Murderers' Makeover

In the annals of Western cretinism on Syria, I reserve a special place for one Olivia Sterns. The country has gotten a bad rap, she wrote in an article last May, and President Obama should recognize it has a softer side. "One look at the country's first lady Asma al-Assad should help prove so to disbelievers. The British-born, jeans-wearing wife of the current President Bashar represents a radically more modern regime."

But what about the killing of Lebanon's former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, certainly the work of Syria's radically more modern regime? This was not the doing of "President Bashar," Sterns implied in a passage soggy with obfuscation: "Presently, the dark days of the reign of Bashar's father, President Hafez al-Assad, appear long gone. A United Nations tribunal of [sic] the 2005 assassination of … Hariri is now underway. That investigation should go a long way to exposing the remaining loyalist elements and corruption in the current regime."

Had Sterns been less besotted with the Assads, she might have learned something about the system they preside over. Those who have done so know the president could not possibly have avoided being involved in Hariri's elimination, even if his men implicated others to spread the blame and impose silence. The Assad regime is a centralized, hierarchical, family-led affair. It allows no room but for those at the very top to take so perilous a decision as removing someone of Hariri's stature. None but Assad's authority could have mobilized the vast resources used in the Hariri conspiracy--or triggered the (botched) cover-up afterward.

However, Sterns was right in one regard: Bashar Assad is becoming respectable again, and it's not just because his wife wears jeans. Several factors are contributing to make the Syrian leader palatable.

The first is that the United Nations-led investigation of the Hariri murder appears to be going nowhere. After four years, not a single suspect remains in custody and the investigation process, now transformed into a trial process being held in a suburb of The Hague, has yet to come out with formal indictments. We may have something within the next six months, but don't hold your breath.

That wasn't always the case. There were palpable signs of progress during the early months of the U.N. investigation in late 2005, when it was headed by the German judge Detlev Mehlis. In his first report (and in my own subsequent conversations with him), Mehlis had no doubt that Syria was behind Hariri's killing. I would later learn, though not from Mehlis himself, that he was preparing to arrest Syrian intelligence officers. However, because of time constraints before his departure from Lebanon, Mehlis had left that step to his Belgian successor, Serge Brammertz.

In January 2008 I flew to Berlin to interview Mehlis, his first major statement on the Hariri case since returning home. Brammertz had ended his term without arresting anyone, despite Mehlis' intentions, and the German felt he could legitimately express doubts about his successor's work. "I haven't seen a word in his reports during the past two years confirming that he has moved forward," Mehlis told me.

This was a devastating indictment, one I confirmed through several other sources. I would later hear that Brammertz had told Lebanese colleagues that he had not added much to his file, but expected that within a year the investigation would be concluded. The Lebanese were confused. If there was not much new, how could the Belgian set so precise a deadline?

It has been 18 months since Brammertz's departure, and still no accusations have come down. His successor, Daniel Bellemare, continues his inquiry as prosecutor of the Hariri tribunal, which began operating last March. He may find something, but it's hard to believe that the years of relative idleness under Brammertz have not exacted a serious toll. The Belgian needed to conduct a police investigation when he arrived in Beirut, but instead he reportedly replaced many of his investigators with analysts. Bellemare reversed course, but with so little visibly in hand, it's politics that may ultimately determine the trial's success or failure.

The regional and international political situation has changed since 2005. Officially, everyone supports the Hariri tribunal, but it is a low priority. Syria's Arab adversaries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have mended their ties with Damascus of late, largely to bolster Arab unity against a resurgent Iran. Europe and the U.S. are also in the midst of engaging Assad's regime, and Barack Obama even made this one of his Mideastern priorities. Recently, the U.S. decided to resend an ambassador to Syria, the previous one having been withdrawn after Hariri's assassination. Petitioners are lining up urging Syria to play ball on Iran or Arab-Israeli peace. Nobody wants the Hariri tribunal to ruin things. International tribunals, like most international institutions, easily atrophy when governments allow them to die.

Even in Lebanon, the situation is different. Saad Hariri, Rafiq's son, is prime minister-designate following elections in June. He will doubtless visit Syria after forming a government. His Saudi sponsors are pushing him in that direction, but they don't need to: No Lebanese head of government can readily bypass the Syrians. Understanding these dynamics, other Lebanese opponents of Syria are also preparing to take the road to Damascus, or Canossa. Most prominent among these is the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who once called Assad a "monkey".

Detlev Mehlis told me that upon taking over the Hariri investigation, he met with then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. He "made it clear to me that he did not want another trouble spot," the German recalled. The truth about who killed Rafiq Hariri is indeed troublesome to many states. Don't be surprised, then, if Syria's leaders get away with murder.