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The Israeli campaign in Gaza is ongoing, so it may be premature to designate winners and losers just yet. However, from the perspective of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the fighting until now has allowed both to attain a number of political and military objectives at a crucial time in inter-Palestinian relations.
The latest Gaza war has been very different from previous ones by virtue of the weapons the Palestinian groups have deployed. Whereas Hamas and Islamic Jihad mainly bombed Israeli localities near the Strip in the past (because their weapons didn’t allow otherwise), today they have the capability of targeting Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Plainly, a significant rearmament effort took place during the years of chaos in Egypt after January 2011, with Iran apparently the main supplier. Syrian long-range M302 rockets have also made their way into Gaza, probably through Iranian or Hezbollah channels, though that remains to be confirmed.
This signals that Hamas has rebuilt its relationship with Iran since the two parted ways over the conflict in Syria. Hamas had an interest in this. It has lost much revenue over the past year, since the removal of Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi, because the authorities in Cairo (effectively Egypt’s military) closed most of the smuggling tunnels into Gaza. These tunnels earned Hamas some $200 million annually in tax revenues.
The current conflict shows Iran the value of its Palestinian ally while allowing it to test its weaponry. Though Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system has been successful in shooting down longer range rockets, Hamas’s implicit message is that as the quality of its weapons improves, Israel’s success rate in protecting its cities will decline and casualty rates will rise.
That may be true or it may not be. With Abdel Fattah al-Sisi now president of Egypt, Hamas’s ability to import better arms will continue to be hindered. However, for Hamas the question is one of perception. The movement saw its relative power decline in recent months, and if it can show, as it has, that its military capabilities have improved, that goes a long way toward reversing the appearance of growing ineffectiveness.
In fact, Hamas sees Gaza as a means of underscoring the political marginalization of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. With the failure of the American-sponsored “peace process” evident to everyone, Abbas’s credibility has been severely damaged. Nor have Palestinians, angry as they are with Israel’s continued refusal to compromise over its settlements, regarded Abbas’s collaboration with Israel favorably.
While Hamas may not bring Palestinians many gains by launching rockets at Israel, the movement’s actions in recent days contrast sharply with Abbas’s futility. Hamas is seen as having retaliated for the killing of a Palestinian youth (and may have provoked that killing if indeed it was behind the murder of three Israeli teenagers). It forced Israelis everywhere to flee by bringing the war to their doorsteps. This has resonance with a Palestinian population suffering daily from Israel’s occupation.
It is conceivable that, in the long term, the latest round in Gaza will help impose new thinking in Israel. There is a line of reasoning that the only way to make Israelis accept a new template for dealing with the Palestinians is to show them that their occupation will only bring escalating risks. Therefore, with Israeli cities now under attack, the only long-term solution with the Palestinians is to end the occupation and make peace.
That may be true, but neither Hamas nor the Israeli government has shown much inclination to embrace that logic. Hamas may have changed with regard to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but it still refuses to recognize Israel. This means that it does not really see the Gaza conflict as part of a wider process of negotiations leading to an eventual settlement, while its efforts to undermine Abbas, who can talk to the Israelis, reduce the likelihood of a successful negotiating track.
For now, Hamas’s priorities appear to be less ambitious: to show how vulnerable Israel has become; to reinforce its ties with Iran, restoring a source of financing and improved weaponry; and to show how irrelevant Abbas and Fatah are, allowing Hamas to eventually take control of the Palestinian national movement.
The fact is that Israel has few means to respond to this. Israel’s international standing has taken a hit in recent years, with its right-wing government widely viewed as unwilling to make any concessions for peace. At the same time, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offers no alternative project out of the deadlock, even as his assumption that there is a military solution to the Hamas problem is rejected even in Israel.
In other words, Hamas benefits from the political bankruptcy of Israel’s government. Netanyahu may order his troops into Gaza in the coming days, but even if he does, then what? Holding on to the territory is hardly an ideal option, while destroying buildings and then leaving will only ensure more of what we have today.
If Israel’s short-term goal is to push the international community to isolate Hamas, then this has probably failed. Most governments, even the Obama administration, have accepted Hamas in a Palestinian unity cabinet. If the party emerges stronger after Gaza, many governments will not want to ignore it. In other words, Netanyahu’s strategy will have backfired.
We will see in the coming days if Hamas’s sense of accomplishment is justified. The movement has learned from Hezbollah that merely surviving an Israeli onslaught can be played up as a victory. As for Netanyahu, what does he need to do short of destroying Hamas to declare an Israeli victory? It’s not at all clear. That’s why Hamas feels so confident.
