in which he denounced "Harirism." It was always about Harirism with him, about his loathing for those who collaborated with Syria to build up Lebanon on the ruins of Aoun’s 1988-1990 fiasco. That same coalition would later push the Syrians out. The general cannot stomach that he has been twice deprived: of the merit he deserved for first fighting the Syrians; and of the political capital that should have accrued to him once they departed. You can sympathize, but not enough to follow a frustrated man down the path to communal and national perdition.
The Saudis and the Iranians are in the process of putting together a package deal to end the Lebanese crisis. Neither wants a Sunni-Shiite war in the streets of Beirut, yet somehow Aoun has failed to grasp the implications of this. He remains entirely focused on the fact that their arrangement might undermine his ambition to become president. The Saudi-Iranian project remains very much alive, despite Aoun’s warning on Sunday that Lebanon should not seek a solution from the outside. As usual, the general is moving against the grain of regional and international developments; as usual he is gearing himself up for a fall.
Both Hizbullah and Amal are giving Aoun enough rope to hang himself with. In his interview with Al-Manar on Friday, Hizbullah’s secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, set as a new opposition condition the holding of early parliamentary elections, before a presidential election. Aoun couldn’t have been foolish enough to believe that Nasrallah was serious. Or could he? Nasrallah knows the demand has no chance of being met, but the condition was apparently added to block something he was unhappy with in the Saudi-Iranian draft. Indeed, by Saturday unidentified sources, certainly from the opposition, were leaking to Al-Hayat that the main obstacle to a resolution of the stalemate was Michel Aoun.
On top of that, today Aoun’s and Franjieh’s followers will reportedly be alone in the trenches. While Shiite areas will go on strike, sources in Amal and Hizbullah have said that neither of the parties is committed to blocking roads in and around beirut - unlike the Christian groups. A Sunni-Shiite confrontation will thus be averted, while Aoun and Franjieh march on, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, two soldiers in pursuit of Christian irrelevance.
Nasrallah will let Aoun fall into the ravine, mainly because the general has become a burden. At the same time, Hizbullah will prop Aoun up until he reaches the edge. Nasrallah doesn’t want a messy divorce with the Aounists, who can still be very useful against the majority. If Aoun is ridiculed today, if his calls for a strike fail, if his only tactic is to bully people into not going to work, then soon Nasrallah might be able to tell the general: "Look, I tried, to the extent that I was willing to back your demand for early elections. But your influence is limited and I really must avoid allowing my differences with the Sunnis to get out of hand."
Most disappointing has been the performance of Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir. Now more than ever he must take a sturdier position on those Christians in opposition. Instead, he remains blandly impartial. In his Sunday homily, Sfeir directed condemnation against both the majority and the opposition, in particular against their "tenacity" at a time when Lebanon was sinking fast. That was understandable, but also unfair just before the majority-led government prepared to bring Lebanon billions of dollars in foreign financing. The patriarch was probably reluctant to add insult to Aoun’s and Franjieh’s almost certain injury today. Yet it is within his mandate, even his duty, to warn the Maronite community of the dangers ahead. And when two leaders are taking the lead in a mad adventure that is sure to bomb, and when Maronites in general can expect to feel the harmful backlash of that decision, Sfeir cannot evade taking a clearer stance.
Aoun’s dream of becoming president lies shattered. This showed in a speech on Sunday, in which he denounced "Harirism." It was always about Harirism with him, about his loathing for those who collaborated with Syria to build up Lebanon on the ruins of Aoun’s 1988-1990 fiasco. That same coalition would later push the Syrians out. The general cannot stomach that he has been twice deprived: of the merit he deserved for first fighting the Syrians; and of the political capital that should have accrued to him once they departed. You can sympathize, but not enough to follow a frustrated man down the path to communal and national perdition.
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