Syria’s legacy in Lebanon proves trivial

It may have been a coincidence, but I was offering condolences on Sunday when the former head of the General Security directorate, Jamil al-Sayyed, read his irate statement to the media. This made me think (as has the NOW Lebanon poll this week): Was Sayyed’s tirade a sign of his political resurrection or the opening lines of a political obituary?

We’ve come a long way since Sayyed declared, before the parliamentary elections, that he would accept a cabinet portfolio if asked. Even though the government has yet to be formed, we can be fairly certain that the general will not be in it. From the moment Sayyed left prison in April along with his three colleagues, it was plain that he had exited into a very different political climate than the one prevailing during his last months in office four years ago. Instead of Syria, it was Hezbollah that dominated his onetime political ecosystem, that handled Sayyed upon his release, and that took the lead in televising his appearance last weekend.

From being an initiator of messages, Sayyed appears to have become a transmitter of messages – none more surprising than the comments he addressed at Michel Sleiman. Sayyed told the president that he looked nothing like the man who had once been army commander, and that it was better for him to leave office than to succumb to the attractions of the Baabda Palace. “It is shameful Mr. President for them to render you a hostage and to place you between what is right and what is wrong,” Sayyed said. The word “right” was a warning – Syrian but also backed by Hezbollah – that the opposition was displeased with how the president is building a partnership with Prime Minister-elect Saad Hariri.

However, all this told us was that Syria and its allies are fighting a hard battle against the natural reflexes of the Lebanese system. When they were in Lebanon, the Syrians divided and ruled at will. They oversaw an order in which they could consistently play the president, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament off against each other. With their army gone, the Syrians are having trouble replicating that. All they can do is threaten, kill and mobilize peons to disseminate their political line – people like Wiam Wahhab, Nasser Qandil, whoever Syria has named to head the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and others. For Sayyed, a man with considerable authority once, to now find himself circulating among that congregation of misfits shows how greatly things have changed.

This leads to a broader question: Why is it that Syria, despite a 29-year military presence in Lebanon, was never able to leave behind enduring structures of hegemony? Not that we’re complaining; but the reality is that the Assad regime is almost solely reliant on its ability to use violence and extortion to get its way in the country. It has no power of persuasion beyond that, its allies are anemic, its popularity universally low, even among its Shia partners, and its deep contempt for the Lebanese remains an obstacle to fruitful exchange. It has named an ambassador in Beirut who, when he’s actually in the city, visits with has-beens, affirming how indisposed Syria is to recognizing Lebanon as a diplomatic equal.

Iran, in contrast, saw a brief opening in 1982 to create something more durable, and gradually built up Hezbollah into what it is today, anchoring it in the Shia community (or at least that part of the community not under Syrian orders), and to an extent the state. The Iranians are, alas, builders of institutions, while the Syrians have never seen an institution they have not tried to undermine, ruin and loot. Perhaps it’s the Iranians’ imperial past that makes them what they are, whereas Syria’s regime rests upon foundations created by rural upstarts. Or maybe not. But in the annals of political control, rarely has a state been given as much leeway internationally to rule over a country as Syria was given to rule over Lebanon, only to leave behind such an inconsequential legacy.

Political structures built solely on fear and corruption don’t survive once the intimidation ends. You can say many things about Jamil al-Sayyed, but in his day he could be a subtle enforcer of Syrian diktats. However, his performance on Sunday, in its utter lack of subtlety, showed what his sponsors and allies have reduced him to, and what they themselves have been reduced to. Once the cameras were turned off, it was difficult to interpret the message. Sayyed was angry, so presumably the Syrians were. But then what? By attacking everybody in unison, Sayyed also seemed to attack no one in particular. Those targeted by him became stronger in their solidarity and patiently waited until the storm in a teacup blew over.

So is that a sign of greater power or greater weakness? Time will tell of course. Sayyed has a great deal of information, and may decide to impart some of it. Then again he knows that the Hariri tribunal still has him in its sights, so the general may prefer caution. But nothing Sayyed does will reverse the fact that Syria is having trouble convincing everyone that it has a natural right to govern Lebanon again. Sayyed’s bitterness may have only been a façade for Syrian frustration.