The Ghosts of Martyrs Square

Interview by Nicholas Lowry of Michael Young regarding Young's latest book "Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle."

Michael Young, the opinion editor of the Daily Star and a contributor to this website, has written his first book, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle, which hits stores today. A mix of reportage as well as an introduction to Lebanon’s political culture, the book focuses on the turbulent period in Lebanese history stretching from the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces that same year, to 2009, which Young says marked Syria’s return. NOW Lebanon caught up with Young to talk about his new book, the events of the last four years, and Lebanon’s future.

First the obvious: What inspired you to write The Ghosts of Martyrs Square?

Michael Young: I always wanted to write something on Lebanon, and after 2005 this vague desire suddenly had the structures of a genuine story, and in many respects part of that story was developing as I was writing the book. I was lucky – or perhaps unlucky – that there was a neat finality to the story. It begins in 2005 with the assassination of Rafik Hariri and ends in 2009 with what I consider to be the return of Syrian domination over Lebanon – 2005, of course, being the year the Syrians withdrew their army. But also more generally the point of the book was to use the events between 2005 and 2009 to write an introduction to Lebanon’s political culture. It was always my idea that this book would be more than a narrative limited in time; it would also be a way of explaining how Lebanon functions.

It’s common in Lebanon and the West to bemoan Lebanon’s sectarian system, but you note a somewhat paradoxical connection between the sectarian balance and the inability of one group to dominate others, and the country’s relative openness and vibrancy.

Young: I think that Lebanon, though it is a dysfunctional place, is also in many respects a paradoxically liberal place. Why paradoxical? Because its liberalism is often based on illiberal institutions. Political leaders in Lebanon are not really liberals. The way the system functions, its reliance on sect, is not inherently liberal. Yet this mishmash of contradictions in the society has allowed spaces to open up where people can behave much more freely than in other parts of the Middle East.

My argument is quite simple: The biggest problem in the Middle East is the overbearing state that keeps citizens in line with the perpetual threat of violence, usually implicit. But in Lebanon, because of the sectarian structure, we were never able to develop such a state. Society is stronger than the state, in many respects. And, while this poses problems, it also has advantages, because it is much more difficult to impose an autocratic order. So Lebanon’s different sects tend to balance each other out, the system tends toward equilibrium, and consequently it’s more difficult for a single leader or group of leaders to control all aspects of life.

To what degree during the years of Syrian domination were certain spaces closed off, and to what degree did the Syrians respect those spaces?

Young: The Syrians allowed spaces in which society could maneuver, as they could not control everything. They essentially controlled the commanding heights of the system and the machinery of repression. They used this sparingly, and, when they did use it, they tended to operate through the Lebanese.

The Syrians to a certain extent respected [the] rules of the game... And one of the arguments of the book is that Bashar al-Assad, when he extended the mandate of [then-President] Emile Lahoud in 2004, made the mistake of not respecting those rules... These were in no way liberal rules, but there was always a certain understanding between the Syrian leadership and the Lebanese political class, and when Bashar failed to respect them, there was a revolt of part of the Lebanese political leadership that had once been allied with Syria.

What happened in 2005 did not begin as a popular movement; it only became that later on once Hariri was assassinated. But let me add that while the Syrians did respect certain rules, at least until 2004, what they also did was empty Lebanon’s political system of its meaning by eroding any sense of constitutional continuity.

As someone who has supported March 14, where do you think the coalition went wrong, what did it do right?

Young: One thing I must insist upon is that my book is not a March 14 interpretation of what happened in 2005, even if my sympathies for the objectives of March 14 are evident. On the contrary, what I want to argue once again is that what happened in 2005, while it was a popular revolt for about one month, began as a revolt of part of the Lebanese ruling class against Syria, in part because they felt the Syrians had betrayed them by extending Lahoud’s mandate. This was not a liberal revolt on their part; it was not a revolt for freedom and independence; it was a revolt because part of the ruling class felt Syria was trying to marginalize them.

When Hariri was assassinated in February that’s when people came out, when you had a genuine popular revolt, which, incidentally, some leaders in March 14 always wanted to ensure that they could control. We saw what happened in its aftermath: the divisive elections of 2005. When you look at Lebanese politics you have to understand the limitations on political action. The notion that what happened in February to March 2005 was a revolution against the established order was always, to my mind, very naïve.

Where did March 14 go wrong?

Young: March 14 was always a coalition of disparate forces that remained united through a common agreement that Syria had to leave Lebanon, then later through a common fear of a Syrian return to Lebanon in the aftermath of the Syrian military withdrawal in April 2005. The Syrians almost immediately began a process of trying to reassert their control over Lebanon even though there was an electoral alliance in 2005 between Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and two Syrian allies, Hezbollah and Amal. When that alliance broke down and Syria continued to try to reassert its domination, this forced March 14 to remain unified against a Syrian return.

March 14 was always a coalition of parallel interests. It was not a party, not a movement. It was a coalition of different forces that pragmatically came together against Syria. And last year, when Saad Hariri, at the urging of Saudi Arabia, was compelled to reconcile with Syria, March 14 began disintegrating. Suddenly the game changed. And that is why the end of the book is quite pessimistic. It’s a post-mortem of sorts. Syria is back politically, and I very much believe they intend to prepare the terrain for a military return.