Understanding the Wiam Wahhab factor

There is something somewhat reassuring in watching the former Minister Wiam Wahhab meet March 14 or opposition politicians on Syria’s behalf. If he is the best the Syrians have, then this only confirms how weak Damascus has become in Lebanon.

That doesn’t mean that the Assad regime cannot order people killed, plant bombs or obstruct political progress. Its decline in Lebanon remains a relative concept. However, Syria has few means to build a sympathetic order in the country; and even when it did have the means, during its military presence, it was unable to establish enduring institutions of hegemony. Once the Syrian army left Lebanon, the control exercised by Damascus disintegrated into a lower form of intimidation carrying within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The more brutal Syria’s actions, the greater became the momentum in Lebanon to break free from Syria.

Contrast this with Iran. Though the Iranians never sought to control Lebanon before 2005, mainly because their ally Syria was in charge, they did create lasting institutions – the most significant one being Hezbollah. Iran anchored Hezbollah in the Lebanese Shia reality, so that the party’s future became entwined with that of the community, and vice versa.

The Iranians also understood early on the importance of integrating Hezbollah and its supporters into state institutions, in order to shield the party. For example, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei granted Hezbollah permission to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections. This was the traditional Iranian proclivity for the state talking, in contrast to the behavior of a Syrian regime that has always been about abusing the state and transforming it into the fiefdom and cash cow of the ruling elite.

Take the fate of Sleiman Franjieh, once among Syria’s closest allies. It is no coincidence that he is today embracing the notion of reconciliation with his former Christian adversaries. The reality is that Franjieh, although he narrowly won the elections in Zgharta, has realized the extent to which his power has deteriorated. To his north he is surrounded by predominantly Sunni pro-Hariri districts; and in Batroun, Koura, and Bcharre, those in control are from the March 14 majority, most significantly his main northern rival, Samir Geagea.

For as long as Syria was in Lebanon, Franjieh’s position was protected. But with them gone he has had to face the mood of a society far less inclined to welcome the actions of his allies Syria and Iran. Inter-Christian reconciliation is his only real option to break out of his isolation. As for Franjieh’s recent decision to move to a residence nearer to Beirut, this shows that he grasps the extent to which the political center of gravity has shifted to the capital, well away from Damascus.

Oddly enough, one of Syria’s bitterest enemies between 2005 and 2009 is also facing the reality of what Syria’s growing weakness means. Like Franjieh, Walid Jumblatt was once a prime beneficiary of the Syrian system in Lebanon. His political weight was magnified by the fact that he retained a privileged position in Damascus. He revolted against the Syrians when that position was threatened – following Bashar Assad’s effort to renew the mandate of Emile Lahoud, whom the traditional leaders saw as a Syrian tool to undermine their political authority. Jumblatt won out when the Syrians withdrew, but he also saw that he would now have to fight twice as hard to retain his predominance, because there no longer was someone to safeguard his interests.

Today, Jumblatt is returning to the Syrian fold. However, things are different than before. The Druze leader can afford to move closer to Damascus precisely because he understands that Syrian power has eroded. Other than public words of remorse for what he said about the Syrian regime in recent years, Jumblatt has relatively little to surrender. He can point to the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation to justify his shift, and can also plainly see that because Syria’s army is not in Lebanon, Assad has less of a hold over the country, therefore over Jumblatt himself.

Of course, the Syrians can kill Jumblatt, but at this stage that seems a waste. The Druze leader is of more use alive. They know that he can help Syria restore some of its depleted resources and will work against the Special Tribunal. His death would be deeply destabilizing, would harm Syria’s opening to the United States, and would precipitate a Shia-Druze confrontation that Iran and Hezbollah do not welcome.

Therefore, there are limits even to Syria’s power of the bomb. It’s never a good idea to underestimate Damascus, but it would also be a mistake to assume that it can return to what it had in Lebanon before 2005. Ironically, among those most resistant to a full Syrian restoration is Hezbollah, with Iran behind it. Hezbollah sees no advantages in allowing Bashar Assad to use containment of the Shia party as a strong card in his negotiations with the West. The party will assist Syria, but no more.

That 29 years of Syrian rule should end up with Damascus being represented most forcefully by Wiam Wahhab means something. The mountain has given birth to a mouse. That’s what it means.