Israel prefers a Syrian address in Lebanon

On Tuesday, Benjamin Netanyahu declared while on a visit to northern Israel that “Iran is trying to stir up war between Israel and Syria in order to cause tension in the region.” The Israeli prime minister went on to say, “We want stability and peace… We have no intention of attacking our neighbors, contrary to false rumors.”

It’s never a good idea to read too much into a single phrase, but Netanyahu’s comments uncovered an old train of thought in Israeli thinking. The Israelis have never seen any strategic contradiction between their aims and Syria’s aims in Lebanon, and this for over three decades, even after the withdrawal of Syrian soldiers in 2005.

For Israel, Lebanon was more predictable when the Syrians were around. Syrian and Israeli interests only rarely came into conflict. One of the times they did was in 1982, when Israel tried to break the Lebanese status quo to its advantage by expelling the Palestinians and bringing to power Bachir Gemayel. That scheme ended in success, when Yasser Arafat was expelled from Beirut, and failure when Gemayel was assassinated and Lebanon’s parliament failed later to ratify the May 17 Accord. The Israelis opted to return to the old ways, withdrawing in 1985 to a so-called “security zone” in southern Lebanon and allowing Syria to impose its hegemony everywhere else.

After 1990, when the cycle of Lebanese wars ended, the Israelis continued to accept a Pax Syriana in Lebanon, even though during that period Syria encouraged Hezbollah to arm and grow.

After their withdrawal in 2000, the Israelis went on believing that the Syrian presence was a stabilizing factor. Hezbollah’s sporadic attacks in the Shebaa Farms area were deemed tolerable, even if an alleged Palestinian base in Syria was the target of Israeli air attack in October 2003. However, any crossing of the “red lines,” whether by Israel or Syria, remained part of a subtle balancing game both sides accepted.

Then came 2005 and the Independence Intifada that led Syria to remove its army from Lebanon. While the Israelis never took a public stance on what had happened, from their subsequent statements and behavior it is probably fair to say that they didn’t like the fact that Hezbollah emerged as the most powerful military force in the country, with no Syrian tutelage to control the party. Israel always found it preferable to have a Syrian address in Lebanon.

In other words, Syria was not only the party with which Israel could conclude unwritten understandings over Lebanon, it was the party that could be held accountable if these understandings were transgressed. Netanyahu’s warning that Israel did not want to involve itself in a war with Syria on Iran’s behalf reaffirmed that principle and the rationale underlining it: Better Syria in Lebanon than Iran.

Syria never accepted its Lebanese military withdrawal. I’ve argued that for its president, Bashar al-Assad, the prime objective in the coming years is to reverse what happened in 2005 and return his tanks to Lebanon. But several conditions are needed for him to do so: Arab acceptance, Israeli approval and an American green light.

Arab acquiescence, given the ongoing fear of Iran in the region and its extensions such as Hezbollah, may be a foregone conclusion. Israeli consent, if the proper conditions are met, may be easier than we imagine, hence the importance of statements like Netanyahu’s. That would leave the United States, which initially would resist a Syrian redeployment in Lebanon. But before going too far along that path, consider a scenario that might dilute American disapproval.

Imagine if there is a new war between Lebanon and Israel, and this time Hezbollah manages to put up a tough fight for longer than it did in 2006. Having been armed with more advanced Syrian weapons, including effective anti-aircraft missiles and longer range rockets, the party might be able to turn a new war into a serious brawl. Israel’s reaction would be to destroy Lebanon far more extensively than it did four years ago, including its economic infrastructure.

In that case, the Lebanese state and government would be discredited, impoverished, humiliated, and would have to face the inevitable angry public backlash head on. United Nations resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, would effectively be rendered null and void. Regionally, the Arabs, but also Israel, would regard Hezbollah as a major menace (thanks to Syrian efforts to strengthen the party militarily and ensure it remained a menace). Washington, its attentions elsewhere, could be less inclined to say no if there is a regional consensus, one that the Lebanese support either by conviction or through intimidation, in favor of a Syrian comeback.

Damascus would, of course, market this as a means of stabilizing Lebanon and keeping an eye on Hezbollah, to which it would, nonetheless, give a wide margin of maneuver, since only a Hezbollah perceived as dangerous justifies a Syrian presence in Lebanon.

It’s time to think outside the box on Syrian intentions, and Netanyahu’s remarks help us to do just that. Bashar al-Assad may or may not succeed in bringing his army this side of our border with Syria. But if obstacles there are to such an endeavor, they almost certainly do not lie in Arab capitals or, for that matter, in Tel Aviv.