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You knew it was coming the moment a Jordanian pilot was burned alive by the Islamic State (ISIS). Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called on Amman to work with Syria in fighting “against terrorism represented by the organization Daesh and the Nusra Front ... and other terrorist organizations associated with them in Syria and the region.”
As Martin Chulov reminded us in an article on the establishment of ISIS, published in The Guardian last December, it was Assad’s regime that first allowed jihadis to expand and use Syria as a passageway to enter Iraq to fight Americans and murder Iraqis. At two secret 2009 meetings in Zabadani, Syria, in which the Iraqi government managed to insert a spy, the Syrians coordinated with Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi Baathists as well as senior figures in Al-Qaeda in Iraq to destabilize the American-backed Iraqi order.
A similar story has been told about the rise of ISIS, the successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. When the group emerged on the Syrian scene in 2013 and 2014, there were many accounts of how it had coordinated, usually implicitly, with the Syrian regime. One report quoted an ISIS combatant as saying that he and his comrades knew that they would not be attacked by Syrian aircraft.
The Assad regime’s rationale was cynical, though straightforward. If the extremists gained in strength at the expense of the more moderate opposition, the regime would soon be viewed as a bulwark against jihadism and the international community would be more wary of calling for regime change in Syria. That is one reason why the regime purchased oil from ISIS — perhaps satisfying its own demand for fuel, but also helping to fill the group’s coffers.
If anyone is under the impression that Assad’s transparently hypocritical offer to collaborate in the fight against the jihadist groups is not working, look again. The Obama administration has indicated that it is on the same side as Iran in the battle against ISIS. In a letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the president also reassured the Iranian leader that coalition airstrikes in Syria would not target the Syrian regime.
There have also been reports in Beirut that Paris was willing to resume a dialogue with Syria over terrorism after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January. One Lebanese parliamentarian told me a few weeks ago that a French envoy had been sent to Damascus in this regard. The story remains unconfirmed and there have been no separate indications since then that it is accurate, but such reactions by Western governments do not seem so far-fetched.
What is remarkable is how Assad has been allowed to put himself in this position, where he is once again being viewed as an ally in extinguishing the very fires his own regime helped spread. This was the classical approach of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who exported instability to the region in such a way as to make Syria an indispensible partner in quelling its worst repercussions.
Among those Americans calling for cooperation with Assad is Leslie Gelb, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, an avowed realist who literally delights in making proposals that most people would shrink from making. In a recent article for The Daily Beast, Gelb wrote that while Assad was indeed responsible for massacring his own population, “[t]he U.S. must have effective working arrangements with Syria and Iran to check and defeat the Islamic State. There is no other way.”
Views such as these are controversial, but they seem to have the benefit of lighting a clear, albeit unpopular, path. America has a soft spot for hardnosed pragmatists, and Gelb plays that role well. The only problem is that he fails to really address a difficulty at the heart of his analysis: For as long as Assad remains in office, the appeal and mobilization potential of jihadist groups will remain high. The man with whom Gelb wants Washington to collaborate is a powerful stimulus for the jihad Gelb wants to defeat.
But don’t expect Assad to enlighten anyone. His sinister game is working and the dupes are plentiful. Lost amid the chaos of the Middle East, Western governments are resorting to the old habits with which they are familiar. The Assads were always on hand to help resolve terrorism problems and there are plenty of useful idiots around to recommend returning to that period.
But the price Assad will demand will be onerous. He will want, of course, guarantees assuring his political survival; the reopening of embassies in Damascus; measures against his regional enemies who back opposition groups. The list will be long, even if what is implemented is limited. Assad knows things have changed in the maelstrom created by ISIS. What happens to him is no longer a priority, particularly in Barack Obama’s White House.
One has to hand it to Assad and his Iranian and Russian backers. They sensed early on that the Western countries could be manipulated. They measured Obama up, and saw that the president was a lightweight. With the focus on a problem Assad helped create, he can retain power and persuade everybody that he’s the good guy. The dumber fishes will bite first.
As Martin Chulov reminded us in an article on the establishment of ISIS, published in The Guardian last December, it was Assad’s regime that first allowed jihadis to expand and use Syria as a passageway to enter Iraq to fight Americans and murder Iraqis. At two secret 2009 meetings in Zabadani, Syria, in which the Iraqi government managed to insert a spy, the Syrians coordinated with Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi Baathists as well as senior figures in Al-Qaeda in Iraq to destabilize the American-backed Iraqi order.
A similar story has been told about the rise of ISIS, the successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. When the group emerged on the Syrian scene in 2013 and 2014, there were many accounts of how it had coordinated, usually implicitly, with the Syrian regime. One report quoted an ISIS combatant as saying that he and his comrades knew that they would not be attacked by Syrian aircraft.
The Assad regime’s rationale was cynical, though straightforward. If the extremists gained in strength at the expense of the more moderate opposition, the regime would soon be viewed as a bulwark against jihadism and the international community would be more wary of calling for regime change in Syria. That is one reason why the regime purchased oil from ISIS — perhaps satisfying its own demand for fuel, but also helping to fill the group’s coffers.
If anyone is under the impression that Assad’s transparently hypocritical offer to collaborate in the fight against the jihadist groups is not working, look again. The Obama administration has indicated that it is on the same side as Iran in the battle against ISIS. In a letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the president also reassured the Iranian leader that coalition airstrikes in Syria would not target the Syrian regime.
There have also been reports in Beirut that Paris was willing to resume a dialogue with Syria over terrorism after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January. One Lebanese parliamentarian told me a few weeks ago that a French envoy had been sent to Damascus in this regard. The story remains unconfirmed and there have been no separate indications since then that it is accurate, but such reactions by Western governments do not seem so far-fetched.
What is remarkable is how Assad has been allowed to put himself in this position, where he is once again being viewed as an ally in extinguishing the very fires his own regime helped spread. This was the classical approach of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who exported instability to the region in such a way as to make Syria an indispensible partner in quelling its worst repercussions.
Among those Americans calling for cooperation with Assad is Leslie Gelb, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, an avowed realist who literally delights in making proposals that most people would shrink from making. In a recent article for The Daily Beast, Gelb wrote that while Assad was indeed responsible for massacring his own population, “[t]he U.S. must have effective working arrangements with Syria and Iran to check and defeat the Islamic State. There is no other way.”
Views such as these are controversial, but they seem to have the benefit of lighting a clear, albeit unpopular, path. America has a soft spot for hardnosed pragmatists, and Gelb plays that role well. The only problem is that he fails to really address a difficulty at the heart of his analysis: For as long as Assad remains in office, the appeal and mobilization potential of jihadist groups will remain high. The man with whom Gelb wants Washington to collaborate is a powerful stimulus for the jihad Gelb wants to defeat.
But don’t expect Assad to enlighten anyone. His sinister game is working and the dupes are plentiful. Lost amid the chaos of the Middle East, Western governments are resorting to the old habits with which they are familiar. The Assads were always on hand to help resolve terrorism problems and there are plenty of useful idiots around to recommend returning to that period.
But the price Assad will demand will be onerous. He will want, of course, guarantees assuring his political survival; the reopening of embassies in Damascus; measures against his regional enemies who back opposition groups. The list will be long, even if what is implemented is limited. Assad knows things have changed in the maelstrom created by ISIS. What happens to him is no longer a priority, particularly in Barack Obama’s White House.
One has to hand it to Assad and his Iranian and Russian backers. They sensed early on that the Western countries could be manipulated. They measured Obama up, and saw that the president was a lightweight. With the focus on a problem Assad helped create, he can retain power and persuade everybody that he’s the good guy. The dumber fishes will bite first.
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