The latest Gaza war has been very different from previous ones by virtue of the weapons the Palestinian groups have deployed. Whereas Hamas and Islamic Jihad mainly bombed Israeli localities near the Strip in the past (because their weapons didn’t allow otherwise), today they have the capability of targeting Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Plainly, a significant rearmament effort took place during the years of chaos in Egypt after January 2011, with Iran apparently the main supplier. Syrian long-range M302 rockets have also made their way into Gaza, probably through Iranian or Hezbollah channels, though that remains to be confirmed.
This signals that Hamas has rebuilt its relationship with Iran since the two parted ways over the conflict in Syria. Hamas had an interest in this. It has lost much revenue over the past year, since the removal of Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi, because the authorities in Cairo (effectively Egypt’s military) closed most of the smuggling tunnels into Gaza. These tunnels earned Hamas some $200 million annually in tax revenues.
The current conflict shows Iran the value of its Palestinian ally while allowing it to test its weaponry. Though Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system has been successful in shooting down longer range rockets, Hamas’s implicit message is that as the quality of its weapons improves, Israel’s success rate in protecting its cities will decline and casualty rates will rise.
That may be true or it may not be. With Abdel Fattah al-Sisi now president of Egypt, Hamas’s ability to import better arms will continue to be hindered. However, for Hamas the question is one of perception. The movement saw its relative power decline in recent months, and if it can show, as it has, that its military capabilities have improved, that goes a long way toward reversing the appearance of growing ineffectiveness.
In fact, Hamas sees Gaza as a means of underscoring the political marginalization of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. With the failure of the American-sponsored “peace process” evident to everyone, Abbas’s credibility has been severely damaged. Nor have Palestinians, angry as they are with Israel’s continued refusal to compromise over its settlements, regarded Abbas’s collaboration with Israel favorably.
While Hamas may not bring Palestinians many gains by launching rockets at Israel, the movement’s actions in recent days contrast sharply with Abbas’s futility. Hamas is seen as having retaliated for the killing of a Palestinian youth (and may have provoked that killing if indeed it was behind the murder of three Israeli teenagers). It forced Israelis everywhere to flee by bringing the war to their doorsteps. This has resonance with a Palestinian population suffering daily from Israel’s occupation.
It is conceivable that, in the long term, the latest round in Gaza will help impose new thinking in Israel. There is a line of reasoning that the only way to make Israelis accept a new template for dealing with the Palestinians is to show them that their occupation will only bring escalating risks. Therefore, with Israeli cities now under attack, the only long-term solution with the Palestinians is to end the occupation and make peace.
That may be true, but neither Hamas nor the Israeli government has shown much inclination to embrace that logic. Hamas may have changed with regard to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but it still refuses to recognize Israel. This means that it does not really see the Gaza conflict as part of a wider process of negotiations leading to an eventual settlement, while its efforts to undermine Abbas, who can talk to the Israelis, reduce the likelihood of a successful negotiating track.
For now, Hamas’s priorities appear to be less ambitious: to show how vulnerable Israel has become; to reinforce its ties with Iran, restoring a source of financing and improved weaponry; and to show how irrelevant Abbas and Fatah are, allowing Hamas to eventually take control of the Palestinian national movement.
The fact is that Israel has few means to respond to this. Israel’s international standing has taken a hit in recent years, with its right-wing government widely viewed as unwilling to make any concessions for peace. At the same time, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offers no alternative project out of the deadlock, even as his assumption that there is a military solution to the Hamas problem is rejected even in Israel.
In other words, Hamas benefits from the political bankruptcy of Israel’s government. Netanyahu may order his troops into Gaza in the coming days, but even if he does, then what? Holding on to the territory is hardly an ideal option, while destroying buildings and then leaving will only ensure more of what we have today.
If Israel’s short-term goal is to push the international community to isolate Hamas, then this has probably failed. Most governments, even the Obama administration, have accepted Hamas in a Palestinian unity cabinet. If the party emerges stronger after Gaza, many governments will not want to ignore it. In other words, Netanyahu’s strategy will have backfired.
We will see in the coming days if Hamas’s sense of accomplishment is justified. The movement has learned from Hezbollah that merely surviving an Israeli onslaught can be played up as a victory. As for Netanyahu, what does he need to do short of destroying Hamas to declare an Israeli victory? It’s not at all clear. That’s why Hamas feels so confident.
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