Permanent government, Lebanese style

The most amusing thing that happened last week was the doubt surrounding the future of the interior minister, Ziad Baroud, following his dispute with the director general of the Internal Security Forces, Ashraf Rifi. Some gullible souls actually worried that Baroud might resign.

The amusement came not from that fact that Baroud, competent and ambitious, was never likely to engage in such a career-ending move, but that even if he had decided to resign, it would have taken about half a dozen foreign governments to approve it.

That’s because our government “made in Lebanon” was really the child of a thousand fathers. There were, of course, the Americans and the French, but also the Saudis, the Syrians, the Iranians, the Turks, and to a lesser extent the Egyptians and the Qataris. So for Baroud, or anyone else, to walk out on his or her colleagues would reopen the infernal bazaar to new bargaining, until the international constellation of forces again aligns.

When in doubt, listen to Walid Jumblatt. The Druze leader recently remarked on Al-Manar television that he expected the current government to remain in place until the next parliamentary elections, in 2013. That seems an awful long time, particularly for so uninspiring a crew, but what Jumblatt was really saying was that the regional agreement over Lebanon would impose such stalemate.

In light of this, we’re entitled to reflect for a moment what the Independence Intifada of 2005 really brought us. It certainly didn’t provoke an intifada; or rather while it did force Syria to withdraw its soldiers, it failed to change the old order or push Lebanon into a durable phase of emancipation and sovereignty. On the contrary, instead of being tossed around by one state, Syria, the country’s future is now being decided by several states, few of which much care for each other.

However, as disappointing as this situation may appear when placed against the backdrop of the high ambitions almost five years ago, it does provide advantages. In the end, many fathers are better than one, particularly when that one father happened to be Bashar al-Assad.

Between 2004 and 2006, Lebanon benefited from a series of United Nations decisions that effectively placed the country under a form of international trusteeship. Security Council Resolution 1559 set the stage for the Syrian withdrawal and the disarming of Hezbollah; Resolution 1595 initiated an international investigation of Rafik al-Hariri’s assassination; and Resolution 1701 created a mechanism for the pacification of southern Lebanon after the 2006 July War.

That framework has been gradually eroded over the years. Hezbollah has resisted disarming, while the Lebanese political class, including leading members of the majority, has covered that refusal. The Hariri investigation has now become a tribunal, but there continue to be doubts about its outcome, given indications that the investigation stalled under the second commissioner, Serge Brammertz. As for Resolution 1701, it has been violated repeatedly by Hezbollah and Israel, but also Syria and Iran, with no penalties imposed on any of the parties.

Since Lebanon is a regional concern, and who can doubt that it is one, the country would benefit greatly from finding a complementary political framework to that of the United Nations, without abandoning the latter. The main objectives of this new form of trusteeship would be to guard as much as possible against a new war between Hezbollah and Israel, which would be especially devastating; to ensure that Syria does not return militarily to Lebanon, which the Assad regime would do in an instant if the conditions allowed it; and to gradually strengthen the authority of the state at the expense of domestic armed militias, particularly Hezbollah.

Syria and Iran would resist such measures, and in many cases they would do so successfully. However, the upshot of this give-and-take over Lebanon might often be compromises – between what the Saudis, Turks and Egyptians, with American and French support, seek, and what the Syrians and Iranians are willing to give up. These compromises, even if they perpetuate the status quo, might also, in certain ways, limit the ability of the Syrians and the Iranians, with Hezbollah, to bend the system their way, as they have continually tried doing in the past four years.

The reality is that far more states have an interest in stabilizing Lebanon than in destabilizing it, when it is mainly through instability that Syria and Iran sought to impose their preferences on the country in recent years. But Assad will always want more, exclusive control. To resist this, those Lebanese concerned with reinforcing their national sovereignty must think creatively of how to turn to their advantage the regional and international yearning to preserve a peaceful Lebanon.

Once more, Lebanon is the fruit of a convoluted compromise. That doesn’t say much about our ability to shape our own future, but it’s better than being solely a Syrian protectorate. It buys us some time, although it’s up to us, Lebanese, to determine what we do with that time.