The region imposes a Lebanese stalemate

In recent weeks, Walid Jumblatt has retreated from the sharp position he adopted at the Beau Rivage Hotel earlier this month on his separation from the March 14 coalition. From a desire to play an axial role in a Syrian revival in Lebanon, the Druze leader, evidently in the face of Saudi and American annoyance, took several steps backward. That shows some confusion on Jumblatt’s part when it comes to regional dynamics, and when Jumblatt is confused you can be sure things are confusing.

What is delaying the formation of the government? It would be nice to put all the blame on Michel Aoun’s desire to advance the career of his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil. But Bassil is an addendum. The fact is that the states most involved in Lebanon – Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, as well as the United States – are caught in a wait-and-see attitude that makes difficult any accord over a new government, which, once formed, might tilt the balance one way or the other. Therefore, deadlock has prevailed.

At the heart of the problem is the ambiguous Syrian-Saudi relationship, characterized by reconciliation but also disagreement over what Syria seeks in Lebanon. The Assad regime had wanted to position itself as the sponsor of an inter-Lebanese reconciliation in order to hit three birds with one stone: to force Saad Hariri to visit Damascus and go a long way toward declaring Syria innocent in the murder of his father; to regain lost ground in Lebanon, both with respect to the March 14 majority and its allies Iran and Hezbollah; and to absorb the Lebanese track before a possible resumption of regional negotiations in the coming weeks.

However, the Saudis, and with them the United States and Egypt, have refused to sell the Lebanese store to Syria. It is an open secret that the Obama administration thwarted a visit by Hariri to Damascus before he became prime minister. The Saudis, too, became tougher, which is why Jumblatt, at least publicly, has moved away from his Beau Rivage speech.

At the same time, Damascus and Riyadh see advantages in maintaining a good rapport elsewhere, for example over Iraq. The succession of devastating suicide bombings in recent weeks has exposed implicit divergences between the Syrians and the Iranians, with the Saudis having an interest in going along with whatever impairs Iran. Syria continues to allow Sunni militants across its border to undermine stability in Iraq, while Iran, now that the Americans have started withdrawing from Iraqi cities, is keener to consolidate a secure Iraqi state friendly to Tehran.

The essence of Syria’s strategy is the destabilization of its surroundings to increase its own regional leverage. Yet this cuts in many contradictory ways. Iran cannot be happy with the prospect of a sectarian war in Iraq; Syria’s efforts in Iraq are also alienating the United States at a time when the Obama administration has engaged Bashar Assad to bring about a change in his regime’s behavior; Egypt is fed up with Syria’s and Iran’s encouragement of Hamas’ intransigence, which has neutralized Egypt’s role in inter-Palestinian reconciliation talks; Saudi Arabia and Egypt are unhappy with Syria’s obstructionism in Lebanon; and both Syria and Iran are eying each other with quiet suspicion to see which of them might open a full-scale dialogue with the United States before the other does.

No wonder Walid Jumblatt has seemed bewildered. As things appear today, he played his cards on Syria too soon, without any guarantees that Assad would come out on top in Lebanon. But who will come out on top? The lack of a simple answer is precisely why the government is not being formed. The country is a distillation of the Middle East’s contradictions, and rarely have these been as extensive as they are today.

Where does this leave us? There seems to be a general consensus that we should not expect a government until after the month of Ramadan ends. That’s a good excuse to dally. But then the road will be open to two possibilities: If the regional situation becomes clearer, particularly with respect to peace talks involving the Syrians, then we may well see a breakthrough, even if that will be preceded by strenuous efforts by Syria to ensure it has substantial sway over the Lebanese negotiating track.

If, on the other hand, the region is stuck where it is today, Lebanon will have to find a more practical solution to its political crisis. Pressure may build either for a reassessment of the idea of establishing a national-unity government or, given the diversity of interests in the region, to consider a different prime minister-designate. This would be a blow to a majority of voters in that Saad Hariri best embodies the March 14 victory last June.

The thing is, stalemate tends to impose new thinking, sensible or not. And for now the thinking is taking place not in Beirut but in foreign capitals, regardless of whether most Lebanese voters are happy with the results.