Will a new cabinet cost Lebanon its sovereignty?

What occurred in Jeddah on Wednesday? Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, traveled to the Saudi city for a university inauguration, also attended by outgoing Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The prime minister-elect, Saad Hariri, happened to be in the kingdom. Reports suggested that Turkey had played a significant role in the visit. Who met whom? What was discussed? Are we near a breakthrough on the cabinet’s formation?

We shall soon see. It was clear from the outset that the obstacles to the formation of the government had very little to do with the appointment of Gebran Bassil as a minister. The problem was the continuation of Saudi-Syrian divergences over Lebanon. This was the contention of the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, and of Walid Jumblatt, newfound friends. They were right, even if one might disagree with either or both of them on the practical consequences of their conclusion.

The question the Lebanese are asking is what political price the Saudis will pay to purchase Syrian flexibility on the government. When Saad Hariri began putting one together weeks ago, the United States and Egypt blocked a Syrian effort to bring the prime minister-designate to Damascus before a ministerial lineup was finalized. Hariri himself, reluctant to be pushed into the arms of his father’s killers, visited Cairo to gain Egyptian reinforcement. Press reports at the time said that Syria sought to sponsor inter-Lebanese reconciliation, as Qatar did last year. Its failure to achieve this aim led to the cancellation of a visit to Damascus by King Abdullah.

Since then several things have changed in the region. The Saudi priority remains the containment of Iran, one reason why the kingdom hoped that a rapprochement with Syria would help break the Assad regime away from Tehran. But the situation today is even more complicated. In October, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with Germany, will begin discussions in Geneva with Iran on its nuclear program. At the same time, the priority of the United States in Iraq is disengagement, leading the Obama administration to advocate an Iraqi-Syrian dialogue, even though US officials admit that Syria continues to allow jihadists through its territory on their way to Iraq.

As Saudi Arabia watches the Americans cutting back their involvement in Iraq while simultaneously striving to reconcile Damascus with Baghdad to facilitate their departure, the kingdom’s leadership may have concluded three things: that once the US is gone from Iraq, Saudi Arabia will be on its own in facing a Shia-dominated, oil-rich state to its north, as well as a resurgent Iran that already holds considerable leverage in the Gulf.

Second, that it makes little sense for the kingdom to allow its dispute with Syria to fester, since the Assad regime can be of use in destabilizing Iraq, thereby preventing the consolidation of a Shia-led order there, particularly one over which Iran has great influence.

And third, that if the Saudis and the Syrians are to improve their relationship, it might be necessary to give Syria much more of what it seeks, namely a decisive political say in Lebanon. Left unsaid in that equation is that Iran may disapprove, since Lebanon is much more an Iranian card today, thanks to Tehran’s control over Hezbollah, than it is a Syrian one. But the flip side of that implicit Iranian rebuff is that Saudi Arabia, in order to contain Iran and Hezbollah, may feel that the best way to do so is through some form of Syrian return to Lebanon.

If that is indeed what the Saudis are thinking, which remains to be proven, we may face difficult times ahead. On the other hand the kingdom is sensitive to the worries in Washington and Cairo. Up to now nothing indicates that the Obama administration has agreed to surrender Lebanon to Syria in order to thwart Iran. Nor that Egypt intends to give Assad a break in Lebanon, when Syria has persistently blocked a breakthrough in Egyptian-sponsored inter-Palestinian talks in Cairo.

However, how long will that last? If Barack Obama moves toward benign neglect in the broader Middle East, because he just cannot get anything done in the region, then Lebanon will fall even lower on the American priorities list. That’s what Syria is banking on. As for Egypt, its ability to derail a Syrian-Saudi rapprochement is limited, while Washington’s abandonment of the peace process if it continues to go nowhere will further undermine Cairo’s importance. Syria is banking on that as well.

Lebanon may have a government sooner rather than later. The real issue, however, is whether the government will be truly Lebanese, or merely a compromise between different regional states now managing their sundry alliances and animosities. The near-certainty is that it will be the second, driving another nail into the coffin of our emancipation.